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Abstract 
 
Essays in Corporate Governance 
Jared I. Wilson 
 
 
 
 
Corporate governance examines the mechanisms through which managers and 
directors are incentivized to act in the best interests of shareholders.  The three essays of 
this dissertation focus on internal and external control mechanisms in the CEO and director 
labor markets and their effectiveness in aligning the interests of mangers, directors and 
shareholders.  The first essay examines the influence of industry shocks and peer firms on 
board monitoring decisions.  Recent evidence documents that industry factors influence 
CEO turnover decisions, despite agency theory’s proposition that boards should filter out 
industry shocks when evaluating CEO performance.  Consistent with industry dynamics 
affecting board monitoring decisions, I document that industries exhibit CEO turnover 
waves.  During these periods of abnormally high turnover, executives face a heightened 
threat of discipline as boards increase turnover-performance sensitivity.  This increased 
scrutiny inside waves represents a meaningful managerial incentive that curbs value-
destroying behavior of CEOs.  Overall, this essay documents the existence of CEO turnover 
waves, which motivate boards to monitor management differently and have real effects on 
CEO behavior and shareholder wealth. 
The second essay examines the shareholder wealth effects associated with a 
required venue for shareholder litigation.  In response to the increased threat of shareholder 
litigation filed in multiple states, firms have adopted exclusive forum provisions which 
limit lawsuits to a single venue of the board’s choice.  It is unclear whether these provisions 
x 
 
impose increased costs on shareholders’ ability to discipline managers and directors or 
provide benefits to shareholders by eliminating multi-forum and duplicative lawsuits.  I 
use the Delaware Chancery Court’s announcement upholding the adoption of these 
provisions as a natural experiment to evaluate their wealth implications.  Overall, this essay 
suggests that exclusive forum provisions create value for shareholders by specifying a 
required venue for corporate litigation. 
The final essay, with David Becher and Ralph Walkling, examines the stability and 
composition of acquirer boards around mergers and the director characteristics associated 
with selection for the post-merger board.  Our results indicate that the post-merger board 
changes substantially and variation is significantly different from both non-merger years 
and non-merging firms.  Adjustments reflect firms upgrading skills associated with 
executive and merger experience and bargaining between targets and acquirers, rather than 
agency motives.  Conversely, director selection at non-merging firms is driven by general 
skills and diversity. Our analyses provide insight into the dynamic nature of board structure 
and characteristics valued in the director labor market.  
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Chapter 1:  
CEO Turnover Waves: Spillovers to Monitoring and Managerial Incentives 
 
 
 
Jared I. Wilson† 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Recent evidence documents that industry factors influence CEO turnover decisions, despite 
agency theory’s proposition that boards should filter out industry shocks when evaluating 
CEO performance.  Consistent with industry dynamics affecting board monitoring 
decisions, I document that industries exhibit CEO turnover waves.  During these periods 
of abnormally high turnover, executives face a heightened threat of discipline as boards 
increase turnover-performance sensitivity.  This increased scrutiny inside waves represents 
a meaningful managerial incentive that curbs value-destroying behavior of CEOs.  Overall, 
this study documents the existence of CEO turnover waves, which motivate boards to 
monitor management differently and have real effects on CEO behavior and shareholder 
wealth. 
 
 
Keywords:  CEO turnover, CEO performance evaluation, managerial incentives 
JEL Classification:  G34, G39 
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1. Introduction  
The separation of ownership and control creates the need for shareholders to depend 
on governance mechanisms to monitor management and alleviate agency conflicts.  
Arguably, the most important function of the board of directors is the hiring, succession 
management and in some cases, firing of the chief executive officer (CEO).  The threat of 
replacement acts as an implicit incentive mechanism aligning the interests of executives 
with those of shareholders.  Turnover decisions have long-term implications for the firm 
and its shareholders considering the discretion that the CEO holds in the firm’s financing, 
investment and operating decisions.   
The decision to dismiss the CEO depends on the board’s evaluation of CEO 
performance.  Standard agency theory suggests that boards should assess firm performance 
relative to industry peers (i.e. Holmstrom, 1979, 1982).  By doing so, boards are better able 
to separate performance that is attributable to their manager from exogenous shocks outside 
of the CEO’s control, like rival firm activities.  Recently, however, Eisfeldt and Kuhnen 
(2013) and Jenter and Kanaan (2015) report that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover 
increases with poor industry performance suggesting that board monitoring decisions are 
influenced by industry shocks and peer firms.   
Given these competing views, this paper explores the industry dynamics of CEO 
turnover decisions.  Existing empirical evidence suggests that the decisions of peers play a 
role in influencing the corporate policies of others in the same industry.  For example, 
Leary and Roberts (2014) document that a firm’s capital structure decisions are a response 
to the financing decisions of peer firms.  These types of industry spillover effects suggest 
that the board monitoring decisions of peers, such as firing the CEO, may impact board 
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actions and evaluations of CEO performance.  There are several reasons why peer turnover 
may motivate boards to monitor their management differently.  First, turnover at peer firms 
may convey information to the board about the type of executive demanded in an industry 
or about the ability of their own CEO.  Second, CEO dismissals at peer firms may draw 
the board’s attention to their own monitoring decisions.  Finally, boards may decide to 
implement a similar strategy as peers and mimic the policies of rivals.   
Potential changes to board monitoring associated with peer firm decisions imply 
that managerial incentives vary according to factors outside of the CEO’s control.  
Consequently, executive behavior may change in response to the shift in incentives and 
could have important shareholder wealth effects.  For example, the type and value of 
projects that CEOs are willing to engage in may vary by how the board evaluates CEO 
performance.  To better understand what motivates boards to monitor management, this 
study investigates whether peer board monitoring decisions influence a board’s actions and 
if so, whether CEO behavior is affected.   
To address these questions, I construct a sample of 3,596 CEO turnovers from 
1992-2014, of which 945 are forced.  A direct implication of boards responding to industry 
shocks and peer firm monitoring decisions is the clustering of CEO turnover within 
industries.  My results indicate that industry turnover rates, especially forced departures, 
vary significantly over time.  For example, Figure 1 illustrates substantial clustering of 
forced turnover in the Business Services industry.  The variation is highlighted by peaks in 
2001, 2004 and 2007.  This pattern is evident across a wide spectrum of industries and 
suggests that industries exhibit waves of CEO turnover.  I document these executive 
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turnover waves, which I define as periods of 1-2 years when an abnormally high percentage 
of the industry fires their CEO.   
Next, I consider the determinants of CEO turnover waves, which are just as likely 
to occur following positive industry performance as they are following negative.  The 
primary catalysts of waves vary by the state of the industry.  Turnover waves following 
positive industry performance are preceded by shocks to the industry’s operating 
environment, where the CEO skill set demanded within an industry changes.  Negative 
performance turnover waves follow increases in the quality of the industry’s information 
environment and external pressure from activist shareholders. 
Considering the significant variation in CEO dismissals within industries and the 
potential for spillover effects to board monitoring, I examine whether CEO turnover waves 
and the peer turnovers that occur during these periods influence the board’s dismissal 
decisions.  The results indicate that CEOs are significantly more likely to be fired during 
turnover waves.1  In addition, the sensitivity of turnover to performance directly 
attributable to management, rather than industry performance, increases inside waves.  
These results imply that boards place increased scrutiny on CEOs and engage in relative 
performance evaluation (RPE) during turnover waves when they can benchmark against 
the salient performance evaluation decisions of peers (i.e. peer CEO turnover).     
To provide evidence on why peer turnover influences the board of director’s firing 
decision, I investigate whether the spillover effects vary by industry type.  The results 
indicate that the impact of turnover waves on board monitoring decisions only manifest in 
                                                           
1 In this analysis, industry turnover waves are identified for each firm excluding any turnovers at that firm.  
Therefore, only peer turnover is captured in a turnover wave and this result is unlikely to be mechanical in 
nature.   
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competitive, low information cost and homogeneous industries.  This is consistent with 
peer CEO dismissals conveying information to other boards in the same industry about 
their own monitoring decisions.  Directors are better able to benchmark CEO performance 
to peers in these industries because firms are subject to similar economic factors 
(Holmstrom, 1982) and CEOs have comparable skill sets (Parrino, 1997).  In addition, 
information gathered from rivals is more useful for board monitoring in industries with 
lower information costs (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).   
Information conveyed by peer turnovers aids boards in two respects.  The increases 
in disciplinary pressure during turnover waves are limited to underperforming CEOs 
suggesting that boards are better able to identify relative underperformers.  Second, 
benchmarking to peer dismissals allows boards to better determine whether their CEO has 
the required industry skill set.  Turnover announcements made inside of waves experience 
higher returns than those made outside of waves providing evidence that boards benefit 
from gathering information from peer turnovers.    
It is possible that spillover effects to board monitoring during turnover waves may 
be attributed to a common industry factor, rather than information conveyed by peer 
turnover.  If this is the case, turnover should be more sensitive to industry performance 
during waves.  My results, however, indicate that boards engage in RPE and that turnover 
is more sensitive to performance that is attributable to managers inside turnover waves.  In 
addition, I utilize a propensity score matching method and instrumental variables approach 
to address endogeneity concerns.  Both of these analyses confirm the influence of peer 
CEO turnover on board monitoring decisions. 
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A heightened threat of discipline during turnover waves suggests that managerial 
incentives shift with industry shocks and peer turnover.  Therefore, I investigate whether 
CEO actions are affected by these changes in incentives.  There are several effects that 
changes in board monitoring may have on CEO behavior.  First, increased scrutiny of CEO 
performance inside waves may curb value-destroying behavior.  Second, increased 
discipline during waves may influence managers to forgo some positive net present value 
(NPV) projects, if these projects are very risky.  Finally, greater scrutiny may spur CEOs 
to engage in projects that they otherwise would be reluctant to undertake in non-wave 
periods while enjoying the ‘quiet life’. 
To explore the impact of turnover waves on CEO actions, I examine acquisition 
decisions and their shareholder wealth effects.2  My results indicate that CEOs are less 
likely to make acquisitions during turnover waves.  Conditional on making a bid, however, 
acquisition announcement returns during waves are significantly higher than outside of 
waves.  This suggests that CEOs are more selective in the acquisition process when the 
disciplinary pressure in a wave increases.  Overall, these results imply that the spillover 
effects to monitoring during turnover waves act to curb value-destroying behavior and 
represent a meaningful managerial incentive.  
This study makes several contributions to the corporate finance literature.  First, 
wave-like behavior of corporate events, such as mergers (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996, 
Harford, 2005) and IPOs (Lowry, 2003, Chemmanur and He, 2011), has been well 
documented.  I add to this evidence by documenting that industries exhibit CEO turnover 
waves.  Second, my results suggest that board monitoring decisions of peers have a 
                                                           
2 Lehn and Zhao (2006) suggest that boards place an emphasis on acquisition performance in CEO 
evaluations.   
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significant influence on board actions.  Prior literature reports that internal factors, such as 
board independence and committee membership, influence monitoring of the CEO 
(Weisbach, 1988 and Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash, 2011), however the impact of external 
factors is less understood.  My results complement the studies of Bushman, Dai and Wang 
(2010), Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013) and Jenter and Kanaan (2015) by suggesting that peer 
firm decisions motivate boards to monitor and discipline management differently.   
Third, my results suggest that industry turnover waves act as a disciplinary 
managerial incentive, resulting in changes to CEO behavior, which have a significant 
impact on shareholder wealth.  This finding adds to prior research on internal managerial 
incentives, like compensation (e.g. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006 and Low, 2009) and 
external incentives, like the market for corporate control (e.g. Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen, 
2009 and Duchin and Schmidt, 2013).  Finally, I document spillover effects within 
industries related to peer CEO turnover.  These results complement studies that explore 
industry spillover effects to corporate decisions, such as capital structure (Leary and 
Roberts, 2014), corporate investment (Foucault and Fresard, 2014) and hedge fund 
activism (Gantchev et al., 2015).  Overall, this study documents CEO turnover waves, 
which motivate boards to monitor management and have real effects on CEO behavior and 
firm value.  
2. Hypotheses 
2.1 Does CEO Turnover Cluster in Industries? 
Prior literature offers two competing hypotheses related to the clustering of CEO 
turnover within industries.  First, traditional agency theory proposes that boards should 
engage in relative performance evaluation (RPE) and filter out exogenous shocks from 
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firing decisions (Holmstrom, 1979, 1982, Gibbons and Murphy, 1990), implying that CEO 
turnover should not systematically cluster within industries.  Existing empirical evidence 
provides support for RPE, documenting that CEOs are more likely to be fired if their 
performance is poor relative to their peers (e.g. Parrino, 1997, Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 
2001, Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino, 2004).   
While agency theory proposes that turnover decisions are independent of industry 
shocks and peer decisions, more recent studies imply a second hypothesis; the rate of 
turnover varies and clusters within industries.  Several studies report that the likelihood of 
forced CEO turnover increases with poor industry stock performance (Jenter and Kanaan, 
2015 and Peters and Wagner, 2014).  In addition, Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013) find evidence 
that shocks to the industry operating environment prompt managerial turnover due to 
changes in the industry’s desired CEO skill set.  
Parrino (1997) suggests that poorly performing CEOs are easier to identify in more 
homogeneous industries.  Directors in these industries can better benchmark firm 
performance against peers, since executives have similar human capital and firms compete 
in related markets.  Similarly, DeFond and Park (1999) suggest that the benefits of 
comparing performance to rivals are greater in more competitive industries.  Furthermore, 
theoretical literature on boards suggests that the effectiveness of monitoring depends on 
the industry information environment (i.e. Adams and Ferreira, 2007, Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1998).  If the cost of acquiring information in an industry is high, directors are 
less effective at monitoring (Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas, 2010).    
In order to test these competing hypotheses, I explore the extent to which CEO 
turnover clusters within industries.  In particular, I examine whether industries exhibit 
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waves of executive turnover.  If turnover is independent of industry shocks, CEO turnover 
should not display systematic variation within industries.  Alternatively, a direct 
implication of boards responding to industry shocks and peer firm monitoring decisions is 
the existence of CEO turnover waves.   
2.2 Does Peer Turnover Influence Board Monitoring? 
Given prior literature documenting that the decisions of peer firms play a significant 
role in influencing corporate policies, I examine the impact of peer turnover on the board’s 
decision to fire the CEO.  Focusing on whether this board action changes during turnover 
waves, I propose two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses for why such changes in board 
monitoring may occur. 
First, the information hypothesis suggests that peer turnover conveys information 
to other boards about their own monitoring decisions.  Prior studies suggest that the actions 
of peer firms provide information to others in the same industry.  For example, Foucault 
and Fresard (2014) document that the market valuation of rivals provides managers with 
information about their own growth opportunities.  Theoretical models of executive 
turnover suggest that boards gather information about CEO ability (i.e. Adams and 
Ferreira, 2007, Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998, and Taylor, 2010).  One source of 
information may include peer turnover, which could signal to the board the type of CEO 
demanded in an industry or the ability of their own CEO.  It is also possible that increased 
peer turnover may draw the board’s attention to their own performance evaluation 
decisions.  In this case, an industry turnover wave could act as a ‘wake-up call’ for the 
board of directors and provide information to assess the performance of their own CEO.  
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Second, the herding hypothesis suggests that the influence of peer turnover on 
board actions is related to directors implementing similar strategies as rivals.  This type of 
mimicking explanation is formalized by Scharfstein and Stein (1990).  In their model, firms 
may mimic the investment decisions of peers, ignoring their own private information.  This 
is rational from a manager’s perspective because managers will be more favorably 
evaluated ex-post if they follow the decisions of others.  In the context of peer turnover, 
boards may mimic peers by also disciplining their CEO, so that they are more favorably 
evaluated in the director labor market.   
The information hypothesis suggests that if peer turnover conveys positive 
information about the firm’s current CEO, the probability of turnover will decrease during 
turnover waves.  Alternatively, if peer turnover conveys negative information about the 
CEO, the likelihood of turnover will increase inside turnover waves.  Turnover-
performance sensitivity related to performance attributable to management should increase 
during waves.  Under this scenario, peer turnover acts as a salient benchmark that informs 
the board that their CEO is a relatively poor performer and/or lacks the required industry 
skill set.  In addition, if peer turnover conveys information that is helpful in evaluating 
CEO performance, any spillover effects will be stronger in industries where engaging in 
RPE is more useful, which include competitive, homogenous and low information cost 
industries.  To test the attention motive of the information hypothesis, I examine whether 
the impact of peer turnover on board monitoring decisions is stronger for more distracted 
boards, which I define as busy boards (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).   
The herding hypothesis suggests that the probability of turnover will increase 
during turnover waves.  Moreover, turnover-performance sensitivity related to 
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performance directly attributable to the manager will decrease and sensitivity associated 
with industry performance will increase.  This effect should be stronger for boards of 
underperforming firms since outperforming firms are unlikely to be motivated to herd.  In 
this situation, boards ignore their private information about CEO ability and base their 
turnover decision on the performance evaluation of peers. 
2.3 Are there Spillover Effects to Managerial Actions? 
If peer turnover changes how the board evaluates CEO performance, it also alters 
managerial incentives.  Thus, spillover effects related to peer turnover, which are outside 
of the CEO’s control, are likely to impact the actions of CEOs and have important 
consequences for shareholders.  Prior literature suggests that disciplinary threats within an 
industry spillover to the behavior of other CEOs in that same industry.  For example, 
Servaes and Tamayo (2014) document that CEOs respond to control threats experienced 
by rivals by adjusting their capital structure.   
I propose three hypotheses related to managerial actions in turnover waves.  First, 
the selective hypothesis suggests that increased scrutiny of CEO performance during waves 
curbs potential value-destroying behavior.  CEOs may be particularly cautious in choosing 
projects that could negatively impact firm value.  Second, the conservative hypothesis 
proposes that if CEOs are exposed to more replacement risk during turnover waves, 
managers may forgo some positive NPV projects, if those projects are especially risky.  
Finally, the stimulation hypothesis suggests that greater scrutiny during waves may spur 
CEOs to engage in projects that they otherwise would be reluctant to undertake while 
enjoying the ‘quiet life’ (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). 
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To explore the impact of turnover waves on managerial behavior, I examine 
acquisition decisions and their shareholder wealth effects.  The selective hypothesis 
predicts that CEOs will be less likely to engage in acquisitions during turnover waves, but 
acquisitions announced inside waves will have higher announcement returns than those 
announced outside of waves.  The conservative hypothesis also predicts a lower likelihood 
of acquisitions during waves, but acquirer announcement returns will be lower compared 
to outside of waves.  Finally, the stimulation hypothesis suggests that CEOs will be more 
likely to engage in an acquisition during a turnover wave, although it makes no predictions 
on the firm value implications of these acquisitions. 
3. Data 
3.1 CEO Turnover Sample 
The initial sample is drawn from the S&P Execucomp database, which includes 
43,882 CEO-firm-year observations for the period 1992-2014.  The sample is merged with 
Compustat for accounting data, with the Center for Research of Stock Prices (CRSP) 
database for stock returns, with I/B/E/S for analyst information, and with institutional 
ownership data from Thomson Reuters.  After excluding CEO-firm-year observations with 
missing values for stock returns, book value of assets, and institutional ownership, the 
sample consists of 39,082 observations. 
Industries are defined using the Fama and French (1997) classification of firms into 
48 industries.3  Industries with less than eight firms in any industry-year during the sample 
period (bottom quartile of number of firms in an industry-year for the full sample) are 
                                                           
3 Following Jenter and Kanaan (2015), all firms in the ‘Other’ industry classification are excluded from the 
analysis.  Results are similar if industries are defined at the Fama-French 12 industry-level or using the 
Hoberg-Phillips product market definitions (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010, Hoberg and Phillips, 2015).   
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excluded.4  This limits the sample to 31 industries and ensures that any variation in the 
main variable of interest, industry turnover rate (number of industry turnovers scaled by 
the total number of industry firms) is not driven by industries with a small number of firms 
that all experience CEO turnover in a given year.  These restrictions yield a final sample 
of 36,532 CEO-firm-year observations, which includes 3,169 unique firms and 6,505 
distinct CEOs.  A CEO turnover is recognized for each firm-year in which the CEO 
identified in Execucomp changes.  Each turnover is classified as forced or voluntary 
following Parrino (1997).5  Changes to the CEO position associated with spin-offs or 
mergers are not categorized as turnovers.  The final sample includes 3,596 CEO turnovers 
at 1,973 unique firms, of which 945 (2,651) are classified as forced (voluntary) turnover.    
3.2 CEO Turnover Wave Identification 
 In order to identify industry-level CEO turnover waves, I implement a procedure 
similar to Harford (2005), who identifies merger waves.  For each industry and month t, I 
calculate the actual number of turnovers in the 12-month period from month t through 
month t+11.  Each 12-month period of actual turnovers is compared to the 95th percentile 
of a simulated distribution of 12-month time intervals.  Using all turnover events over the 
252-month sample period for a given industry, I simulate 1,000 distributions of that number 
of turnovers by randomly assigning each event to a month where the probability of 
                                                           
4 All results are robust to including all industries or eliminating industries with less than 27 firms in any 
industry-year during the sample period (median of number of firms in any industry-year for the full sample).  
5 Turnovers in which news announcements from Factiva state that the CEO is fired, forced out, or departs 
due to policy differences are classified as forced.  All other turnovers where the departing CEO is 60 years 
or older are classified as voluntary.  Turnovers of CEOs under age 60 are further reviewed and classified as 
forced if the turnover news announcement does not report the reason for departure as death, poor health or 
acceptance of another position (elsewhere or same firm) or if it reports that the CEO is retiring, but does not 
announce the retirement at least six months before the turnover.  All turnovers classified as forced are 
reclassified as voluntary if the turnover CEO takes a comparable position elsewhere in the six months 
following turnover. 
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assignment is 1/252 for each month.  Next, I calculate the highest 12-month concentration 
of turnovers for each of the 1,000 random assignments.   
If the actual number of turnovers in the time interval [t, t+11] is greater than or 
equal to the 95th percentile of 1,000 peak concentrations, month t is identified as the 
beginning of a turnover wave and all turnovers in this window are classified as part of the 
wave.  This step is repeated for the interval [t+1, t+12], and if the number of turnovers in 
this interval is greater than or equal to the 95th percentile of the empirical distribution, any 
turnovers in month t+12 are added to the wave identified in month t.6  Turnovers are added 
to the month t wave in this fashion until the first month t+s in which the number of 
turnovers during the interval [t+s, t+s+11] is less than the 95th percentile of the simulated 
distribution.  This procedure is conducted using all turnovers and only forced turnovers to 
identify all and forced turnover waves, respectively.  I identify 24 turnover waves in 20 
industries and 32 forced waves in 23 industries, which are detailed in Appendix C.   
3.3 Acquisition Sample 
 I obtain acquisition data from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers and 
Acquisitions database.  The following restrictions are imposed: (i) the acquirer owns less 
than 50% of the target at announcement and 100% after completion, (ii) the deal value is 
at least $10 million, and at least 5% of the market value of the acquirer at the merger 
announcement, (iii) the deal is completed and (iv) acquirer return data is available around 
the announcement date.  The deal value restrictions are imposed to limit the sample to 
acquisitions that are likely under the influence of the CEO.  From SDC, I collect the 
acquisition announcement date, transaction value, method of payment, target firm public 
                                                           
6 This modification to the procedure of Harford (2005) is adapted from Choi, Karpoff, and Lou (2014). 
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status and nation of the target firm.  Acquisition announcement returns are gathered from 
CRSP and calculated as the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) surrounding the 
deal announcement date using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model.  The final 
sample consists of 3,009 transactions by 1,516 unique firms. 
3.4 Variable Descriptions and Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 presents summary statistics for the final sample of 36,532 firm-year 
observations from 1992-2014.  Panel A reports firm and CEO characteristics as of the prior 
fiscal year-end.  Following Leary and Roberts (2014), I estimate the industry component 
of stock returns, industry-induced return, as the fitted value from firm-specific regressions 
of monthly returns on the excess market return and the excess equally-weighted industry 
return, where industries are defined at the Fama-French 48 level.7  Each firm-level 
regression is estimated on a rolling annual basis using historical monthly returns.  I require 
at least 24 months of historical returns and include up to 60 months in the estimation.  
Idiosyncratic stock return is estimated as the residual value from this estimation.  This 
yields an average industry-induced (idiosyncratic) return of 28.9% (-2.4%).8   
Panel B of Table 1 summarizes industry-level characteristics based on Fama-
French 48 industry classifications.  I follow DeFond and Park (1999) and define industry 
competition as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on industry sales, which has 
a mean value of 0.06.  Information cost index is the sum of annual quartile rankings of 
median industry forecast error, median industry analyst dispersion and median industry 
number of analysts following a firm (reverse ranking), where the minimum index value is 
                                                           
7 Results are robust to estimating regressions using the excess value-weighted industry return.  
8 This is comparable to Bushman et al. (2010), who use a similar procedure for an Execucomp sample (1992-
2005). 
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3 and the maximum is 12.  The average industry-year in the sample has an information cost 
index of 7.55.  Following Parrino (1997), industry homogeneity is the average partial 
correlation coefficient between monthly stock returns of all firms in the same industry and 
monthly industry returns where its average value is 0.22.  Industry takeover activity is 
defined as the percent of public firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry that receive a 
takeover offer in the prior fiscal year and has a mean value of 7%.   
Finally, Panel C of Table 1 details the characteristics of 3,009 acquisitions 
announced by sample firms from 1992-2014.  The average acquirer announcement return 
is -0.5% for deals with an average relative deal size of 38%.  Thirty-five percent of the 
acquisitions are financed with 100% stock and 31% of the targets are in a different Fama-
French 48 industry than the acquirer.  In addition, over half of the acquisitions are of public 
target, while only 11% are of foreign targets. 
4. Turnover Rates within Industries 
4.1 CEO Turnover Clustering 
 Table 2 presents an overview of the CEO turnover sample and describes the 
clustering of turnovers within industries.  Panel A reports the frequencies of forced and 
voluntary turnovers.   The final sample consists of 36,532 total firm-year observations in 
31 industries and 3,596 CEO turnovers, yielding an unconditional turnover rate of 9.84%.  
Of these turnovers, 945 are classified as forced (2.59% of firm-years) and 2,651 are 
classified as voluntary (7.26% of firm-years). 
 Panel B of Table 2 reports industry-level time-series clustering of CEO turnovers.  
One-quarter of all turnovers occur in just 7.7% of industry-years.  This clustering is even 
more pronounced for forced departures.  One-quarter of all dismissals occur in only 4.1% 
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of industry-years.  Panel C of Table 2 reports that the average annual industry turnover rate 
is 9.67% with a standard deviation that amounts to more than 50% of the mean turnover 
rate.  Variation in forced turnover is even more significant.  A standard deviation of 2.97% 
represents 120% of the average annual forced turnover rate, suggesting wide swings in the 
rate of dismissals from one industry-year to the next.9  Overall, the results in Table 2 
confirm that CEO turnover varies significantly within industries and clusters in time.   
4.2 CEO Turnover Waves 
 The clustering of turnover observed in Table 2 suggests the existence of CEO 
turnover waves.  Two categories of waves are identified; all turnover waves and forced 
turnover waves.  Panel A of Table 3 reports the frequency of all and forced turnover waves 
and the number of unique industries experiencing at least one wave during the sample 
period.  I identify 24 CEO turnover waves in 20 industries.  Over 60% of industries in the 
sample experience at least one turnover wave during the sample period suggesting that 
periods of abnormally high turnover are widespread across industries.  I also identify 32 
forced turnover waves in 23 unique industries providing further evidence of abnormally 
high concentrations of CEO dismissals within industries.   
Appendix C lists all industries experiencing turnover waves and the start (end) date 
for each wave.  Four industries experience two all turnover waves and seven (one) 
industries experience two (three) forced waves.  The average (forced) turnover wave lasts 
1.45 (1.38) years.  While there is time overlap between all and forced waves in a given 
                                                           
9 Appendix A (B) reports summary statistics of the annual rate of (forced) turnover for all industries in the 
sample.  Industries with the most variation in forced turnover include the Entertainment and Apparel 
industries, while Banking and Machinery exhibit the least amount of variation.  Industries with higher 
variation in turnover have higher average forced turnover rates, less competition, and are less homogeneous 
than industries with less variation in forced turnover.   
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industry, 62% of forced waves are separate from all turnover waves in the same industry.  
For example, firms in the Steel Works industry experience two forced waves.  The second 
forced turnover wave coincides with an all turnover wave, but the first forced wave is 
distinct.  In addition, waves are fairly well distributed across time as every sample year 
except for 1992 and 2014 contains at least part of one all turnover wave and all years from 
1994-2013 experience at least one forced wave.  These results provide evidence of the 
existence of turnover waves and their prevalence across industries and time. 
 Panel B of Table 3 compares the frequency of turnover during waves to 12-month 
non-wave periods.10  The average number of turnovers in a turnover wave is 18.5 compared 
to only 4.7 in a non-wave period, which is significantly different at the 1% level.11  These 
figures represent 28% of the industry experiencing turnover in a wave compared to only 
10% in non-wave periods.  If turnover was uniformly distributed across the 23-year sample 
period, the percentage of all industry turnovers occurring in any one 12-month period 
would be equal to 4.3%.  Non-wave periods experience a similar concentration of all 
industry turnover in a given year, whereas, on average, 14% of all industry turnovers occur 
during waves.   
 Differences in the frequency of CEO dismissals during forced turnover waves 
compared to non-wave periods are even greater (Panel C).  The average number of forced 
turnovers in waves is six times higher than in non-wave periods.12  This represents 12% of 
the industry experiencing a forced departure during a forced wave compared to only 2% of 
the industry in non-wave periods.  On average, only 4% of all industry forced turnovers 
                                                           
10 In unreported results, I compare the frequency of turnover during waves to 15 and 18-month non-wave 
periods.  All results in Table 3 are robust to these benchmarks.     
11 445 out of 3,596 turnovers (12.4%) occur during turnover waves.   
12 210 out of 945 forced turnovers (22.2%) occur during forced turnover waves. 
19 
 
 
 
over the entire sample period are concentrated in non-wave periods.  In sharp contrast, on 
average, 21% of all industry forced turnovers occur during forced waves.  Voluntary 
turnovers also occur during forced turnover waves at almost twice the rate than during non-
wave periods suggesting that CEO changes are not all disciplinary in nature during a forced 
wave.  All of the differences between forced wave and non-wave periods are significantly 
different at the 1% level.  Overall, Table 3 provides evidence that the dynamics of the CEO 
labor market are significantly different during turnover waves.  For the remainder of the 
paper, I limit the analysis to forced turnover waves in order to focus on spillovers to 
monitoring and managerial incentives during periods of increased disciplinary pressure in 
an industry. 
4.3 CEO Turnover Waves – Industry Determinants 
Table 4 examines two sets of industry factors that may be associated with CEO 
turnover waves: industry stock performance and economic shocks.  Industry stock 
performance is plausibly linked to turnover waves given the evidence of Jenter and Kanaan 
(2015), that CEO turnover is related to industry performance.  The second set of factors 
captures shocks to the industry’s operating environment.  Such shocks to profitability, 
research and development (R&D) expenditures, capital expenditures, asset turnover, and 
sales growth are motivated by Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2014) who propose a model in which 
industry conditions determine the desired CEO skill set sought by firms within an industry 
and will elicit managerial turnover as that skill set changes.  The second group of industry 
shock measures are motivated by prior literature suggesting that industry competition 
(DeFond and Park, 1999), industry homogeneity (Parrino, 1997), and the cost of acquiring 
information about the firm (Farrell and Whidbee, 2003) are associated with CEO turnover.  
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Finally, I examine whether CEO turnover waves are preceded by other disciplinary shocks 
to an industry including takeover and shareholder activism activity.   
Panel A of Table 4 reports industry stock performance prior to, during, and outside 
of forced CEO turnover waves.  The average equally-weighted industry stock return in the 
year prior to a wave is 7.4% and during a wave is 10.9%.  Performance in both of these 
periods is not significantly different from industry-years outside of waves (9.9%) 
suggesting that, in general, stock performance is not a significant predictor of waves.  This 
is consistent with additional results in Panel A that a turnover wave is just as likely to occur 
following positive industry stock performance as it is following negative performance.  
However, the probability of a turnover wave following an industry-year in the bottom 
quintile of industry stock returns is 8.7%, which is significantly higher than 3.6% for 
industry-years in the top quintile.  This result suggests that extreme negative shocks to 
industry performance are a significant determinant of turnover waves.    
Shocks to an industry’s operating environment as determinants of turnover waves 
are examined in Panel B of Table 4 and are defined as indicator variables equal to one if 
the change in the industry measure is above the median for the full sample in that industry-
year.  Examining all industry-years in the sample suggests that these shocks do not spur 
turnover waves.  However, given the result that turnover waves are just as likely to occur 
following positive industry performance as negative, there may be distinct economic 
drivers of waves based on prior industry performance.  Therefore, I analyze industry-years 
following positive and negative industry stock performance separately.  Focusing on years 
following positive performance, turnover waves are significantly more likely to occur 
following significant increases in profitability, R&D and capital expenditures.  These 
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results are consistent with Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013), who suggest that turnover related 
to economic shocks reflect changes in the type of CEO demanded by firms in that industry.  
Boards of directors appear to replace incumbent CEO who no longer have the skills 
necessary to run the firm in the new industry environment following these ‘CEO skill 
shocks’. 
 Shifting attention to years following negative industry stock performance, turnover 
waves are more likely to occur following a decrease in the cost of acquiring information in 
the industry.  This result is consistent with the findings of Farrell and Whidbee (2003), who 
document a negative relationship between CEO turnover and analyst forecast error.  In 
addition, turnover waves following negative industry performance occur more frequently 
following an increase in industry homogeneity.  This is consistent with prior studies 
reporting that poorly performing CEOs are easier to identify in more homogeneous 
industries (Parrino, 1997).  Finally, these turnover waves are more likely to occur following 
an increase in shareholder activism activity in the industry suggesting that external pressure 
from investors is also a driver of CEO turnover waves.   
Panel C of Table 4 summarizes the results of linear probability models estimating 
the likelihood that a forced CEO turnover wave starts in a given industry-year as a function 
of industry stock performance, volatility and economic shocks.  All independent variables 
are measured as of the industry-year prior.  The regressions also include year and industry 
fixed effects to capture any macroeconomic or unobservable industry conditions.  Model 1 
(2) includes industry-years following positive (negative) stock performance.  After 
controlling for macro and industry characteristics, the primary drivers of positive industry 
performance turnover waves are shocks to the industry’s operating environment or ‘CEO 
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skill shocks’.13  On the other hand, the main determinants of negative industry performance 
turnover waves are changes in the industry’s information environment and external 
pressure from activist shareholders.   
5.  Spillover Effects of Turnover Waves on Board Monitoring  
The existence of industry turnover waves suggests that peer turnover may play a 
role in board monitoring decisions.  Therefore, I examine whether turnover waves affect 
the probability that a CEO is fired and the turnover-performance sensitivity of board 
monitoring.   
5.1 Turnover-performance Sensitivity 
Table 5 summarizes the results of linear probability models estimating the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover in a given firm-year as a function of forced turnover 
waves, firm characteristics and CEO attributes.14  The regressions also include year fixed 
effects to capture any macroeconomic conditions and firm fixed effects to control for a 
wide range of unobservable firm characteristics.15  Model 2 of Panel A includes an 
interaction term between forced turnover wave and lagged firm performance to capture any 
differences in turnover-performance sensitivity depending on whether the industry is 
experiencing a turnover wave.  The measure of turnover wave is an indicator equal to one 
                                                           
13 To shed additional light on the ‘CEO skill shocks’, I examine the characteristics of replacement 
CEOs hired inside versus outside of forced turnover waves.  Replacement CEOs hired inside 
turnover waves are more likely to be external hires, in particular, hires from outside of the industry 
than replacements hired outside of waves.  This is consistent with a different type of CEO being 
demanded within the industry following one of these ‘CEO skill shocks’. 
14 Despite a binary dependent variable, I use a linear probability model (i.e. OLS estimation) for two reasons.  
First, nonlinear models with fixed effects can provide inconsistent estimates (Neyman and Scott, 1948, 
Abrevaya, 1997).  Estimation of a linear probability model avoids this incidental parameters problem.  
Second, unbiased coefficient estimates for interaction terms can be obtained using a linear probability model 
(Ai and Norton, 2003).   
15 Results are robust to substituting industry fixed effects for firm fixed effects. 
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during a wave.16  All other independent variables are measured as of the fiscal year end 
prior to when turnover is identified and coefficient p-values based on standard errors 
clustered by firm are reported in parentheses.  
Consistent with prior literature, Panel A of Table 5 suggests that CEOs are more 
likely to be fired following both poor idiosyncratic and industry-induced performance.  The 
economic magnitude of the turnover-performance relation is consistent across all models.  
For example, Model 1 reports that a one standard deviation decrease in idiosyncratic 
(industry-induced) return is associated with a 0.95 (0.62) percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of forced turnover.  
Focusing on the influence of turnover waves reveals that peer turnover has a 
significant impact on the probability of forced turnover.  Models 1 and 2 report that the 
probability of CEO dismissal increases by 1.0 - 1.2 percentage points in industries 
experiencing a forced turnover wave as compared to outside of a wave, which represents a 
38% - 46% increase in the unconditional rate of forced turnover.  This result is consistent 
with both hypotheses for spillover effects on board monitoring: peer turnover conveys 
negative information about the existing CEO or draws the attention of the board and boards 
mimic the activities of peers.  To begin to disentangle these motives, I examine changes to 
the turnover-performance sensitivity during turnover waves.   
Model 2 reports that the coefficient on the interaction term between idiosyncratic 
return and forced turnover wave is negative and statistically significant suggesting that 
                                                           
16 In order to avoid a mechanical relationship between forced CEO turnover and forced turnover waves, 
industry turnover waves are calculated separately for each firm excluding any turnovers at that firm.   
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CEOs with lower idiosyncratic returns are more likely to be fired during a turnover wave.17  
However, the interaction between industry-induced return and forced turnover wave is 
insignificant.  Both of these results are inconsistent with the herding hypothesis.  The 
results do suggest that the increased scrutiny of CEOs during waves only manifests for 
performance directly attributable to managerial actions rather than for events outside of 
their control, which is consistent with the information hypothesis.  Boards place more 
emphasis on relative performance evaluation in turnover waves where they can benchmark 
against the salient decisions of peers (i.e. peer turnover).   
To provide evidence on the attention motive of the information hypothesis, I 
examine whether the impact of waves on monitoring varies by board distractions.  One 
potential measure of board distraction is board busyness (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).  
Untabulated results indicate that the probability of forced turnover in waves increases with 
the percentage of the board that is busy (holds three or more outside directorships), but the 
sensitivity of turnover to idiosyncratic performance does not change for busier boards 
during waves.  These results lend some support to the notion that peer turnover draws the 
attention of the board to their own monitoring decisions.    
I examine whether the impact of peer turnover on board monitoring varies by 
industry type to provide additional evidence on the information hypothesis.  If boards use 
signals from peer dismissals as informative about their own monitoring decisions, any 
                                                           
17 In unreported tests, I replace the continuous measure of idiosyncratic (industry-induced) stock return with 
an indicator equal to one if prior idiosyncratic (industry-induced) performance is in the bottom quartile for 
the full sample.  These results compare the impact of poor performance inside of turnover waves versus 
outside waves and continue to suggest that boards place increased scrutiny on CEO performance during 
turnover waves. 
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spillover effects to board actions should be stronger in industries where engaging in RPE 
is more useful. 
Panel B of Table 5 summarizes regressions similar to Panel A with the addition of 
indicator variables based on industry type and interaction terms between those indicators, 
turnover wave and performance measures.18  The industry factors in Models 1-3 are 
industry competition, information cost and homogeneity, respectively.  Indicators for 
competition and homogeneity (information cost) are equal to one if the measure is above 
(below) the median in a given sample year and zero otherwise. All industry characteristics 
are measured as of the fiscal year end prior.   
The results in Panel B suggest that changes to the board’s turnover decision during 
waves are concentrated in more competitive, lower information cost and more 
homogeneous industries.  The increase in the likelihood of turnover during waves varies 
from 2.4 percentage points in lower information cost industries to 5.6 percentage points in 
more competitive industries.  In addition, the sensitivity of idiosyncratic returns to turnover 
more than doubles during waves in these industries.  This result suggests that boards are 
more likely to use peer turnover as a salient benchmark to engage in RPE in industries 
where gathering information signals from rivals is less costly and CEOs have similar 
human capital.  These findings are consistent with peer turnover conveying information to 
other boards in the same industry about their own monitoring decision.    
One potential source of information that may be conveyed to boards during 
turnover waves is whether the firm’s CEO is a relative underperformer compared to 
                                                           
18 Results are robust to estimating regressions for above and below median subsamples based on industry 
competition, information environment and homogeneity instead of the inclusion of industry factor interaction 
terms.   
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industry peers.  The evidence presented in Panel A of Table 5 suggests that boards place 
increased emphasis on benchmarking and RPE during waves given that turnover-
sensitivity with respect to idiosyncratic performance, but not industry performance 
increases.  To test whether information conveyed during turnover waves is related to better 
identifying underperformers, I estimate whether the probability of dismissal and sensitivity 
of turnover to performance during a turnover wave depends on industry underperformance.  
Panel C of Table 5 summarizes regressions similar to Panel A with the addition of an 
indicator variable based on whether the CEO is an industry underperformer and an 
interaction term between that indicator, turnover wave and performance measures.  
Industry underperformers are defined as CEOs with negative idiosyncratic returns in the 
prior year.   
The results in Panel C of Table 5 detail that the previously documented increases 
in board monitoring scrutiny during turnover waves are restricted to CEOs who 
underperform their industry.  Model 1 reports that the probability of CEO dismissal 
increases by 3.4 percentage points for underperforming CEOs during turnover waves, 
while outperforming CEOs are less likely to be fired.  In addition, the increased sensitivity 
of turnover to idiosyncratic performance during waves also only manifests for 
underperforming CEOs (Model 2).  This result also provides evidence against the herding 
hypothesis, which predicts that turnover for underperforming CEO should become more 
sensitive to industry performance during turnover waves. 
The fact that spillover effects to board monitoring during turnover waves are 
concentrated in underperforming CEOs, provides additional evidence on the benchmarking 
motive for information conveyed by peer turnover.  Boards can better identify relative 
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underperformers and engage in relative performance evaluation during turnover waves.  
This result in conjunction with the results in Section 4 documenting ‘CEO skill shocks’ as 
drivers of turnover waves suggest that peer turnover during waves conveys information to 
boards about whether their CEO is a relative underperformer and whether their CEO has 
the relevant skill set demanded by the industry.  
I conduct two main robustness tests related to the spillover effects to board 
monitoring during CEO turnover waves.  First, the results in Table 5 are robust to 
classifying industries at the Fama-French 12 industry-level and using the Hoberg-Phillips 
product market industry definitions. Second, Table 5 results are robust to defining the 
measure of peer turnover as all turnover waves (forced and voluntary) or continuous 
measures of forced CEO turnover (percentage of industry that fires CEO in industry-year).   
Boards increase scrutiny on CEO performance and are more likely to dismiss the CEO 
during turnover waves identified within these alternative industry definitions or during 
these alternative measures of high industry turnover.    
5.2 CEO Turnover Announcement Returns   
 Panel A of Table 6 reports summary statistics on Fama-French-Carhart four-factor 
adjusted three-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement date of 
forced turnovers with available return data.  The average return surrounding turnover 
(replacement) announcements is -0.75% (0.83%) which is significantly different from zero 
at the 5% level.  There is a significant difference in the market response to turnover 
announcements made in conjunction with the appointment of a replacement and those 
turnover and replacement announcements that are made on separate dates.  Combined 
announcements are met with an average -0.07% announcement return, which is 
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indistinguishable from zero, while turnover and replacement announcements made 
separately earn average returns of -2.38% and 2.78% respectively. 
 To explore whether the market responds to turnover announcements made inside 
of turnover waves differently than those made outside of waves, Panel B of Table 6 
compares announcements returns for these two groups.  On average, turnover and 
replacement announcement returns made inside of turnover waves are significantly higher 
than those made outside of waves.  Turnover (Replacement) announcements made inside 
of turnover waves experience an average return of 0.31% (2.01%) compared to a -1.06% 
(0.50%) average return for non-wave turnover (replacement) announcements.  The 
significant difference in announcement returns is concentrated in turnover announcements 
made in conjunction with naming a replacement CEO.  Announcements made inside of 
turnover waves experience an average 1.68% return, while average returns to those made 
outside of waves are -0.58%.  This result suggests that the market perceives that turnover 
decisions made by boards during turnover waves are value-increasing for shareholders 
compared to those made outside of waves.  This interpretation is consistent with boards 
gathering information from peer turnovers during turnover waves in order to better identify 
underperforming CEOs and replace incumbent CEO that no longer have the skills 
necessary to run the firm in a new industry environment.   
5.3 Addressing Endogeneity 
The results in Table 5 suggest that CEOs are more likely to be fired and boards 
place greater scrutiny on CEO performance during industry turnover waves.  This 
association, however, does not necessarily imply a causal relation because of the possibility 
that some common industry factor simultaneously induces turnover waves and the spillover 
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effects to board monitoring.  I address this concern using a propensity score matched 
sample and an instrumental variables approach.   
The propensity score approach matches CEO-firm-years that occur during turnover 
waves with similar CEO-firm-years that occur outside of waves and compares the rate of 
forced turnover between the two groups.  First, I model the likelihood of a CEO turnover 
wave for each CEO-firm-year in the sample as a function of industry, firm and CEO 
attributes.19  The fitted values from this model are the propensity scores.  Next, I match 
CEO-firm-years inside of waves to ones outside of waves in the same year by score.  One-
to-one matching is performed without replacement, using a caliper of 1%, similar to 
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997).20  The difference in the probability of forced 
turnover between the matched pairs is the effect of the turnover wave.   
Table 7 reports the results of the propensity score matching.  The average treatment 
effect (ATE) implies that the probability of forced turnover inside of an average industry 
turnover wave is 1.24% higher than the rate of dismissal in an average non-wave period.  
The difference is significant at the 5% level.  This represents roughly 50% of the 
unconditional rate of forced turnover and is similar to the economic effect of turnover 
waves reported in Panel A of Table 5.  This result suggests that CEOs in turnover waves 
are significantly more likely to be fired than similar CEOs with similar firm performance 
and industry conditions outside of a turnover wave.   
                                                           
19 Firm characteristics include idiosyncratic return, industry-induced return, return volatility, firm size, and 
institutional ownership.  CEO attributes include age, tenure and ownership.  Industry conditions include 
industry competition, information cost index, homogeneity, and equally-weighted stock return in the current 
and prior years.  
20 Results are robust to using calipers of 5% and 10%.  Results are also robust to matching CEO turnover 
wave observations to the nearest 5, 10 and 20 neighbors based on all calipers.   
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I also implement an instrumental variables approach to control for endogeneity.  A 
valid instrument must be significantly related to CEO turnover waves, but uncorrelated 
with common industry factors that are associated with changes in board monitoring.  The 
instrument chosen is based on a previous study that examines the impact of peer firm 
financing decisions on the capital structure of other firms in the same industry.  Leary and 
Roberts (2014) suggest that idiosyncratic equity shocks to rival firms are a potential source 
of exogenous variation.  For each firm, I define the instrument for turnover wave as the 
lagged average idiosyncratic stock return of all other firms in the industry.  This variable 
is plausibly correlated with turnover waves given evidence from prior studies of a link 
between the probability of CEO turnover and idiosyncratic returns.  It also reasonably 
meets the exclusion restriction since, by definition, the idiosyncratic stock return is 
performance attributable to that firm’s management and filters out any common industry 
factors.   
Table 8 summarizes the results of the two-stage least squares estimation of the 
impact of CEO turnover waves on the probability of forced turnover.  Model 1 reports the 
first stage model estimating the likelihood of a forced turnover wave.  These results suggest 
that the instrument, average industry idiosyncratic stock return, is a significant determinant 
of turnover waves.  In addition, the p-value for the Cragg and Donald (1993) instrument 
relevance test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of a weak instrument.  Model 2 describes 
the second stage model estimating the probability of forced CEO turnover as a function of 
instrumented turnover wave (fitted value from first stage) and other firm and CEO 
characteristics.  Consistent with the results in Tables 5 and 7, CEOs in industries 
experiencing a turnover wave are significantly more likely to be fired in that year.  These 
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results suggest that even after controlling for endogeneity, peer turnover has significant 
spillover effects on board monitoring. 
Overall, peer turnover in waves motivates boards to monitor management 
differently, representing an additional disciplinary managerial incentive.  These results 
complement those of Jenter and Kanaan (2015) and others, who provide evidence that 
CEOs are disciplined for poor absolute industry performance.  My results suggest that one 
of the signals through which boards become informed about the CEO turnover decision is 
the turnover of peers.  The observation of other dismissals in the industry provides boards 
with a salient benchmark to engage in RPE and directors place increased scrutiny on CEO 
performance during industry turnover waves. 
6.  Spillover Effects of Turnover Waves on CEO Actions 
If board monitoring changes in turnover waves, this implies that managerial 
incentives also shift.  The evidence indicates that CEOs are more likely to be fired and face 
increased scrutiny regarding performance directly attributable to their actions during 
turnover waves.  Consequently, there may be spillover effects to CEO actions when boards 
increase disciplinary pressure in waves.   
I explore three alternative hypotheses related to the potential impacts on CEO 
behavior.  First, the selective hypothesis suggests that the increased scrutiny over 
performance and job uncertainty in turnover waves can have a positive disciplinary effect 
on potential CEO actions.  This may influence CEOs to be more selective in project 
evaluation, so as not to engage in value-destroying projects.  Second, the conservative 
hypothesis proposes that if CEOs are exposed to a higher risk of discipline during turnover 
waves, mangers may forgo some positive NPV projects.  Finally, the stimulation hypothesis 
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suggests that increased monitoring during turnover waves may spur CEOs to engage in 
projects that they otherwise would be reluctant to undertake during normal times.  To 
investigate the potential spillover effects of industry turnover waves on CEO actions, I 
consider acquisition decisions and their outcomes given the emphasis that boards place on 
the performance evaluation of acquisition activity (Lehn and Zhao, 2006).   
Model 1 of Table 9 reports a linear probability model estimating the likelihood of 
engaging in an acquisition in a given firm-year as a function of forced turnover wave, firm 
and CEO characteristics.  The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the firm 
engaged in at least one acquisition in a given firm-year.  The regression also includes year 
and firm fixed effects and coefficient p-values clustered by firm are reported in 
parentheses.21   
The coefficient on forced turnover wave is negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that during turnover waves CEOs in that industry are less likely to engage in an 
acquisition.22  A 1.2 percentage point decrease in the probability of making a bid during a 
wave represents a 15% reduction in the unconditional probability of engaging in an 
acquisition (7.9%).  This result suggests that changes to managerial incentives during 
forced turnover waves have a significant impact on CEO actions and could be consistent 
with both the selective and conservative hypotheses.  To provide further evidence on the 
spillover effects related to industry turnover waves, I examine the market responses to 
acquisition announcements.  If announcement returns for acquisitions initiated during 
waves are higher than non-wave periods, this suggests evidence in favor of more selective 
                                                           
21 Analysis in Table 9 is robust to restricting the sample to acquisitions of only public targets.   
22 207 out of 3,009 acquisitions (6.9%) occur during forced turnover waves. 
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CEOs avoiding potentially value-destroying deals, while lower announcement returns 
suggest CEOs are forgoing risky, positive NPV projects for shareholders.   
Model 2 and Table 9 summarizes an OLS regression modeling acquisition 
announcement returns as a function of forced turnover waves, firm and deal characteristics.  
The dependent variable is the three-day Fama-French-Carhart four-factor adjusted 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the acquirer centered on the deal announcement 
date.  The regression also includes year and firm fixed effects and coefficient p-values 
clustered by firm are included in parentheses. 
The results in Model 2 show that the market reacts more favorably to acquisitions 
announced during turnover waves than those in non-wave periods.  The coefficient estimate 
on turnover wave suggests that the average three-day acquirer CAR for acquisitions 
announced during a wave is 1.6 percentage points higher providing evidence in favor of 
the selective hypothesis.  The increase in the average acquirer announcement return of 1.6 
percentage points represents $96 million in market capitalization for the average firm in 
the sample or $109 million for the average firm in the acquirer sample.  This effect is 
economically significant considering the average CAR for the full sample is -0.5%.  The 
result implies that the changes in board monitoring during turnover waves have a 
disciplinary effect on executive actions.  Overall, the results in Table 9 suggests that CEOs 
are more selective in the acquisition process when boards increase the disciplinary pressure 
during turnover waves.  This is consistent with peer turnover providing a meaningful 
managerial incentive which decreases potential value-destroying behavior of CEOs.  
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7.  Conclusion 
This study examines the extent to which CEO turnover varies within industries and 
the impact of industry shocks and peer turnover on the board’s monitoring function and 
executive actions.  The results suggest that industry turnover rates vary substantially over 
time, and the extent to which they vary is highlighted by industry-level CEO turnover 
waves.  The wave-like behavior of turnover is widespread as 75% of industries experience 
at least one forced turnover wave during the sample period, where a significant portion of 
the industry fires their CEO.  The primary drivers of turnover waves vary by the 
performance of the industry.  Waves following positive industry performance are preceded 
by ‘CEO skill shocks’, while negative performance waves follow changes in the industry’s 
information environment and external pressure from activists. 
Peer turnover plays an important role in how the board evaluates the CEO.  The 
results indicate that executives are more likely to be fired and turnover-performance 
sensitivity increases during turnover waves.  Boards engage in relative-performance 
evaluation in periods in which they can benchmark against the salient decisions of peers 
(i.e. forced turnover).  These results are concentrated in more competitive, more 
homogeneous and lower information cost industries.  This result is consistent with peer 
turnover conveying information to the board about its own monitoring function as these 
are industries in which engaging in relative performance evaluation is more useful.  Similar 
to benchmarking performance to that of peers, boards consider the evaluation and dismissal 
of rivals as informative about their own CEO monitoring decisions.  This interpretation is 
consistent with higher announcement returns surrounding turnover and replacement 
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decisions during waves suggesting that boards make informed monitoring decisions during 
these periods.   
Managerial incentives vary with peer turnover given the changes to the board’s 
actions and evaluation of CEO performance during turnover waves.  The results suggest 
that CEOs are less likely to engage in acquisitions during industry turnover waves.  
Conditional on making a bid, however, acquisitions announced during waves earn 
significantly higher abnormal returns than acquisitions announced outside of these periods.  
This implies that CEOs are more selective in the acquisition process when the disciplinary 
pressure within an industry increases.  Collectively, these results suggest that monitoring 
spillover effects related to peer turnover curb potential value-destroying behaviors and act 
as a meaningful managerial incentive.  
My work provides important evidence on the spillover effects of peer turnover as 
well as more general work on board monitoring and managerial incentives.  I add to the 
substantial literature related to the wave-like behavior of corporate decision-making by 
documenting CEO turnover waves.   In addition, this paper highlights the importance of 
external factors in the board’s monitoring and evaluation of the CEO.  Consequently, the 
spillover effects related to peer turnover act as a managerial incentive resulting in changes 
to CEO behavior, which has a significant impact on firm outcomes.  Overall, this study 
details the existence of CEO turnover waves, which motivate boards to monitor 
management and have real effects on CEO behavior and shareholder wealth.     
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Appendix A: Industry Rates of CEO Turnover 
 
The table reports summary statistics on the annual rate of turnover for each industry during the 1992-2014 
sample period.  Industries are defined at the Fama-French 48 level and the list is sorted in decreasing order 
of standard deviation of the annual rate of industry turnover.  All industries with fewer than eight firms in 
any given sample year are excluded. 
 
Industry Mean Median Std. Dev Q1 Q3 
Entertainment 8.27% 6.25% 8.31% 0.00% 14.29% 
Personal Services 12.40% 13.33% 7.61% 8.33% 18.18% 
Electrical Equipment 11.56% 10.00% 7.51% 7.41% 16.67% 
Printing & Publishing 8.74% 7.14% 6.92% 4.35% 13.04% 
Food 9.56% 9.38% 6.71% 3.33% 11.43% 
Construction 8.42% 8.00% 6.66% 4.00% 12.00% 
Consumer Goods 9.07% 7.41% 6.43% 3.85% 11.54% 
Steel 10.83% 11.11% 6.01% 4.55% 13.89% 
Business Supplies 10.26% 10.53% 5.97% 4.55% 15.00% 
Automobiles 11.79% 10.81% 5.90% 7.69% 17.14% 
Construction Materials 9.67% 9.38% 5.86% 3.45% 13.79% 
Measuring & Control Equip. 9.69% 10.00% 5.29% 5.26% 13.33% 
Restaurants & Hotels 10.86% 10.81% 5.26% 6.67% 14.81% 
Chemicals 9.89% 9.30% 5.22% 7.14% 13.73% 
Apparel 7.95% 7.69% 5.20% 4.00% 11.11% 
Computers 13.59% 12.70% 4.83% 9.62% 18.33% 
Communication 9.46% 8.11% 4.82% 7.14% 12.50% 
Medical Equipment 8.79% 8.33% 4.81% 5.88% 12.50% 
Wholesale 9.96% 9.68% 4.74% 6.35% 13.21% 
Machinery 9.92% 10.00% 4.71% 7.46% 12.50% 
Transportation 8.06% 7.55% 4.42% 4.76% 11.11% 
Healthcare 7.68% 7.41% 4.19% 4.00% 10.71% 
Business Services 10.68% 10.49% 4.18% 8.65% 11.83% 
Electronic Equipment 9.92% 9.17% 4.14% 8.33% 12.50% 
Insurance 7.94% 7.23% 4.13% 5.33% 12.33% 
Trading 6.55% 6.50% 4.07% 4.13% 9.86% 
Retail 11.55% 11.97% 3.90% 9.17% 14.68% 
Pharmaceutical Products 9.25% 9.52% 3.60% 6.45% 11.90% 
Petroleum & Natural Gas 8.88% 8.47% 3.56% 6.94% 11.43% 
Utilities 10.30% 10.77% 3.22% 8.74% 12.64% 
Banking 8.33% 8.80% 3.15% 7.20% 10.78% 
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Appendix B: Industry Rates of Forced CEO Turnover 
 
The table reports summary statistics on the annual rate of forced turnover for each industry during the 1992-
2014 sample period.  Industries are defined at the Fama-French 48 level and the list is sorted in decreasing 
order of standard deviation of the annual rate of industry forced turnover.  All industries with fewer than 
eight firms in any given sample year are excluded. 
 
Industry Mean Median Std. Dev Q1 Q3 
Entertainment 2.99% 0.00% 4.64% 0.00% 5.26% 
Apparel 2.91% 0.00% 4.50% 0.00% 4.00% 
Personal Services 3.85% 4.17% 4.47% 0.00% 6.25% 
Automobiles 2.97% 3.13% 3.83% 0.00% 3.45% 
Steel 2.89% 0.00% 3.58% 0.00% 5.00% 
Printing & Publishing 1.59% 0.00% 3.29% 0.00% 0.00% 
Electrical Equipment 2.91% 3.70% 3.23% 0.00% 5.00% 
Food 2.01% 0.00% 3.22% 0.00% 3.13% 
Communication 2.78% 2.70% 3.17% 0.00% 5.13% 
Computers 6.33% 6.45% 3.14% 3.70% 8.62% 
Restaurants & Hotels 3.58% 3.13% 3.09% 0.00% 6.06% 
Consumer Goods 1.91% 0.00% 2.96% 0.00% 3.85% 
Wholesale 3.00% 1.89% 2.85% 0.00% 5.56% 
Measuring & Control Equip. 2.69% 2.50% 2.70% 0.00% 5.41% 
Construction 1.60% 0.00% 2.62% 0.00% 4.00% 
Construction Materials 1.74% 0.00% 2.53% 0.00% 3.45% 
Healthcare 2.24% 3.03% 2.50% 0.00% 3.70% 
Retail 4.15% 3.67% 2.48% 2.13% 6.03% 
Electronic Equipment 2.79% 1.96% 2.48% 1.08% 3.77% 
Medical Equipment 2.48% 2.22% 2.47% 0.00% 4.08% 
Business Supplies 1.56% 0.00% 2.42% 0.00% 2.63% 
Pharmaceutical Products 2.74% 2.56% 2.21% 1.39% 3.85% 
Business Services 3.73% 2.92% 2.20% 2.17% 5.17% 
Petroleum & Natural Gas 2.11% 1.56% 2.12% 0.00% 3.28% 
Transportation 1.65% 1.96% 1.91% 0.00% 2.38% 
Chemicals 1.60% 1.96% 1.79% 0.00% 2.44% 
Insurance 1.39% 1.15% 1.63% 0.00% 1.52% 
Utilities 1.50% 1.49% 1.57% 0.00% 2.50% 
Trading 1.00% 0.84% 1.10% 0.00% 1.65% 
Machinery 1.03% 1.56% 0.99% 0.00% 1.69% 
Banking 1.21% 0.92% 0.95% 0.76% 1.68% 
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Appendix C: Industries with CEO Turnover Waves 
 
The table reports each industry identified as experiencing a CEO turnover wave during the 1992-2014 sample 
period. The first three columns report the start date, end date and length of 24 waves including all turnovers 
and the second three columns report the start date, end date and length of 32 waves including only forced 
turnover.  Waves are identified using methodology similar to Harford (2005), which is detailed in Section 
3.2. 
 
Industry 
All 
Turnover   
Wave 
Start 
All 
Turnover 
Wave End 
Length 
(years) 
 
Forced 
Turnover 
Wave 
Start 
Forced 
Turnover 
Wave End 
Length 
(years) 
Apparel - - -  Feb-05 Mar-06 1.17 
Automobiles - - -  Jan-06 Jul-07 1.58 
Banking Jul-06 Nov-07 1.42  - - - 
Business Services Feb-99 Nov-01 2.75  Feb-00 Nov-01 1.83 
Business Services Apr-04 Jul-05 1.75  Mar-04 Mar-05 1.08 
Business Services - - -  Jun-06 Sep-07 1.33 
Business Supplies Aug-93 Aug-94 1.33  Jun-99 Dec-00 1.58 
Chemicals Jan-95 Feb-96 1.17  - - - 
Communication - - -  Mar-98 Dec-99 1.83 
Communication - - -  Jun-07 Nov-08 1.50 
Computers Feb-99 Jul-00 1.50  Mar-99 Feb-00 1.00 
Computers Aug-06 Jul-07 1.00  - - - 
Construction Jun-10 Jul-11 1.17  - - - 
Construction Materials Jul-98 Nov-99 1.42  Aug-94 Dec-95 1.42 
Construction Materials - - -  Apr-12 Apr-13 1.08 
Consumer Goods Jan-99 Nov-00 1.92  Sep-99 May-01 1.75 
Electrical Equipment Jun-04 Feb-06 1.75  Apr-04 Nov-05 1.67 
Electronic Equipment Jul-04 Feb-06 1.83  Jun-07 Feb-09 1.75 
Electronic Equipment Jun-07 Jan-09 1.67  - - - 
Entertainment Jul-08 Dec-09 1.50  Feb-95 May-96 1.33 
Financials Feb-08 Aug-09 1.58  Aug-08 Jun-10 1.92 
Financials Jun-12 May-13 1.00  - - - 
Food Products - - -  Nov-04 Apr-07 1.50 
Insurance - - -  May-99 Sep-00 1.42 
Insurance - - -  Jul-07 Jul-08 1.08 
Measuring & Control Equip. - - -  Dec-06 Nov-07 1.00 
Personal Services Jan-06 May-07 1.42  Nov-05 Dec-06 1.17 
Petroleum & Natural Gas Oct-11 Sep-12 1.00  Sep-12 Aug-13 1.00 
Pharmaceutical Products Apr-07 Jul-08 1.33  Apr-07 Apr-08 1.08 
Printing & Publishing Jul-05 Jun-06 1.00  Feb-97 Jul-98 1.50 
Printing & Publishing - - -  Jan-11 Mar-12 1.25 
Restaurants & Hotels Jul-94 Dec-95 1.50  - - - 
Retail - - -  Oct-04 Nov-05 1.17 
Retail - - -  Dec-05 Dec-06 1.08 
Steel Works Nov-02 Nov-03 1.08  Apr-96 Jan-98 1.83 
Steel Works - - -  Nov-02 Feb-04 1.33 
Utilities Jan-97 Jul-98 1.58  Jun-01 Aug-02 1.25 
Utilities - - -  Jun-03 Dec-04 1.58 
Wholesale Jan-99 Dec-99 1.08  Jul-98 Jun-99 1.00 
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Figure 1: CEO Turnover Waves in Select Industry 
 
The figure reports examples of CEO turnover waves identified within the Business Services industry.  The 
solid line represents the number of turnovers in each industry per year.  The dotted line represents the number 
of turnovers scaled by the number of firms in each industry per year.  The areas within shaded bars represent 
CEO turnover wave periods.  The first (second) panel includes all (forced) turnovers.  Waves are identified 
using methodology similar to Harford (2005), which is detailed in Section 3.2.  The y-axis represents the 
number/percentage of total CEO turnovers that occur in each sample year.  The x-axis represents years of the 
sample period 1992-2014.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
The table summarizes firm, industry and acquisition characteristics for 36,532 firm-years between 1992-
2014.  Industries are defined at the Fama-French 48 level and industries with fewer than eight firms in a given 
year are excluded.  Panel A reports firm and CEO characteristics.  Industry-induced (idiosyncratic) return is 
the industry (firm-specific) return in the fiscal year prior.  Return volatility is the standard deviation of 
monthly returns in the fiscal-year prior.  Firm size is the natural logarithm of assets at the end of the prior 
fiscal year.  Leverage is total book value of debt scaled by total assets in the prior fiscal year.  Market-to-
book is the market value of equity scaled by the book value of equity at the end of the prior fiscal year.  
Institutional ownership is the percentage of outstanding shares held by the top 5 institutional investors as of 
the prior fiscal year end.  CEO age (tenure) is the age (tenure) of the CEO in years.  CEO-Chair is an indicator 
equal to one if the CEO also holds the position of board chair and zero otherwise.  CEO ownership is the 
percentage of outstanding shares held by the CEO.  Panel B summarizes industry-level characteristics.  
Competition is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on industry sales.  Information cost index is the 
sum of quartile rankings of median industry forecast error, median industry analyst dispersion and median 
industry number of analysts following (reverse ranking) where the minimum index value is 3 and the 
maximum is 12.  Industry homogeneity is the average partial correlation coefficient between monthly stock 
returns of all firms in the same FFI48 industry and monthly industry returns.  Industry takeover activity is 
the percent of public firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry that receive a takeover offer in the prior 
fiscal year.  Panel C summarizes acquisition characteristics for 3,009 acquisitions made by firms in the 
sample.  Announcement return is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return surrounding the acquisition 
announcement date estimated using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model.  Relative deal size is the 
deal transaction value scaled by acquirer market capitalization.  All stock is an indicator equal to one if the 
deal is financed 100% with stock and zero otherwise.  Diversifying deal is an indicator equal to one if the 
acquirer and target are in different Fama-French 48 industries and zero otherwise.  Public target is an indicator 
equal to one if the target is publicly traded and zero otherwise.  Foreign target is an indicator equal to one if 
the target is from a country outside of the United States and zero otherwise.    
41 
 
 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics (Continued) 
 
Panel A: Firm-Level 
Characteristics 
Mean Median Std. Dev Q1 Q3 
  Industry-induced Return  28.9% 21.7% 51.6% 2.1% 44.9% 
  Idiosyncratic Return -2.4% -8.1% 45.0% -28.2% 13.2% 
  Return Volatility 10.8% 9.4% 6.0% 6.6% 13.5% 
  Firm Size  7.43 7.31 1.77 6.12 8.59 
  Leverage 22.0% 19.8% 18.5% 5.5% 33.8% 
  Market-to-Book 2.89 2.10 3.11 1.41 3.37 
  Institutional Ownership 26.2% 25.7% 9.9% 19.2% 32.5% 
  CEO Age 55.68 56.00 7.43 51.00 60.00 
  CEO Tenure 8.00 5.58 8.18 2.50 10.67 
  CEO-Chair 65.1% 100.0% 47.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
  CEO Ownership 2.4% 0.4% 5.6% 0.1% 1.5% 
Panel B: Industry-Level 
Characteristics 
Mean Median Std. Dev Q1 Q3 
  Competition (HHI) 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.07 
  Information Cost Index 7.55 8.00 2.24 6.00 9.00 
  Homogeneity 0.22 0.20 0.09 0.15 0.27 
  Industry Takeover Activity 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.10 
Panel C: Acquisition 
Characteristics  
Mean Median Std. Dev Q1 Q3 
  Announcement Return -0.5% -0.4% 6.8% -3.7% 2.8% 
  Relative Deal Size 38% 18% 63% 9% 43% 
  All Stock 35% 0% 48% 0% 100% 
  Diversifying Deal 31% 0% 46% 0% 100% 
  Public Target 62% 100% 49% 0% 100% 
  Foreign Target 11% 0% 31% 0% 0% 
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Table 2: CEO Turnover Clustering 
 
The table reports summary statistics of CEO turnover and the clustering of CEO turnover events at the 
industry-year level.  The sample of CEO turnover events includes 3,596 turnovers from 1992-2014.  
Industries are defined at the Fama-French 48 level and industries with fewer than eight firms in any given 
year are excluded.  Each panel includes statistics on three types of CEO turnover: all, forced, and voluntary.  
Panel A reports the frequency of turnovers during the sample period.  Panel B reports industry-level time-
series clustering as the percentage of turnover events that occur in X% of industry-years.  Panel C reports 
summary statistics on the annual rate of turnover at the industry-level.   
 
 
Panel A: Frequency of Turnover    
Number of 
Firm-Years 
Total Forced 
Turnovers 
Total 
Voluntary 
Turnovers 
Percentage of 
Firm-Years 
with CEO 
Turnover 
Percentage of 
Firm-Years 
with Forced 
CEO 
Turnover 
Percentage of  
Firm-Years 
with 
Voluntary 
CEO 
Turnover 
36,532 945 2,651 9.84% 2.59% 7.26% 
 
 
Panel B:  Industry-Year Clustering 
Turnover Type % of Turnovers % of Industry-Years 
  All 25% 7.7% 
  Forced 25% 4.1% 
  Voluntary 25% 8.1% 
 
 
Panel C: Rate of Turnover within Industries    
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3 
Turnover Rate 9.67% 9.59% 5.46% 5.88% 12.73% 
Forced Rate 2.48% 1.68% 2.97% 0.00% 3.85% 
Voluntary Rate 7.19% 6.67% 4.53% 4.00% 10.00% 
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Table 3: CEO Turnover Waves 
 
The table reports summary statistics on CEO turnover waves in industries identified during the 1992-2014 
sample period, which are detailed in Appendix C.  Industries are defined at the Fama-French 48 level and 
industries with fewer than eight firms in any given year are excluded.  Waves are identified using 
methodology similar to Harford (2005), which is detailed in Section 3.2.  Panel A reports the number of all 
and forced turnover waves and the number of unique industries experiencing at least one wave during the 
sample period.  Panel B reports statistics related to waves of all turnover events and Panel C summarizes 
forced turnover waves.  Number of turnovers during wave (non-wave) periods is the number of firms 
experiencing turnover in the industry during wave periods (non-wave 12-month periods).  Percentage of 
industry experiencing turnover during wave (non-wave) periods is the number of firms experiencing turnover 
in the industry during wave periods (non-wave 12-month periods) scaled by the total number of firms in the 
industry.  Percentage of all industry turnovers during wave (non-wave) periods is the number of turnovers 
that occur during wave periods (non-wave 12-month periods) scaled by the total number of turnovers within 
the industry during the sample period. 
 
Panel A: Frequency of CEO Turnover Waves 
 Number of Waves 
Number of 
Industries 
All Waves 24 20 
Forced Waves 32 23 
 
Panel B: All Turnover Waves     
  
Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
Q1 Q3 
Number of Turnovers 
Wave 18.5 13.0 15.2 10.0 24.5 
Non-
Wave 
4.7 4.0 3.8 2.0 6.0 
Percentage of 
Industry 
Experiencing 
Turnover 
Wave 28% 27% 10% 21% 35% 
Non-
Wave 
10% 9% 5% 6% 13% 
Percentage of All 
Industry Turnovers 
Wave 14% 13% 4% 11% 16% 
Non-
Wave 
4% 4% 2% 3% 6% 
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Table 3: CEO Turnover Waves (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Forced Turnover Waves     
  
Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
Q1 Q3 
Number of Turnovers 
Wave 6.6 5.0 4.9 4.0 6.0 
Non-
Wave 
1.1 1.0 1.5 0.0 2.0 
Percentage of 
Industry 
Experiencing 
Turnover 
Wave 12% 10% 4% 9% 16% 
Non-
Wave 
2% 2% 3% 0% 4% 
Percentage of All 
Industry Turnovers 
Wave 21% 20% 8% 17% 25% 
Non-
Wave 
4% 3% 4% 0% 6% 
Number of Voluntary 
Turnovers 
Wave 6.8 6.0 5.6 2.0 9.0 
Non-
Wave 
3.8 3.0 3.0 2.0 5.0 
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Table 4: CEO Turnover Waves – Industry Determinants 
 
The table reports industry characteristics and compares industry-years in which a forced turnover wave 
begins to industry-years that do not experience a forced turnover wave.  Panel A summarizes equally-
weighted industry stock returns in the one year prior to forced turnover waves, during forced turnover waves 
and all other years outside of forced turnover wave waves.  Panel A also reports the probability of a forced 
turnover wave starting the year following various portfolio sorts of industry stock performance.  Panel B 
summarizes shocks to industry characteristics and differences in those characteristics based on a forced 
turnover wave occurring in the following year.  The sample is split into industry-years experiencing positive 
and negative equally-weighted industry performance in the prior year.  Each industry characteristic shock is 
defined as above or below median for the industry.  Profitability is operating income scaled by total assets.  
R&D is research and development expenditures scaled by total assets.  CAPX is capital expenditures scaled 
by total assets.  Asset turnover is sales scaled by total assets.  Sales growth is the percentage change in sales.  
Competition is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based industry sales.  Information cost index is the 
sum of quartile rankings of median industry forecast error, median industry analyst dispersion and median 
industry number of analysts following (reverse ranking) where the minimum index value is 3 and the 
maximum is 12.  Industry homogeneity is the average partial correlation coefficient between monthly stock 
returns of all firms in the same industry and monthly industry returns.  Industry takeover activity is the 
percentage of firms that receive a takeover offer in a given year.  Industry activist activity is the percentage 
of firms with 13D filer as a shareholder in a given year.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels respectively.    
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Table 4: CEO Turnover Waves – Industry Determinants (Continued)  
 
Panel A: Wave Stock 
Performance 
    
 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3 
Equal-weighted industry return 
(prior) 7.39% 6.86% 25.21% -11.16% 14.38% 
Equal-weighted industry return 
(outside) 9.90% 7.16% 19.68% -3.50% 20.63% 
Equal-weighted industry return 
(during) 10.87% 3.40% 34.55% -7.25% 14.65% 
 
Prior Industry 
Stock 
Performance 
No. of 
Obs. 
Probability 
of Turnover 
Wave Start 
 
Prior Industry 
Stock 
Performance 
No. of 
Obs. 
Probability 
of Turnover 
Wave Start 
Negative 248 5.24%  Quintile 1 138 8.70% 
Positive 465 4.09%  Quintile 2 138 1.45% 
Negative – Positive 1.16%  Quintile 3 161 2.48% 
    Quintile 4 138 6.52% 
    Quintile 5 138 3.62% 
    Q1 – Q5  5.08%* 
    Q1 – (Q2+Q3+Q4+Q5) 5.22%** 
 
Panel B: Wave Industry Shocks   
 Positive Industry Performance  Negative Industry Performance 
 
 
Wave 
Start 
(1) 
Non-Wave 
Start 
 (2) 
 
(1)–(2)    
 Wave 
Start 
(3) 
Non-Wave 
Start 
(4) 
 (3)-(4)    
Profitability 63% 42%  21%**  54% 59%  5%* 
R&D 11% 3%  8%**  15% 16%  -1%* 
CAPX 74% 48%  26%**  54% 43%  11%* 
Asset Turnover 42% 50%  -8%**  46% 53%  -7%* 
Sales Growth 42% 56%  -14%**  62% 43%  19%* 
Competition 53% 46%  7%**  62% 50%  11%* 
Information Cost 
Index 
53% 69%  -16%**  38% 62%  -24%* 
Homogeneity 37% 54%  -17%**  69% 52%  17%* 
Industry Takeover 
Activity 
53% 44%  9%**  62% 53%  9%* 
Industry Activist 
Activity  
42% 31%  11%**  62% 42%  20%* 
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Table 4: CEO Turnover Waves – Industry Determinants (Continued) 
 
Panel C 
Dependent Variable: Forced Turnover      
Wave Start (0/1) 
 
Positive Prior 
Industry Performance 
Negative Prior 
Industry Performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.045 -0.247 
 (0.504) (0.189) 
Stock Return Performance 0.031 -0.446 
 (0.752) (0.113) 
Stock Return Volatility 0.020 0.279 
 (0.768) (0.193) 
Profitability 0.038* -0.054 
 (0.066) (0.126) 
R&D 0.103* 0.093 
 (0.072) (0.197) 
Capital Expenditures 0.051*** 0.031 
 (0.009) (0.376) 
Asset Turnover -0.021 -0.039 
 (0.308) (0.253) 
Sales Growth 0.007 0.070* 
 (0.738) (0.058) 
Competition 0.010 0.020 
 (0.592) (0.539) 
Information Cost Index -0.035* -0.072** 
 (0.091) (0.031) 
Homogeneity  -0.022 0.055* 
 (0.256) (0.090) 
Takeover Activity 0.010 -0.003 
 (0.638) (0.928) 
Activist Activity 0.012 0.064* 
 (0.625) (0.095) 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 465 248 
Adjusted R-squared 0.166 0.247 
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Table 5: CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity 
 
The table reports linear probability models estimating the probability of forced CEO turnover.  The dependent 
variable in each model is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO was fired during a given firm-year.  
In forced wave is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year occurs during a forced turnover wave.  
Industry forced turnover waves are identified for each firm excluding any turnovers that occurred at the firm 
using methodology similar to Harford (2005), which is detailed in Section 3.2.  Idiosyncratic (Industry-
induced) return is the firm-specific (industry) return in the fiscal-year prior.  CEO retirement age is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the age of the CEO is 63-66.  CEO tenure is the tenure of the CEO in years.  
CEO ownership is an indicator equal to one if the CEO’s equity ownership is greater than 5% of outstanding 
shares.  Firm size is the natural logarithm of assets at the end of the prior fiscal year.  Return volatility is the 
standard deviation of monthly returns in the fiscal-year prior.  Institutional ownership is the percentage of 
outstanding shares held by the top five institutional shareholders.  Panel B includes interactions with an 
industry factor indicator.  The industry factor in Model 1 is competition and the industry factor indicator is 
equal to one if the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based industry sales is above the sample median in a 
given year.  The industry factor in Model 2 is information cost and the industry factor indicator is equal to 
one if the information cost index is below the sample median in a given year.  Information cost index is the 
sum of quartile rankings of median industry forecast error, median industry analyst dispersion and median 
industry number of analysts following (reverse ranking) where the minimum index value is 3 and the 
maximum is 12.  The industry factor in Model 3 is homogeneity and the industry factor indicator is equal to 
one if the average partial correlation coefficient between monthly stock returns of all firms in the same FFI48 
industry and monthly industry returns is above the median in a given year.  Panel C includes interaction with 
an underperformer indicator.  Underperformer is an indicator equal to one if the firm’s idiosyncratic returns 
is negative and zero otherwise.  All models include firm and year fixed effects.  Industries are defined at the 
Fama-French 48 level and industries with fewer than eight firms in any given year are excluded.  p-values 
based on standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.    
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Table 5: CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity (Continued) 
 
Panel A 
Dependent Variable:         
Forced Turnover (0/1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.067*** -0.068*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
In Forced Wave 0.010** 0.012** 
 (0.037) (0.024) 
Idiosyncratic Return -0.021*** -0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Idiosyncratic Return *         
In Forced Wave 
 -0.037** 
 (0.021) 
Industry-induced Return -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry-induced Return *      
In Forced Wave 
 -0.011 
 (0.175) 
CEO Retirement Age  0.001 0.001 
 (0.614) (0.609) 
CEO Tenure -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Ownership 0.003 0.003 
 (0.457) (0.448) 
Firm Size 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Return Volatility 0.086*** 0.087*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Institutional Ownership 0.023* 0.022 
 (0.098) (0.105) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 36,532 36,532 
Adjusted R-squared 0.024 0.025 
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Table 5: CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity (Continued) 
 
Panel B Dependent Variable: Forced Turnover (0/1) 
Industry Factor: Competition  Information Cost  Homogeneity 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Intercept -0.067***  -0.066***  -0.066*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
In Forced Wave -0.003  -0.001  0.005 
 (0.621)  (0.835)  (0.331) 
In Forced Wave * Industry Factor 0.056***  0.024**  0.049*** 
 (0.001)  (0.023)  (0.000) 
Idiosyncratic Return -0.020***  -0.021***  -0.020*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Idiosyncratic Return * In Wave -0.017  -0.001  -0.029*** 
 (0.337)  (0.913)  (0.002) 
Idiosyncratic Return * In Wave * 
Industry Factor 
-0.096***  -0.059**  -0.062** 
(0.005)  (0.044)  (0.032) 
Industry-induced Return -0.012***  -0.014***  -0.012*** 
 (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Industry-induced *  In Wave -0.003  0.006  -0.004 
 (0.708)  (0.682)  (0.504) 
Industry-induced * In Wave * 
Industry Factor 
-0.050  -0.028  -0.094*** 
(0.181)  (0.131)  (0.000) 
Industry Factor -0.005  -0.003  -0.001 
 (0.176)  (0.228)  (0.730) 
Idiosyncratic Return *          
Industry Factor 
0.002  0.003  0.007 
(0.728)  (0.462)  (0.261) 
Industry-induced Return *                
Industry Factor 
0.003  0.005  0.006 
(0.490)  (0.314)  (0.289) 
CEO Retirement Age  0.001  0.001  0.001 
 (0.599)  (0.603)  (0.665) 
CEO Tenure -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO Ownership 0.004  0.004  0.003 
 (0.432)  (0.438)  (0.467) 
Firm Size 0.011***  0.010***  0.010*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Return Volatility 0.092***  0.089***  0.087*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Institutional Ownership 0.022  0.022  0.022 
 (0.106)  (0.107)  (0.100) 
Firm & Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 36,532  36,532  36,532 
Adjusted R-squared 0.026  0.025  0.025 
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Table 5: CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity (Continued) 
 
Panel C Dependent Variable: Forced Turnover (0/1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.069*** -0.070*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
In Forced Wave – Outperformer -0.011** -0.019** 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
In Forced Wave – Underperformer 0.034*** 0.008 
 (0.000) (0.559) 
Idiosyncratic Return -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Idiosyncratic Return * In Wave – 
Outperformer 
 0.025 
 (0.243) 
Idiosyncratic Return * In Wave – 
Underperformer 
 -0.190*** 
 (0.001) 
Industry-induced Return -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry-induced *  In Wave – 
Outperformer 
 -0.014 
 (0.167) 
Industry-induced * In Wave – 
Underperformer 
 -0.013 
 (0.365) 
Underperformer 0.005** 0.005*** 
 (0.018) (0.009) 
CEO Retirement Age  0.001 0.001 
 (0.601) (0.607) 
CEO Tenure -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Ownership 0.003 0.003 
 (0.459) (0.467) 
Firm Size 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Return Volatility 0.085*** 0.081*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Institutional Ownership 0.022 0.022 
 (0.104) (0.118) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 36,532 36,532 
Adjusted R-squared 0.026 0.026 
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Table 6: CEO Turnover Announcement Returns 
 
The table reports summary statistics of the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor adjusted three-day cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) for a sample of 887 forced CEO turnover and replacement announcements.  Panel 
A reports statistics of CARs for the full sample and separates turnover and replacement announcements that 
are made on the same date (combined) from those made on different dates (stand-alone).  Panel B compares 
CARs of turnovers announced inside turnover waves versus those announced outside of waves.  ***, **, and * 
denote statistically significant differences in means between these two groups (Inside – Outside) at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
 
Panel A: Forced Turnover Announcement 
Returns  
    
 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3 
Turnover Announcement 887 -0.75% -0.36% 10.64% -5.50% 4.17% 
Replacement Announcement 887 0.83% 0.30% 10.28% -3.35% 4.47% 
       
Combined Announcement 625 -0.07% -0.19% 10.25% -4.72% 4.29% 
Stand-Alone Turnover 
Announcement 
262 -2.38% -1.32% 11.36% -7.01% 3.40% 
Stand-Alone Replacement 
Announcement 
262 2.78% 0.82% 9.93% -1.67% 5.25% 
 
 
Panel B: Inside Wave vs. Outside Wave   
 Inside Wave  Outside Wave   
 N Mean  N Mean  Inside - Outside 
Turnover 
Announcements 
196 0.31%  691 -1.06%  1.37%** 
Replacement 
Announcements 
196 2.01%  691 0.50%  1.51%** 
        
Combined 
Announcements 
142 1.68%  483 -0.58%  2.26%** 
Stand-Alone Turnover 
Announcements 
54 -3.27%  208 -2.15%  -1.12%*v 
Stand-Alone 
Replacement 
Announcements 
54 2.84%  208 2.77%  0.07%* 
 
 
  
53 
 
 
 
Table 7: Propensity Score Matched Sample 
 
The table reports the likelihood of forced turnover conditional on a CEO turnover wave based on a propensity 
score matching methodology.  CEO-firm-years that occur inside of a turnover wave are matched to CEO-
firm-years that occur outside of a turnover wave based on a propensity score.  The propensity score measures 
the likelihood that a CEO-firm-year occurs during a forced turnover wave.  First, the likelihood of a CEO 
turnover wave is estimated for each CEO-firm-year in the sample as a function of industry, firm and CEO 
attributes.  The fitted values from this model are the propensity scores.  Next, CEO-firm-years inside of 
turnover waves are matched to ones outside of waves by the propensity score.  Matching is done without 
replacement to the nearest neighbor in the same sample year using a caliper of 1%.  The number of CEO-
firm-years that are successfully matched are reported.  The average treatment effect (ATE) is the difference 
in the probability of forced turnover between wave CEO-firm-years and non-wave CEO-firm-years.   
 
 In-Wave Out-Wave 
Average 
Treatment Effect 
(ATE) 
p-value for 
ATE 
N 2,018 2,018   
Probability of 
Forced Turnover 
4.41% 3.17% 1.24% 0.039 
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Table 8: CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity – Instrumental Variable Approach 
 
The table reports the results of an instrumental variable approach for estimating the probability of forced 
CEO turnover.  Model 1 reports the first stage linear probability model estimating the likelihood of a forced 
turnover wave.  The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a forced turnover wave 
occurred during the firm-year.  The instrument for forced turnover wave is the average idiosyncratic stock 
return of all other firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry.  Idiosyncratic return is the firm-specific return 
in the fiscal-year prior.  Industry forced turnover waves are identified for each firm excluding any turnovers 
that occurred at the firm using methodology similar to Harford (2005), which is detailed in Section 3.2.  
Model 2 reports the second stage linear probability model estimating the probability of forced CEO turnover.  
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO was fired during a given firm-year.  
Instrumented forced turnover wave is created as the fitted value from the first stage regression.  Idiosyncratic 
(Industry-induced) return is the firm-specific (industry) return in the fiscal-year prior.  CEO retirement age 
is an indicator variable equal to one if the age of the CEO is 63-66.  CEO tenure is the tenure of the CEO in 
years.  CEO ownership is an indicator equal to one if the CEO’s equity ownership is greater than 5% of 
outstanding shares.  Firm size is the natural logarithm of assets at the end of the prior fiscal year.  Return 
volatility is the standard deviation of monthly returns in the fiscal-year prior.  Institutional ownership is the 
percentage of outstanding shares held by the top five institutional shareholders.  Firm and year fixed effects 
are also included.  Industries are defined at the Fama-French 48 level and industries with fewer than eight 
firms in any given year are excluded.  p-values based on standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses.  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.    
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Table 8: CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity – Instrumental Variable Approach 
(Continued) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Forced Turnover 
Wave (0/1) 
 
Forced Turnover 
(0/1) 
 1
st Stage  2nd Stage 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Intercept -0.123***  -0.047** 
 (0.000)  (0.011) 
Instrumented Forced Wave   0.164* 
   (0.088) 
Average Industry  -1.070***   
Idiosyncratic Return (0.000)   
Idiosyncratic Return 0.005*  -0.022*** 
 (0.094)  (0.000) 
Industry-induced Return 0.018***  -0.015*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO Retirement Age  0.001  0.001 
 (0.856)  (0.685) 
CEO Tenure -0.000  -0.001*** 
 (0.164)  (0.000) 
CEO Ownership -0.015**  0.006 
 (0.019)  (0.223) 
Firm Size 0.017***  0.008*** 
 (0.000)  (0.002) 
Return Volatility 0.066**  0.077*** 
 (0.035)  (0.001) 
Institutional Ownership 0.016  0.021 
 (0.394)  (0.127) 
Firm & Year FE Yes  Yes 
Observations 36,532  36,532 
1st Stage Craig-Donald F-statistic 52.84  - 
1st Stage p-value of Craig-Donald 
F-statistic 
0.000  - 
Adjusted R-squared 0.133  0.024 
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Table 9: Acquisition Probability & Announcement Returns 
 
The table reports results of models estimating the likelihood of making an acquisition and abnormal returns 
around acquisition announcements.  Model 1 reports linear probability models estimating the likelihood of 
making an acquisition where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the firm engages in an 
acquisition with a public/private target in a given firm-year and zero otherwise.  Model 2 reports OLS 
regressions estimating abnormal returns around acquisition announcements where the dependent variable is 
the three-day cumulative abnormal return surrounding acquisition announcement dates.  In forced wave is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year occurs during a forced turnover wave and zero otherwise.  All 
other independent variables are measured as of the fiscal year prior.  Idiosyncratic (Industry-induced) return 
is the firm-specific (industry) return in the fiscal-year prior.  Firm size is the natural logarithm of assets at 
the end of the prior fiscal year.  Leverage is total book value of debt scaled by total assets.  Market-to-book 
is market capitalization scaled by the book value of equity as of the prior fiscal year end. Return volatility is 
the standard deviation of monthly returns in the fiscal-year prior.  Institutional ownership is the percentage 
of outstanding shares held by the top five institutional shareholders.  CEO age (tenure) is the age (tenure) of 
the CEO in years.  CEO ownership is an indicator equal to one if the CEO’s equity ownership is greater than 
5% of outstanding shares.  CEO turnover is an indicator equal to one if the firm experienced turnover in the 
prior fiscal year.  Industry takeover activity is the percent of public firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry 
that receive a takeover offer in the prior fiscal year.  Relative deal size is deal transaction value scaled by 
acquirer market capitalization.  All stock is an indicator equal to one if the deal is financed 100% with stock 
and zero otherwise.  Diversifying deal is an indicator equal to one if the acquirer and target are in different 
Fama-French 48 industry and zero otherwise.  Foreign target is an indicator equal to one if the target is a non-
US firm.  Public target is an indicator equal to one if the target is publicly traded and zero otherwise.  Firm 
and year fixed effects are also included.  Industries are defined at the Fama-French 48 level and industries 
with fewer than eight firms in any given year are excluded.  p-values based on standard errors clustered by 
firm are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.    
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Table 9: Acquisition Probability & Announcement Returns (Continued) 
 
Dependent Variable: Acquisition (0/1) 
 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR 
 Model 1   Model 2 
Intercept 0.336***  Intercept 0.077*** 
 (0.000)   (0.005) 
In Forced Wave -0.012*  In Forced Wave 0.016* 
 (0.060)   (0.056) 
Idiosyncratic Return 0.009**  Idiosyncratic Return 0.002 
 (0.015)   (0.685) 
Industry-induced Return 0.017***  Industry-induced Return 0.005 
 (0.000)   (0.296) 
Firm Size -0.040***  Firm Size -0.011*** 
 (0.000)   (0.002) 
Leverage -0.081***  Leverage 0.025 
 (0.000)   (0.167) 
Market-to-Book 0.002**  Market-to-Book -0.002** 
 (0.029)   (0.041) 
Return Volatility -0.144***  Return Volatility 0.047 
 (0.000)   (0.325) 
Institutional Ownership 0.047**  Institutional Ownership -0.007 
 (0.029)   (0.814) 
CEO Age -0.000  CEO Age -0.006 
 (0.978)   (0.362) 
CEO Tenure -0.000  CEO Tenure -0.000 
 (0.758)   (0.883) 
CEO Ownership -0.018**  CEO Ownership 0.010 
 (0.014)   (0.297) 
CEO Turnover -0.010**  CEO Turnover 0.000 
 (0.047)   (0.960) 
Takeover Activity 0.135***  Takeover Activity 0.028 
 (0.000)   (0.363) 
   Relative Deal Size -0.013*** 
    (0.000) 
   All Stock -0.007* 
    (0.095) 
   Diversifying Deal -0.007 
    (0.112) 
   Foreign Target 0.004 
    (0.478) 
   Public Target -0.019*** 
    (0.000) 
Firm & Year FE Yes  Firm & Year FE Yes 
Observations 36,532  Observations 3,009 
Adjusted R-squared 0.092  Adjusted R-squared 0.222 
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Chapter 2:  
The Value of Venue in Corporate Litigation: 
Evidence from Exclusive Forum Provisions 
 
 
Jared I. Wilson† 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In response to the increased threat of shareholder litigation filed in multiple states, firms 
have adopted exclusive forum provisions which limit lawsuits to a single venue of the 
board’s choice.  It is unclear whether these provisions impose increased costs on 
shareholders’ ability to discipline managers and directors or provide benefits to 
shareholders by eliminating multi-forum and duplicative lawsuits.  I use the Delaware 
Chancery Court’s announcement upholding the adoption of these provisions as a natural 
experiment to evaluate their wealth implications.  Overall, my findings suggest that 
exclusive forum provisions create value for shareholders by specifying a required venue 
for corporate litigation.   
 
 
JEL Classification: G30, G34, K22, K41 
Keywords: Exclusive forum provision, shareholder litigation, corporate governance 
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Studies, the 2015 Eastern Finance Association Annual Meeting, the 2015 Financial Management Association 
Annual Meeting, the 2015 Southern Finance Association Annual Meeting, and Drexel University. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance literature examines the mechanisms through which 
managers and directors are incentivized to act in the best interests of shareholders.  Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) suggest one common approach to corporate governance relies on 
empowering investors through legal protection.  When management and the board of 
directors fail to maximize firm value, shareholders have the ability to discipline them 
through litigation.  Jensen (1993) suggests that directors and executives are motivated by 
the reputation effects and adverse publicity associated with litigation.   Consequently, the 
threat and use of shareholder lawsuits is an important external governance mechanism 
aligning the interests of managers and directors with those of shareholders. 
The frequency of shareholder lawsuits has significantly increased in recent years.  
Changes to the shareholder litigation environment are especially apparent in the context of 
mergers and acquisitions.  Cain and Davidoff (2013) document that while only 40% of 
large mergers (>$100 million transaction value) involved litigation in 2005, over 90% of 
deals were litigated in 2012.  Furthermore, the authors report that of the deals litigated in 
2012, more than 70% incurred multiple lawsuits and over 50% involved lawsuits filed in 
multiple forums (states).  For example, target shareholders of Delaware incorporated firms 
typically file multiple lawsuits in Delaware courts as well as outside of Delaware claiming 
that the board breached its fiduciary duty by agreeing to sell the firm for too low a price.  
In most cases, these lawsuits settle for additional disclosure about the merger transaction 
and payment of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.  Judges on the Delaware Chancery Court 
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have become increasingly concerned about this “forum shopping” by lawyers to find the 
state or venue with the most favorable outcome and that pays the highest attorneys’ fees.23     
Many boards of directors have responded to the increased frequency of shareholder 
litigation and the threat of multi-forum lawsuits by adopting exclusive forum provisions to 
corporate charters or bylaws.  These provisions require that shareholder lawsuits brought 
against the firm, executives and/or directors must be filed in a single state or venue of the 
board’s choice.  It is not clear whether these exclusive forum provisions are beneficial or 
detrimental for shareholders.  On the one hand, some shareholders claim that exclusive 
forum provisions restrict their legal rights to choose the litigation venue.  These opponents 
argue that the board’s selection of a state such as Delaware as the required forum insulates 
managers and directors from the threat and discipline of litigation.  For example, 
shareholders may be less willing to file lawsuits in Delaware because of higher expected 
costs associated with what is perceived to be a managerial-friendly venue for litigation.  
Therefore, the managerial entrenchment hypothesis suggests that exclusive forum 
provisions weaken incentives created by potential or actual litigation for managers and 
directors to act in shareholders’ best interests and have negative firm value implications. 
On the other hand, firms argue that exclusive forum provisions benefit shareholders 
by eliminating duplicative lawsuits and specifying the appropriate venue for shareholder 
litigation.  With an exclusive forum provision in place, directors and management save 
time and money by focusing on one lawsuit in one forum instead of essentially identical 
lawsuits in multiple forums every time a major corporate event occurs.  In addition, these 
provisions designate the appropriate venue for litigation by eliminating the risk that other 
                                                           
23 See L. Hoffman, “Judge Makes Merger Lawsuits Disappear” The Wall Street Journal, January 11, 2016. 
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courts involved in multi-forum litigation misinterpret the corporate law of the firms’ state 
of incorporation, which governs shareholder disputes regardless of the venue.  Finally, the 
adoption of a provision may deter opportunistic lawsuits and limit unwarranted reputation 
costs for directors, resulting in the ability to retain or attract more qualified directors.  The 
shareholder interest hypothesis suggests that exclusive forum provisions create value for 
shareholders through the elimination of duplicative shareholder lawsuits and the 
designation of a required venue for litigation.  
I use the Delaware Chancery Court’s Boilermakers decision on June 25, 2013 that 
upheld the adoption of exclusive forum provisions as a natural experiment to examine the 
shareholder wealth implications associated with the adoption of a required venue for 
shareholder litigation.  This announcement provides a clean setting to evaluate the 
shareholder wealth effects associated with these provisions because it involves a decision 
directly related to the validity of provision adoption that is exogenous from firm-specific 
confounding or anticipation effects.  If exclusive forum provisions benefit shareholders by 
allowing boards to select a required litigation venue that eliminates duplicative lawsuits, 
firms that have adopted provisions and those that are more likely to be targeted by multi-
forum litigation should increase in value around the Boilermakers decision relative to firms 
that are less likely.  Alternatively, if these provisions inhibit shareholders’ ability to 
discipline managers and directors through litigation, the opposite result should manifest.  
It is also possible that the costs and benefits associated with a required litigation venue 
depend on the extent to which a firm is likely to be subject to litigation.  In this case, 
provisions may have positive firm value effects for shareholders of some firms, while 
reducing shareholder wealth for others.   
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The results favor the shareholder interest hypothesis and are stronger for firms 
likely to benefit from the elimination of multi-forum lawsuits.  Consistent with the rise of 
merger-related lawsuits, firms that are likely to be subject to a takeover offer and those that 
have already adopted an exclusive forum provision react positively around the 
Boilermakers decision.24  For these firms, the benefits of specifying a required forum 
appear to outweigh the costs that shareholders assume to file litigation in a venue of the 
board’s choice.  However, firms that are unlikely to be subject to merger-related litigation 
experience negative returns around the decision.  There is little benefit associated with 
eliminating duplicative litigation for these firms given that they are unlikely to receive 
multi-forum lawsuits.  Collectively, these findings suggest that the board’s ability to 
unilaterally specify a required forum for shareholder litigation benefits provision adopters 
and firms likely to be subject to merger-related litigation, while shareholders of firms with 
low litigation risk incur costs to discipline managers and directors in a forum of the board’s 
choice. 
To provide additional evidence on the shareholder wealth effects associated with 
exclusive forum provisions and a required venue for litigation, I examine the determinants 
of provision adoption and the market reaction to the announcement of these adoptions.  
Results suggest that firms that are likely to receive a takeover offer are more likely to adopt 
a provision.  This finding is consistent with these firms eliminating multi-forum litigation 
that is typically filed against target boards in merger transactions.  The evidence also 
                                                           
24 Typically, target shareholders file lawsuits against the target board of directors in multiple forums/states 
claiming a breach of fiduciary duty around the announcement of a takeover (Cain and Davidoff, 2013).  
Thomas and Thompson (2004) report that merger-related shareholder lawsuits are the dominant form of 
corporate litigation representing 80% of breach of fiduciary duty claims in1999 and 2000 in the Delaware 
Chancery Court. 
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indicates that firms adopting exclusive forum provisions experience significantly positive 
stock returns around provision adoption announcements.  This result is concentrated in 
firms likely to be subject to a takeover offer and subsequently, merger-related lawsuits, 
which are the dominant form of shareholder litigation (Thomas and Thompson, 2004).  
While this finding may be an anticipation effect of an upcoming bid, tests using the 
Boilermakers decision as a natural experiment are free from these concerns and draw 
similar conclusions.  Overall, these results provide additional evidence in favor of the 
shareholder interest hypothesis suggesting that exclusive forum provisions benefit 
shareholders.   
This study contributes to the literature examining shareholder litigation as well as 
more general work on corporate governance.  First, I investigate the firm wealth 
implications associated with exclusive forum provisions, which significantly change how 
shareholders can pursue litigation against the firm by limiting lawsuits to a single forum of 
the board’s choice.  To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to evaluate the firm 
value effects related to this innovation in the shareholder litigation environment.25  Second, 
this paper adds to prior studies focusing on corporate litigation as a disciplinary mechanism 
(e.g. Fich and Shivdasani, 2007, Cheng, Huang, Li and Lobo, 2010, Brochet and 
Srinivasan, 2014) by examining whether these provisions alter the ability of litigation to 
align the interests of managers and directors with those shareholders.  Finally, the results 
add to the debate over the value of Delaware incorporation.  Prior studies, such as Daines 
                                                           
25 Grundfest (2012) examines the temporal trend of provision adoption and the different methods of adoption 
for IPO firms versus already public firms.  Romano and Sanga (2015) consider the factors driving the growth 
in provision adoption and the different methods of adoption for IPO firms and established firms.  The authors 
document that the trend to near-universal adoption of provisions for IPO firms is driven by law firms that 
always adopt a provision in the IPOs they advise, while corporate governance is not a significant determinant 
of adoption for established firms.  
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(2001), suggest that one channel through which Delaware incorporation is valuable is 
Delaware’s specialized business courts.  My study complements this work by suggesting 
that the Delaware corporate judicial system benefits shareholders of Delaware-
incorporated firms and supports the notion that it is the appropriate venue for shareholder 
disputes involving these firms.  Overall, this paper provides empirical evidence that 
exclusive forum provision and the designation of a specific venue for shareholder litigation 
have positive shareholder value implications, particularly for firms that are likely to be 
subject to merger-related litigation. 
2. Exclusive Forum Provisions and Hypotheses 
2.1 Exclusive Forum Provisions 
Exclusive forum provisions, adopted into either the corporate charter or bylaws, 
create limits on where shareholders can file lawsuits against the firm, executives, and/or 
board of directors.  These provisions require all shareholder lawsuits brought in the name 
of the firm to be filed in the single forum (state or court) of the board’s choice.  The 
provisions serve two purposes including the elimination of duplicative lawsuits as well as 
litigation filed outside of the firm’s state of incorporation.  Bylaw amendments can be 
unilaterally adopted by the board, while charter amendments must be voted on by 
shareholders.  Shareholder lawsuits subject to these provisions are state corporate law 
claims including class-action, derivative, and other intra-corporate suits.  Shareholders 
typically allege that executives or directors violated their fiduciary duty and failed to 
maximize shareholder value.  In the case of major corporate actions like mergers, target 
shareholders may allege that the board agreed to sell the company for too low a price 
(Krishnan, Masulis, Thomas, and Thompson, 2012). 
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2.2 Boilermakers Decision 
The adoption of exclusive forum provisions has created a debate between adopting 
firms and shareholders over whether they are beneficial or detrimental to firm value.  This 
debate is highlighted by shareholders of twelve firms with existing provisions that sued 
each firm’s board in the Delaware Chancery Court in February 2012 claiming that directors 
lacked the power to adopt such provisions without shareholder consent.  All but two of the 
sued firms repealed their existing provisions.  Chevron Corporation and FedEx Corporation 
did not, deciding to litigate.  On June 25, 2013, the Delaware Chancery Court ruled in the 
Boilermakers decision that boards have the authority to adopt these provisions without 
shareholder consent.26  The impact of this decision and exclusive forum provisions, 
however, remains unknown.  Examining the wealth implications of a required forum for 
litigation is essential for our understanding of shareholder lawsuits as an incentive 
mechanism aligning the interests of managers and directors with those of shareholders.  
The debate over provision adoption suggests two competing hypotheses regarding their 
firm wealth effects: the shareholder interest hypothesis and the managerial entrenchment 
hypothesis. 
2.3 Shareholder Interest Hypothesis 
The shareholder interest hypothesis contends that exclusive forum provisions 
benefit shareholders by eliminating duplicative lawsuits and specifying the appropriate 
venue for shareholder litigation.  Boards argue that these provisions increase shareholder 
wealth by eliminating the possibility of a wave of essentially identical lawsuits filed in 
                                                           
26 Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund et al. v. Chevron Corp. et al., No. 7220-CS; IClub Investment 
Partnership v. FedEx Corp. et al., No. 7238-CS, 2013 WL 3191981 (Delaware Chancery, June 25, 2013). 
66 
 
 
 
multiple forums every time a merger or other major corporate action is announced.  With 
an exclusive forum provision in place, directors and management can focus on one lawsuit 
in one forum instead of duplicative lawsuits in multiple states all making the same claim.  
This is important because addressing litigation consumes a large amount of time for 
managers and directors and can be prohibitively costly for the firm and its shareholders 
(e.g. Bizjak and Coles, 1995, Field, Lowry, and Shu, 2005).27   
Boards of directors also argue that exclusive forum provisions benefit shareholders 
by specifying the appropriate venue for litigation.  Boards suggest that plaintiffs’ ability to 
file duplicative lawsuits in multiple forums places shareholders at risk of inconsistent 
rulings.  Exclusive forum provisions eliminate the risk that other courts involved in multi-
forum litigation misinterpret the corporate law of the firms’ state of incorporation, which 
governs shareholder disputes regardless of the venue in which the suit is filed.  For 
example, Delaware incorporated firms may select the state of Delaware, specifically the 
Delaware Chancery Court which has special expertise in applying Delaware corporate law, 
as their exclusive forum. 
In addition to direct costs, such as attorney’s fees, managers and directors face 
reputation costs associated with shareholder litigation.28  The fear of reputation penalties 
may discourage some individuals from serving as directors or cause already serving 
directors to be risk averse, reducing board effectiveness (Black, Cheffins, and Klausner, 
2006).  The adoption of an exclusive forum provision may limit the reputation costs faced 
by directors through the deterrence of opportunistic lawsuits.  Armour, Black, and Cheffins 
                                                           
27 Cain and Davidoff (2013) report an average number of shareholder lawsuits per merger transaction of 5.2 
and average attorneys’ fees of $600,000 per merger-related shareholder lawsuit in 2012. 
28 Hanley and Hoberg (2012), among others, suggest that firms have strong incentives to avoid the potential 
reputational losses associated with litigation. 
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(2012) suggest that Delaware judges apply plaintiff attorney fee scrutiny to encourage what 
the judges perceive as valid cases and discourage frivolous cases brought in Delaware.  One 
possible consequence may be that opportunistic lawsuits are not filed in Delaware that 
otherwise would be brought outside of Delaware.  Given that firms overwhelmingly choose 
Delaware as the required forum, these provisions may limit opportunistic lawsuits.  As a 
result, directors do not face as high of a risk of reputation penalties from frivolous lawsuits 
and firms may increase their ability to attract and retain high quality directors.   
Overall, this hypothesis proposes that exclusive forum provisions benefit 
shareholders by specifying a required venue for shareholder litigation and eliminating 
duplicative multi-forum lawsuits.  The shareholder interest hypothesis suggests:  
        H1: Exclusive forum provisions increase firm value. 
If this hypothesis holds, firms that adopt exclusive forum provisions should 
experience positive abnormal returns around provision adoption announcements.  In 
addition, firms likely to be subject to shareholder litigation and multi-forum lawsuits 
should increase in value around the Boilermakers decision relative to firms with lower 
respective likelihoods.  Firms expected to be subject to multi-forum litigation are likely to 
be affected by the Boilermakers decision because exclusive forum provisions limit 
shareholder lawsuits to a single forum of the board’s choice.   
2.4 Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis 
On the other hand, the managerial entrenchment hypothesis suggests that exclusive 
forum provisions harm shareholders by restricting their choice of the legal venue and 
discouraging discipline of managers and directors through litigation.  Under this 
hypothesis, the board of director’s ability to set the rules governing where they can be sued 
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by shareholders hinders shareholders’ ability to discipline managers and directors and is 
detrimental to firm value.   
  The managerial entrenchment hypothesis recognizes that shareholders must incur 
costs to prevent managers and directors from taking actions that are harmful to shareholder 
interests. Exclusive forum provisions can increase the costs associated with bringing a 
lawsuit and decrease the disciplinary effect imposed on managers and directors by such 
litigation.29  Armour, Black, and Cheffins (2012) provide evidence that shareholder 
lawsuits are increasingly brought outside of Delaware.  This suggests that shareholder 
plaintiffs and their lawyers find the net benefit of filing suit in Delaware to be lower than 
filing in other states.  Given that firms overwhelmingly choose Delaware as their exclusive 
forum, these provisions may discourage shareholders from filing suit against managers or 
directors if it must be done in Delaware.  If exclusive forum provisions deter the threat of 
shareholder litigation, the incentive alignment between shareholders, directors and 
managers may be weakened and allow management and the board to entrench themselves.   
 Exclusive forum provisions allow the board of directors to choose a forum that 
may be perceived as more management and director-friendly (i.e. Delaware).  Several 
studies suggest that Delaware corporate law may cater towards managerial interests (e.g. 
Cary, 1974, Bebchuk, 1992).  Therefore, these provisions may act to increase the job 
security of incumbent management and directors through more favorable outcomes in a 
forum of the board’s choice.  In addition, shareholders may be less willing to engage in 
                                                           
29 In general, proxy advisory firms Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS) and Glass, Lewis & Co. 
oppose exclusive forum provision adoption without a shareholder vote.  ISS and Glass Lewis make case-by-
case recommendations on the efficacy of these provisions but suggest that the provisions may negatively 
impact shareholders by removing their choice of venue.  In addition to recommending a vote against provision 
adoption, Glass Lewis recommends voting against the governance committee chair of any firm that has 
already adopted an exclusive forum provision without shareholder approval. 
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litigation and discipline management and the board if they are limited to only filing 
lawsuits in what is perceived to be a business-friendly venue.   
Prior studies provide evidence of director reputation losses associated with the 
threat of shareholder litigation (i.e. Fich and Shivdasani, 2007).  The fear of lawsuits can 
motivate outside directors to act in the interests of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983 
and Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles, 1987).  However, if exclusive forum provisions reduce 
the threat of shareholder litigation, then the fear of reputation loss associated with these 
lawsuits is reduced.  This decreases the incentive alignment between directors and 
shareholders.  Also, previous studies related to director and officer (D&O) insurance 
suggest mechanisms that shield directors and officers from the discipline of shareholder 
litigation may create unintended moral hazard (Chalmers, Dann, and Harford, 2002 and 
Lin, Officer, and Zou, 2011).  This suggests negative outcomes for similar governance 
mechanisms, like exclusive forum provisions, that may shield directors and officers from 
the discipline of shareholder litigation.   
Overall, this hypothesis proposes that exclusive forum provisions decrease 
incentives created by shareholder litigation for managers and directors to act in 
shareholders’ best interests.  The managerial entrenchment hypothesis suggests:  
        H2: Exclusive forum provisions decrease firm value. 
If this hypothesis holds, firms that adopt exclusive forum provisions should 
experience negative abnormal returns around the announcement of provision adoption.  In 
addition, firms likely to be subject to shareholder litigation and multi-forum lawsuits 
should decrease in value around the Boilermakers decision relative to firms with lower 
respective likelihoods. 
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3. Research Design and Descriptive Statistics 
The initial sample to investigate hypotheses related to the shareholder wealth 
effects of exclusive forum provisions is drawn from the Compustat database.  I begin with 
78,527 firm-year observations during the sample period that begins in fiscal year 2009 and 
ends in fiscal year 2015.  This sample of firm-years is merged with the Center for Research 
of Stock Prices (CRSP) database for stock returns, with the Thomson Reuters Institutional 
Ownership database for institutional ownership, with acquisition data from the 
Thomson/SDC U.S. Merger and Acquisition database (SDC), with Execucomp for CEO 
characteristics, and with governance data from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and 
Management Diagnostic’s BoardEx databases.  After excluding firm-years with missing 
values for stock returns, book value of assets, and institutional ownership, the final sample 
consists of 25,544 firm-year observations for 5,078 unique firms.   
Firms with exclusive forum provisions as of December 31, 2015 are identified in 
two ways.  First, I conduct a Factiva search using the keywords ‘exclusive forum’ and 
‘current report’ to search for public companies that have amended their corporate charter 
or bylaws to include an exclusive forum provision (midstream adopters).  This search 
yields 8-K documents from the SEC announcing the charter or bylaw amendment.  
Information related to the adoption of the provision is collected from the corresponding 
SEC documents (8-K, DEF 14A, etc.).  Second, I search S-1 (IPO) filings for a set of firms 
that went public between 2010-2015.  This set of firms is collected from Thomson/SDC to 
determine if the firm went public with an exclusive forum provision in their corporate 
charter or bylaws at the time of the IPO.  I identify a total of 753 public companies that 
have adopted an exclusive forum provision as of December 31, 2015.  The final sample of 
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provision adopters is restricted to 510 firms (2,156 firm-years) that adopted the provision 
as an already public company (midstream adopter) with available information in the 
Compustat/CRSP sample for fiscal years 2009-2015.  The sample of provision adopters is 
limited to only midstream adopters in order to capture the shareholder wealth effects 
associated with provision adoption.  
The Boilermakers decision on June 25, 2013 provides a good quasi-experimental 
setting to measure the value implications associated with a required forum for shareholder 
litigation.  It involves a decision directly related to the validity of provision adoption that 
is exogenous to confounding effects related to firm-specific provision adoption.  In 
addition, news analyses suggest that the Boilermakers decision was not fully anticipated 
by the market.30   
  Schwert (1981) suggests that stock price changes following an announcement, 
such as the Boilermakers decision, can be informative about the market’s valuation of the 
decision.  Since all firms share the same event window, their abnormal returns may be 
correlated and traditional event study methodology may underestimate the standard errors.  
Schwert (1981) recommends forming portfolios to reduce the cross-sectional correlation 
between stocks.  I adopt this approach and form portfolios based on the likelihood that 
firms in the portfolio are affected by the decision.  The Fama-French-Carhart four factor 
model is used as the benchmark to measure three-day cumulative abnormal returns around 
the Boilermakers decision.  The following regression is estimated:  
                                                           
30 I conduct a Factiva search during the one-year period prior to the Boilermakers decision for any news 
related to its potential outcome.  This search does not yield any events that could be interpreted as related to 
the outcome of this decision prior to its announcement on June 25, 2013.  However, to the extent that any 
earlier unobservable events signaled the outcome of the Boilermakers decision, it will bias against finding 
significant results at its announcement.     
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Rp,t = α + β1Rm,t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + β5Boilermakerst + et           (1) 
where Rp is the portfolio return, Rm is the market return, SMB is the size factor, HML is 
the book-to-market factor, and UMD is the momentum factor, all at date t.  The dummy 
variable Boilermakerst equals one for the three trading days between June 24 and June 26, 
2013, and zero for all other dates.  The estimation period spans the 348 trading days 
between February 7, 2012 and June 26, 2013.  Schwert (1981) suggests that the estimation 
period should include any events related to the ultimate outcome of a decision like 
Boilermakers.  Therefore, I begin the estimation period on the date that shareholders of 
thirteen firms filed lawsuits against each firm’s board of directors over their existing 
exclusive forum provisions.  The estimated average daily abnormal return during the 
Boilermakers decision event window is captured by the β5 coefficient.  
Firms are sorted into portfolios based on the likelihood they are affected by the 
Boilermakers decision to test hypotheses related to the firm value implications of exclusive 
forum provisions.  Firms that are most likely to be affected include those that have or will 
eventually adopt a provision and firms with a higher likelihood of being subject to multi-
forum litigation, given that exclusive forum provisions limit shareholder lawsuits to a 
single venue of the board of director’s choice.  I use measures of the probability of 
receiving a takeover offer as a proxy for the likelihood that a firm is subject to multi-forum 
lawsuits considering the increased frequency of such litigation associated with mergers in 
recent years.  Cain and Davidoff (2013) report that over 90% of large mergers involved 
litigation in 2012 with 50% of these deals receiving multiple lawsuits in multiple forums.  
Typically, target shareholders allege that the target board of directors breached their 
fiduciary duty by failing to disclose sufficient information about the deal and/or obtain a 
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fair price.  Takeover probability is estimated as the fitted value from panel regressions 
using information from the Thomson/SDC Merger & Acquisitions database.31   
 A firm’s existing governance structure may also play a role in the adoption and 
shareholder wealth effects of an exclusive forum provision.32  I consider the effect of 
several internal and external governance features commonly associated with agency 
conflicts including board co-option (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2014), board busyness 
(Fich and Shivdasani, 2006), CEO-Chair duality, CEO ownership, classified board 
(Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005) and institutional ownership. 
Table 1 provides provision characteristics for 753 firms with exclusive forum 
provisions as of December 31, 2015 with available information in Compustat and CRSP.  
Panel A reports that 69% of the sample is a midstream adopter.  Midstream adopters 
typically add the provision to their bylaws, while firms that adopt at their IPO normally 
include the provision in their corporate charter.  Over half of exclusive forum provisions 
were adopted in conjunction with other amendments to the firm’s bylaws/charter.  Finally, 
80% of sample firms have adopted since the Boilermakers decision on June 25, 2013.  This 
result is consistent with the notion that the Boilermakers decision provided clarity on the 
validity of provision adoption and that the decision to uphold exclusive forum provision 
adoption encouraged many firms to adopt.   
Panel B of Table 1 reports the temporal distribution of exclusive forum provision 
adoptions by year.  The low rate of adoption in 2012 and beginning of 2013 can be 
attributed to firms’ reluctance to adopt until lawsuits against FedEx and Chevron related to 
                                                           
31 Appendix B provides variable definitions and estimation results.  
32 Prior literature, such as Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994), suggests that the firm value implications 
associated with the adoption of internal governance mechanisms vary by existing firm governance structures.   
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the adoption of their exclusive forum provisions were resolved in the Delaware Chancery 
Court.  These lawsuits were filed in February 2012 and resolved in June 2013.  Panel C 
describes the industry distribution of exclusive forum provisions by Fama-French 12 
industry classifications.  Provision adoption is not concentrated in any one industry, 
although business equipment (21%), healthcare (19%), financials (12%), and retail and 
wholesale (11%) are the most well represented industries in the sample.  Panel D of Table 
1 details the states selected as exclusive forums and incorporation (headquarters) states of 
sample firms.  Firms overwhelmingly choose Delaware as their exclusive forum, which 
typically matches the firm’s state of incorporation.  Grundfest (2012) and Romano and 
Sanga (2015) construct samples of exclusive forum provision adopters and find similar 
distributions of IPO/non-IPO, charter/bylaw and pre-/post-Boilermakers decision adopters. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Determinants of Exclusive Forum Provision Adoption  
Table 2 presents univariate comparisons of exclusive forum provision adoption firm-
years, firm-years for non-adopting firms, and a matched sample of non-adoption firm-years 
from fiscal years 2009-2015.  I consider takeover probability, firm characteristics, and 
governance measures as the main determinants of provision adoption.  Column 1 includes 
510 provision firm-years, column 2 includes 25,034 firm-years of non-adopting firms, and 
column 3 includes 510 non-adopting firm-years matched to adopting firms based on 
adoption year, industry, and firm size.   
Panel A of Table 2 reports the average difference in measures of takeover 
probability between the sub-samples.  As previously discussed, firms that receive takeover 
offers are likely to be subject to multi-forum litigation.  Consistent with an attempt to 
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eliminate duplicative merger-related litigation, firms that adopt an exclusive forum 
provision have significantly higher takeover probability and actually receive a takeover 
offer in the following year at a significantly higher frequency than non-adopting firms.  
Overall, Panel A suggests that firms adopting exclusive forum provisions are more likely 
to be subject to shareholder litigation and multi-forum lawsuits. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports average differences in firm fundamentals between adopting 
and non-adopting firms.  Focusing on columns 1 and 2, firms with exclusive forum 
provisions are larger, have higher operating performance, higher Tobin’s Q, more free cash 
flow, and lower stock return volatility than non-adopting firms.  Adopting firms are also 
more likely to be incorporated in Delaware as well as incorporated in a state that is different 
from their state of headquarters.  This result is consistent with an attempt to eliminate 
duplicative multi-forum shareholder litigation that may be filed in both the state of 
headquarters and state of incorporation.  Shifting to columns 1 and 3, adopting firms are 
relatively similar to the matched non-adopting sample, but remain more likely to be 
incorporated in Delaware and in a state that is different from the state of headquarters.     
Average differences in corporate governance characteristics are reported in Panel 
C.  There is some evidence that boards of exclusive forum provision adopters have a higher 
percentage of busy directors, but this result only manifests in the non-matched firm 
comparison.  In addition, adopting firms have a higher percentage of institutional 
ownership.  Overall, the results from Table 2 suggest that the main determinant of exclusive 
forum provision adoption is the likelihood of a takeover offer and the subsequent multi-
forum litigation associated with such an offer. 
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Table 3 summarizes the results of logistic regressions modeling the likelihood of 
provision adoption as a function of takeover likelihood, firm attributes and governance.  
The regressions also include year and industry fixed effects.  Panel A includes all firm-
years in the main sample and Panel B includes a sub-sample with available governance 
measures.  Models 1 and 2 include the full sample and Models 3 and 4 are limited to the 
matched sample of adopting and non-adopting firms.  The dependent variable in all models 
is equal to one if the firm adopted an exclusive forum provision in that fiscal year and zero 
otherwise.  Coefficient p-values based on standard errors clustered by industry are reported 
in parentheses and a standardized coefficient in brackets.  The standardized coefficient 
relates the modeled effect on the likelihood of adoption for a one standard deviation change 
in a continuous variable, or for a change from 0 to 1 for an indicator variable.   
After controlling for firm and industry characteristics, Model 1 documents a 
significantly positive relation between provision adoption and takeover probability.  Firms 
that are likely to be subject to multi-forum litigation associated with a takeover appear to 
adopt a provision to eliminate duplicative lawsuits.  The motivation to eliminate 
duplicative, multi-forum litigation is especially relevant for potential takeover targets 
considering that, in the typical merger, target shareholders file lawsuits in multiple forums 
against the target board claiming a breach of fiduciary duty.  
Firms that adopt exclusive forum provisions are larger, have lower prior stock 
performance, more free cash flow and higher R&D expenditures than firms that do not 
adopt.  Even after controlling for firm and industry factors, adopting firms are more likely 
to be incorporated in a state that is different from their state of headquarters, which is 
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consistent with firms attempting to eliminate duplicative multi-forum shareholder litigation 
that may be filed in both the state of headquarters and state of incorporation.33   
Model 2 reports that firms experiencing a takeover offer in the following fiscal year are 
significantly more likely to adopt an exclusive forum provision than firms that do not 
receive a takeover bid.  Firms that are subject to a future takeover bid are 0.8 percentage 
points more likely to adopt a provision, representing a 40% increase in the unconditional 
rate of adoption (2.0%).  This result provides additional support for the notion that firms 
that are likely to be subject M&A-related litigation, the most dominant form of shareholder 
lawsuits, are more likely to adopt a provision.  Results in Models 3 and 4 of Panel A provide 
consistent evidence for the matched sample; exclusive forum provision adopters are more 
likely to receive a future takeover offer.   
The regressions in Panel B of Table 3 control for internal and external measures of 
governance.  Even after controlling for firm governance, provision adopters continue to be 
more likely to be subject to takeover offers than non-adopters.  There is limited evidence 
that adopting firms have boards with a higher percentage of captured directors.  In general, 
however, the results suggest that the governance structure of the firm does not have a 
significant impact on provision adoption.34   
Overall, results from Table 3 suggest that firms likely to be targeted by multi-forum 
lawsuits associated with a takeover offer are more likely to adopt exclusive forum 
provisions.  These results, however, do not provide evidence on the shareholder wealth 
implications associated with these provisions.  In order to distinguish between the two 
                                                           
33 Results are robust to replacing the Different Inc./HQ indicator with an indicator for Delaware 
incorporation, which yields a significantly positive coefficient. 
34 Romano and Sanga (2015) find similar results of no significant differences in the governance structures of 
exclusive forum provision adopters from non-adopters. 
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proposed hypotheses, I begin by examining the firm-specific market reaction to the 
announcement of exclusive forum provision adoption.   
4.2 Market Reaction to Exclusive Forum Provision Adoption  
The sample of provision adoption announcement returns consists of 482 midstream 
adoptions with no confounding events, such as merger or earnings announcements, around 
the announcement date.  Table 4 reports average Fama-French-Carhart four-factor adjusted 
three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) surrounding the filing date of the 8-K 
announcing the amendment to the corporate charter or bylaws.35   
Panel A reports that the full sample average adoption announcement return is positive 
1.56% and statistically significant at the 1% level.  This result suggests that, on average, 
the market perceives exclusive forum provisions as value creating governance 
mechanisms, providing support for the shareholder interest hypothesis.  Furthermore, this 
hypothesis suggests that exclusive forum provisions are more valuable to firms that are 
more likely to be subject to shareholder litigation and multi-forum lawsuits.  The degree to 
which provisions benefit shareholders through increased protection from duplicative 
and/or opportunistic lawsuits may depend on firm-specific characteristics, specifically 
takeover likelihood, state of incorporation, and governance measures.  Therefore, I 
compare announcement returns for firms sorted into high and low sub-samples based on 
full sample median firm characteristics.  All firm characteristics are measured as of the 
fiscal year end prior to the provision adoption announcement. 
Panel B of Table 4 describes results based on high and low takeover likelihood 
subsamples.  On average, adoption firms with higher takeover probability experience 
                                                           
35 Announcement returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  In addition, results are robust to using 1, 2, or 
5-day windows surrounding the announcement date.   
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significantly positive announcement returns of 2.46%, while those with a lower likelihood 
experience average returns of 0.69%, which is still significant at the 10% level.  In addition, 
firms that receive a takeover offer in the year following provision adoption experience a 
significantly positive average announcement return of 10.30%.  These results suggest that 
exclusive forum provisions are especially valuable to shareholders of firms that are likely 
to be subject to takeover-related lawsuits, which is the dominant form of shareholder 
litigation (Thomas and Thompson, 2004).   
An alternative explanation for the positive returns around adoption announcement for 
firms that are likely to or do receive a takeover offer in the future is related to the 
anticipation of an upcoming bid.  Provision adoption, which eliminates multi-forum 
litigation that is especially prevalent in merger transactions, may signal to the market that 
the firm is likely to receive a takeover offer in the future.  Thus, the positive returns around 
adoption may not reflect the market’s evaluation of the provision and instead capture the 
positive effects of the upcoming bid.   
To address this concern, I examine a set of provision adopters in which a future 
takeover bid may be more anticipated.  Cai, Song and Walkling (2011) document that 
takeover bids following a lull in industry takeover activity are less anticipated than 
subsequent bids in that industry.  Therefore, I focus on adopting firms in industries with 
higher takeover activity in the prior year.  For these firms, the adoption of a provision is 
less likely to signal to the market that the firm is expected to receive a takeover offer 
because the possibility of a takeover offer is more likely to have been anticipated in the 
industry.  In these cases, the adoption announcement return should to a greater extent 
reflect the impact of the exclusive forum provision and not an upcoming bid.   
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In unreported results, the average adoption announcement return for firms with above 
median takeover probability and in the highest quartile of prior year industry takeover 
activity is a statistically significant 2.24%.  In addition, adopting firms that receive a future 
takeover offer and are in the highest quartile of prior year industry takeover activity have 
an 8.86% announcement return around provision adoption.  While this test is unable to rule 
out the potential effects of anticipation, subsequent tests using the Boilermakers decision 
as a natural experiment are free from these concerns and are consistent with the positive 
impact of exclusive forum provisions for firms likely to be subject to merger-related 
litigation.   
Panel C of Table 4 sorts firms based on the time period in which they adopted an 
exclusive forum provision.  Firms that adopted provisions following the Boilermakers 
decision on June 25, 2013 experience a significantly positive average announcement return 
of 1.76%, while announcement returns of those that adopted prior are positive, but 
essentially zero.  This result is consistent with the notion that the Boilermakers decision 
provided clarity on the validity of provision adoption and that these provisions are 
beneficial for shareholders.   
Adopting firms are sorted based on their state of incorporation in Panel D.  Regardless 
of differences in state of headquarters and incorporation, adoption announcement returns 
are significantly positive.  In addition, adopters incorporated in Delaware and outside of 
Delaware react positively to adoption announcements.  This evidence refutes the argument 
by opponents of the provisions that boards choose litigation venues, such as Delaware, 
which may be perceived as a more management friendly in order to insulate themselves 
from the discipline of shareholder litigation by choosing.  The positive announcement 
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returns for Delaware incorporated adopters also adds to the debate over the value of 
Delaware incorporation and suggests that one channel through which Delaware 
incorporation is valuable is Delaware’s specialized business courts. This supports the 
notion that it is the appropriate venue for shareholder disputes involving these firms. 
Adoption announcement returns are sorted based on governance characteristics in 
Panel E of Table 4.  Except for adopters with low institutional ownership, all sorts based 
on firm governance experience significantly positive adoption announcement returns.  This 
includes firms with a high percentage of captured or busy directors as well as adopters with 
a CEO-Chair or classified board.  These results suggest that governance structures do not 
play a significant role in the degree of value associated with exclusive forum provisions 
and provide no evidence to support the managerial entrenchment hypothesis which predicts 
significantly lower returns for firms with weaker governance structures. 
The final sort in Panel F of Table 4 is based on two exclusive forum provision 
characteristics.  Provisions that are adopted into the firm’s bylaws or corporate charter both 
experience significantly positive announcement returns.  This result suggests that even 
when boards unilaterally amend the corporate bylaws without shareholder approval to 
adopt an exclusive forum provision, it is value increasing for shareholders.  Panel F also 
reports the announcement returns for provisions adopted without any other amendments to 
the bylaws or charter, which may provide a cleaner test of the firm value implication of 
exclusive forum provisions.  These adopting firms experience significantly positive 
announcement returns of 2.10%.  Collectively, the results in Table 4 suggest that all 
adopters and especially firms most likely to be subject to merger-related litigation and 
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multi-forum lawsuits experience significant gains in firm value associated with exclusive 
forum provision adoption and provide support for the shareholder interest hypothesis. 
Table 5 presents the results of OLS regressions modeling the market response to 
exclusive forum provision adoption as a function of litigation risk, firm characteristics, and 
governance.  The regressions also incorporate year and industry fixed effects.  The 
dependent variable in each model is the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor adjusted three-
day announcement CAR.  Coefficient p-values based on standard errors clustered by 
industry are reported in parentheses.   
After controlling for firm and industry factors, Model 1 documents a significantly 
positive relation between announcement returns and takeover probability.  The results in 
Model 2 report that firms that receive a takeover offer in the year following the adoption 
of a provision experience adoption announcement returns that are 10.0% higher than 
adopters that do not, which is economically significant considering an average 
announcement return of 1.56%.  This result continues to hold after controlling for firm 
governance characteristics in Models 3 and 4.  In general, these results are consistent with 
the notion that the benefits of exclusive forum provisions are greater for firms that are 
likely to be subject to multi-forum litigation as target shareholders typically file lawsuits 
against the target board in multiple venues.  These firms appear to benefit from a required 
venue for litigation which eliminates duplicative lawsuits.   
As mentioned, it is possible that the adoption of an exclusive forum provision signals 
to the market that the firm is likely to receive a takeover offer.  Under this scenario, the 
positive returns observed around provision adoption could reflect anticipation of an 
upcoming bid and prevent interpretation about the true impact of the provisions.  To help 
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address this concern, I repeat the analysis in Table 5 for the subsample of adopters in the 
highest quartile of prior year industry takeover activity in which future takeover offers may 
be more anticipated.  In untabulated analysis, I find quantitatively and qualitatively similar 
results to those in Table 5.  While this robustness test is unable to fully alleviate this 
concern, subsequent tests using the Boilermakers decision as a natural experiment to 
evaluate the wealth implications of exclusive forum provisions are free of concerns related 
to confounding effects of firm-specific adoptions.  This decision was not fully anticipated 
by the market and is exogenous to anticipation effects related to firm decision-making. 
The findings in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that announcement returns to provision adoption 
are significantly positive, supporting the view that these provisions benefit shareholders.  
The designation of a specific venue for shareholder litigation and increased protection from 
duplicative lawsuits provided by provisions are especially valuable for firms that are likely 
to be subject to merger-related litigation in the future.  Overall, these results provide 
evidence in favor of the shareholder interest hypothesis; exclusive forum provisions create 
value for shareholders.   
4.3 Market Reaction to Boilermakers Decision  
The Boilermakers decision of June 25, 2013 provides a natural experiment around 
which to study the firm value implications associated with exclusive forum provisions.  It 
is a setting that was not fully anticipated by the market and is directly related to the validity 
of provision adoption.  The decision validated that boards of directors have the ability to 
unilaterally adopt exclusive forum provisions into the firm’s corporate bylaws without 
shareholder consent.  It is also exogenous from confounding effects related to firm-specific 
provision adoption announcements.  To examine the stock market reaction around this 
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decision, all firms incorporated in Delaware with available stock return data (2,024 firms) 
are sorted into portfolios based on takeover likelihood and exclusive forum provision 
adoption characteristics.36  All firm characteristics are calculated as of the fiscal year end 
prior to the decision.  Next, the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model in equation (1) is 
used to estimate the abnormal returns to the portfolios in the three-day event window 
surrounding the Boilermakers decision.37   
Overall, the results suggest that the firm value implications associated with exclusive 
forum provisions and the ability for boards for unilaterally specify a required forum for 
shareholder litigation depend on the extent to which a firm is likely to be subject to 
shareholder litigation and multi-forum lawsuits.   For provision adopters and firms that are 
likely to be subject to multi-forum lawsuits and merger-related litigation, the benefits of 
specifying a required forum to eliminate duplicative lawsuits appear to outweigh the costs 
that shareholders must bear to file litigation in a venue of the board’s choice.  However, 
for firms that are unlikely to receive multi-forum lawsuits, there is little benefit associated 
with eliminating duplicative litigation and, if the board was to adopt an exclusive forum 
provision, shareholders of these firms must assume the incremental costs of filing a lawsuit 
in a venue that the board selects.    
Table 6 begins by sorting firms into portfolios based on takeover likelihood.  The 
results in Panel A suggest that the stock price reaction to the Boilermakers decision is 
unrelated to the estimated ex-ante probability of a takeover offer.  Panel B, however, 
                                                           
36 The sample is restricted to Delaware incorporated firms given that the decision was made by the Delaware 
Chancery Court and was solely applicable to Delaware incorporated firm.  In unreported results, I also 
examine the market reaction to the Boilermakers decision based on portfolios sorted by measures of firm 
governance.  There are no discernable patterns in returns based on board co-option, board busyness, CEO-
chair duality, or external monitoring. 
37 The average three-day abnormal return based on equation (1) for all firms around the Boilermakers decision 
is -0.320% and significantly different from zero.  
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provides strong evidence that firms that receive a takeover offer in the year following the 
Boilermakers decision experience a significantly positive average return of 1.27% around 
the decision date.  On the other hand, firms that do not receive a future takeover offer 
experience an average return of -0.37%.  A zero-investment portfolio that buys firms that 
receive a takeover offer and sells firms that do not earns a risk-adjusted three-day abnormal 
return of 1.64% that is statistically significant at the 1% level.  This result provides support 
for the notion that the market perceives exclusive forum provisions to be beneficial for 
firms most likely to be subject to multi-forum litigation associated with target shareholders 
typically filing lawsuits against the target board in these transactions, but value-decreasing 
for firms not likely to be subject to such merger-related lawsuits.     
Panel B of Table 6 also double sorts portfolios based on future takeover offers and 
provision adoption.  Of the firms that experience a future takeover offer, nineteen either 
had already adopted an exclusive forum provision or do so following the decision, but prior 
to their takeover offer.  These firms experience an average announcement return of 1.42% 
around the Boilermakers decision, while non-adopting firms earn a 1.23% return.  This 
result suggests that the validation of the board’s ability to specify a required venue for 
shareholder litigation is value-increasing for shareholders of firms most likely to benefit 
from the elimination of duplicative and multi-forum lawsuits, regardless of whether the 
firm actually adopts a provision in the future.   
Focusing on firms that do not receive a takeover offer in the one year following the 
decision, those that adopt a provision before or after the decision earn significantly positive 
returns relative to non-adopting firms.  This result suggests that the ability to specify a 
required forum for litigation is beneficial for adopting firms, even if the firm is not likely 
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to be subject to a takeover offer in the near future.  Significantly negative returns 
concentrated in the non-takeover target, non-adopter portfolio suggests that there are 
potential costs related to the board’s ability to unilaterally specify a litigation venue for 
shareholders of firms that are unlikely to benefit from the elimination of duplicative, multi-
forum lawsuits.  It should be noted that the firms associated with the greatest value losses 
around the decision do not eventually adopt a provision, providing further evidence that 
the actual adoption of an exclusive forum provision is, on average, a value-increasing 
practice.   
Panel C of Table 6 sorts firms into portfolios based on whether the firm had adopted 
an exclusive forum provision before the Boilermakers decision, after the decision or not at 
all.  Relative to firms that never adopt, exclusive forum provision adopters experience a 
significantly positive return around the decision.  The long-short portfolio that buys 
provision adopters and sells non-adopters earns a three-day abnormal return of 0.47%, 
which is statistically significant at the 10% level.  The positive announcement effect for 
provision adopters is concentrated in those firms that had already adopted a provision at 
the time of the Boilermakers decision.  The 0.7% return for these firms is significantly 
different from the portfolio return of firms that never adopt a provision.  Only two of the 
pre-Boilermakers adopters were takeover targets in the year following the decision 
implying that a significantly positive response to the decision is not limited to takeover 
targets as shown in Panel B.  These results suggest that the board’s ability to specify a 
required venue for shareholder litigation is value-increasing for firms that had already 
adopted - evidence in favor of the shareholder interest hypothesis.   
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While the post-Boilermakers adopter portfolio return is not significantly different from 
non-adopters, the long-short portfolio is still positive.  Seventeen of the post-Boilermakers 
adopters eventually receive a takeover offer in the following year and earn an abnormal 
return of 1.58% around the decision providing more evidence of the benefits of provision 
adoption for these types of firms.  The insignificant return for most of the post-
Boilermakers adopters suggests that the market may not be able to fully anticipate which 
firms will adopt unless the firm is likely to receive a takeover offer.  Even in those cases 
where the market cannot fully anticipate the provision adoption and its benefits, Table 4 
provided evidence that firms earn positive returns around their individual adoption 
announcements following the Boilermakers decision.  Collectively, the findings related to 
the market reaction surrounding the Boilermakers decision suggest that exclusive forum 
provisions and the ability to specify a required venue for shareholder litigation are 
beneficial for adopting firms as well as those firms likely to be targeted by duplicative 
and/or opportunistic merger-related lawsuits and are detrimental to firms that are not.   
5. Conclusion 
Shareholders’ ability to discipline management and the board through the threat 
and use of corporate litigation is an important incentive mechanism aligning the interests 
of managers and directors with those of shareholders.  In recent years, many firms have 
responded to an increased frequency of shareholder litigation and threat of multi-forum 
lawsuits, specifically related to mergers, by adopting exclusive forum provisions.  These 
provisions eliminate duplicative shareholder lawsuits filed against the firm, executives 
and/or directors to a single state or venue of the board’s choice.  In this paper, I examine 
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the shareholder wealth implications associated with the adoption of exclusive forum 
provisions and a required venue for shareholder litigation. 
The results indicate that these provisions benefit shareholders by specifying a 
required venue for shareholder litigation and eliminating duplicative multi-forum lawsuits.  
Takeover likelihood is a key determinant of provision adoption as firms with a higher 
probability of receiving a takeover offer and expected to be subject to multi-forum 
litigation are more likely to adopt a provision.  In addition, I find that firms adopting 
exclusive forum provisions experience significantly positive stock returns around the 
announcement of provision adoption suggesting that the market perceives these provisions 
to be value increasing governance mechanisms.  The designation of a specific venue for 
shareholder litigation and increased protection from duplicative lawsuits provided by 
provisions are especially valuable for firms that are likely to be subject to merger-related 
litigation in the future. 
I use the Delaware Chancery Court’s Boilermakers decision on June 25, 2013 that 
upheld the adoption of these exclusive forum provisions as a natural experiment to further 
examine the shareholder wealth effects of such provisions.  The results suggest that firms 
that adopt exclusive forum provisions and those that are likely to be subject to shareholder 
litigation and multi-forum lawsuits increase in value around this decision relative to firms 
with low litigation risk.  This evidence suggests that exclusive forum provisions and the 
ability for boards to unilaterally specify a required forum for shareholder litigation are 
value-increasing for provision adopters and firms that are likely to be subject to multi-
forum lawsuits and merger-related litigation, while shareholders of firms with low 
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litigation risk appear to incur increased costs to discipline the board and managers using 
lawsuits. 
This paper contributes to the literature examining shareholder litigation as an 
incentive mechanism aligning the interests of managers and directors with those of 
shareholders.  Exclusive forum provisions significantly change how shareholders can 
pursue litigation against the firm by limiting lawsuits to a single venue of the board’s 
choice.  This recent innovation in the shareholder litigation environment benefits 
shareholders, especially those of firms likely to be targeted by multi-forum and merger-
related litigation.  In addition, the results shed light on the value of Delaware incorporation 
considering that the vast majority of provision adopters are Delaware-incorporated firms 
that choose Delaware as their exclusive forum.  This study suggests that Delaware’s 
corporate judicial system benefits shareholders of Delaware-incorporated firms and 
supports the notion that Delaware is the appropriate venue for shareholder disputes 
involving these firms.  Overall, exclusive forum provisions and a required venue for 
shareholder lawsuits are associated with positive wealth effects for shareholders of firms 
likely to be subject to litigation.    
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Appendix A:  Variable Definitions  
 
 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Takeover Likelihood Measures  
Takeover Probability The fitted value from a panel regression estimating the probability that a firm 
will be subject to a takeover offer (Appendix B) 
Future Takeover Indicator equal to one if a firm is subject to a takeover offer in the following 
fiscal year 
Panel B: Firm 
Characteristics 
 
Firm Size  Natural log of total market capitalization  
ROA Net income scaled by total book value of assets 
Tobin’s Q Market value of firm scaled by total book value of assets 
FCF Operating cash flow minus dividends scaled by total book value of assets 
R&D Research and development expenditures scaled by total assets 
Leverage Total book value of debt scaled by total book value of assets 
Prior Performance One-year buy and hold market-adjusted return in prior fiscal year 
Return Volatility Standard deviation of daily returns over prior fiscal year 
Delaware Incorporation Indicator equal to one if a firm’s state of incorporation is Delaware 
Different Inc./HQ Indicator equal to one if a firm’s state of incorporation is different from its 
state of headquarters 
Panel C: Governance Characteristics 
Captured Percentage of independent directors with tenure less than the tenure of the 
current CEO 
Busy Percentage of independent directors with greater than or equal to three 
additional public directorships 
CEO Chair Indicator equal to one if the CEO is also chair of the board 
Institutional Ownership Percentage of outstanding shares held by the top five institutional investors 
CEO Ownership Percentage of outstanding shares held by the CEO 
Classified Board Indicator equal to one if the firm has a classified board 
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Appendix B:  Takeover Probability Model 
 
The table reports logistic regressions modeling takeover probability.  The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one 
if the firm was subject to a takeover offer in year t and zero otherwise.  Coefficients are estimated for 25,544 firm-years 
over the 2009-2015 period.  All independent variables are measured at the end of fiscal year t-1.  Firm Size is the natural 
log of market capitalization.  Tobin’s Q is market value of the firm scaled by total book value of assets.  FCF is operating 
cash flow minus dividends scaled by total book value of assets.  Leverage is total debt scaled by total book value of 
assets.  ROA is net income scaled by total book value of assets.  Institutional ownership is the percent of shares held by 
the top five institutional investors.  Targeted in Industry is the number of other firms in the same Fama-French 12 industry 
subject to a takeover offer in a given sample year.  Year and industry (Fama-French 12) fixed effects are also included.  
p-values based on standard errors clustered by industry are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 Takeover Bid 
Intercept -1.970*** 
 (0.000) 
Firm Size -0.198*** 
 (0.000) 
 [-0.011] 
Tobin’s Q -0.070*** 
 (0.000) 
 [-0.004] 
FCF 0.415 
 (0.256) 
 [0.022] 
Leverage 0.722*** 
 (0.003) 
 [0.039] 
ROA 0.019 
 (0.959) 
 [0.001] 
PPE -0.303* 
 (0.088) 
 [-0.016] 
Institutional Ownership 1.077*** 
     (0.000) 
 [0.058] 
Targeted in Industry 0.016*** 
     (0.004) 
 [0.001] 
  
Observations 25,544 
Pseudo r2 0.029 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
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Table 1:  Provision Characteristics 
 
The table reports summary statistics on provision characteristics for 753 firms with exclusive forum provisions through 
December 31, 2015 with available information in Compustat and CRSP.  Panel A reports characteristics on when the 
exclusive forum provision was adopted (at IPO vs. after IPO), whether the exclusive forum provision was adopted into 
the corporate bylaws or corporate charter, whether the exclusive forum provision was adopted as a stand-alone 
amendment or in conjunction with other amendments and whether the exclusive forum provision was adopted before or 
after the Boilermakers decision (June 25, 2013).  Panel B reports the temporal distribution of sample exclusive forum 
adoptions by year.  Panel C reports the industry distribution of sample exclusive forum provisions by Fama-French 12 
industry classification.  Panel D reports the top five states selected as the exclusive forum, the top five states of 
incorporation and the top five states of headquarters for sample exclusive forum provision adopters. 
 
Panel A: Provision Characteristics    
 N %     
IPO 235 31%     
Non-IPO 518 69%     
Bylaw Amendment 519 69%     
Charter Amendment 234 31%     
Stand-Alone Amendment 322 43%     
Combined Amendment 431 57%     
Pre-Boilermakers 147 20%     
Post-Boilermaker 606 80%     
Panel B:  Adoption Date    
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Provision count 33 94 13 206 249 158 
Percent (%) 4% 13% 2% 27% 33% 21% 
Panel C:  Industry Distribution    
 N %     
Non-Durables 29 4%     
Durables 10 1%     
Manufacturing 70 9%     
Energy 30 4%     
Chemicals 20 3%     
Business Equipment 155 21%     
Telecommunications 22 3%     
Utilities 10 1%     
Retail & Wholesale 84 11%     
Healthcare 144 19%     
Financials 87 12%     
Other 92 12%     
Panel D:  States         
Exclusive Forum 
State (Top 5) N % 
Incorporation 
State (Top 5) N % 
Headquarters 
State (Top 5) N % 
Delaware 671 89% Delaware 675 90% California 188 25% 
Maryland 13 2% Maryland 14 2% Texas 76 10% 
North Carolina 9 1% North Carolina 7 1% New York 53 7% 
California 7 1% Nevada 7 1% Massachusetts  46 6% 
Nevada 6 1% Pennsylvania 5 1% Illinois 43 6% 
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Table 2:  Firm Characteristics – Midstream Adopters  
 
The table reports sample means for firm-year observations with non-missing data in Compustat and CRSP for fiscal years 
2009-2015.  Column 1 includes 510 firm-years in which a firm adopted an exclusive forum provision.  Column 2 includes 
25,034 non-adoption firm-years.  Column 3 includes 510 non-adoption firm-years matched to adopting firms based on 
adoption year, industry and firm size.  The final columns are differences in means between adopting and non-adopting 
firm-years.  Panel A includes measures of takeover likelihood.  Takeover Probability is the fitted value from a panel 
regression estimating the probability that a firm will be subject to a takeover offer (Appendix B).  Future Takeover is an 
indicator equal to one if the firm was subject to a takeover during the following fiscal year.  Panel B includes other firm 
characteristics measured in the fiscal year prior to provision adoption.  Firm Size is the natural log of total market 
capitalization.  ROA is net income scaled by total book value of assets.  Tobin’s Q is market value of the firm scaled by 
total book value of assets.  FCF is operating cash flow minus dividends scaled by total book value of assets.  Leverage is 
total book value of debt scaled by total book value of assets.  R&D is research and development expenditures scaled by 
total book value of assets.  Prior Performance is the one-year buy and hold abnormal return over the prior fiscal year.  
Return Volatility is the standard deviation of daily return over the fiscal year.  Delaware Incorporation is an indicator 
equal to one if the firm’s state of incorporation is Delaware.  Different Inc./HQ is an indicator equal to one if the firm’s 
state of incorporation is different from its state of headquarters.  Panel C includes firm governance characteristics 
measured in the fiscal year prior to provision adoption.  Captured is the percentage of independent directors with tenure 
less than the tenure of the current CEO.  Busy is the percentage of independent directors with greater than or equal to 
three additional public directorships.  CEO Chair is an indicator equal to one if the CEO is also chair of the board.  
Institutional ownership is the percent of shares held by the top five institutional investors.  ***, **, and * denote statistically 
significant differences in means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 2:  Firm Characteristics – Midstream Adopters (Continued) 
 
Panel A: Takeover Risk     
 
Adopters  
(1) 
Non-Adopters 
 (2) 
Non-Adopters 
Matched  
(3) 
(1) – (2)    (1) – (3)    
Takeover Probability 6.4% 6.3% 6.0% 0.1%*** 0.4%*** 
Future Takeover 15.3% 6.1% 4.9% 9.2%*** 10.4%*** 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics     
 
Adopters  
(1) 
Non-Adopters 
 (2) 
Non-Adopters 
Matched  
(3) 
(1) – (2)    (1) – (3)    
Firm Size 7.16 6.23 7.15 0.93*** 0.00*** 
ROA 7.3% 3.3% 6.6% 4.0%*** 0.7%*** 
Tobin's Q 2.09 1.89 2.34 0.20*** -0.25*** 
FCF 3.8% 0.9% 2.8% 2.9%*** 1.0%*** 
Leverage 22.5% 21.3% 19.4% 1.3%*** 3.1%*** 
R&D 5.7% 5.0% 5.2% 0.6%*** 0.5%*** 
Prior Performance 2.6% 0.5% 6.9% 2.2%*** -4.3%*** 
Return Volatility 10.4% 12.6% 10.7% -2.2%*** -0.3%*** 
Delaware 
Incorporation 
85.3% 61.2% 64.7% 24.1%*** 20.6%*** 
Different Inc./HQ 89.6% 70.8% 75.1% 18.8%*** 14.5%*** 
Panel C: Governance Characteristics    
 
Adopters  
(1) 
Non-Adopters 
 (2) 
Non-Adopters 
Matched  
(3) 
(1) – (2)    (1) – (3)    
Captured 47.8% 46.4% 47.3% 1.5%*** 0.6%*** 
Busy 20.8% 16.0% 19.4% 4.8%*** 1.4%*** 
CEO Chair  46.0% 48.2% 45.6% -2.3%*** 0.4%*** 
Institutional 
Ownership 
28.4% 25.5% 27.2% 2.9%*** 1.3%*** 
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Table 3:  Probability of Exclusive Forum Provision Adoption 
 
The table reports logistic regressions modeling the likelihood of exclusive forum provision adoption.  The sample consists 
of 25,544 firm-year observations from 2009-2015.  In each model, the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if 
the firm adopts an exclusive forum provision in that fiscal year and zero otherwise.  Panel A reports the results for the 
full sample of firm-years.  Panel B reports results for a sub-sample of firm-years with available firm governance 
characteristics.  Models 1 and 2 of each panel includes all firm-year observations.  Models 3 and 4 include the sample of 
510 adoption firm-years and 510 non-adoption firm-years matched to adopting firms based on adoption year, industry 
and firm size.  Takeover Probability is the fitted value from a panel regression estimating the probability that a firm will 
be subject to a takeover offer in the following fiscal year (Appendix B).  Future Takeover is an indicator equal to one if 
the firm is subject to a takeover offer in the following fiscal year.  Captured is the percentage of independent directors 
with tenure less than the tenure of the current CEO.  Busy is the percentage of independent directors with greater than or 
equal to three additional public directorships.  CEO Chair is an indicator equal to one if the CEO is also chair of the 
board.  Firm Size is the natural log of total market capitalization.  Prior Performance is the one-year buy and hold 
abnormal return over the prior fiscal year.  FCF is operating cash flow minus dividends scaled by total book value of 
assets.  Leverage is total book value of debt scaled by total book value of assets.  R&D is research and development 
expenditures scaled by total book value of assets.  Institutional ownership is the percent of shares held by the top five 
institutional investors.  Different Inc./HQ is an indicator equal to one if the firm’s state of incorporate is different from 
firm’s state of headquarters.  All independent variables are measured at the end of the prior fiscal year.  Year and industry 
fixed effects based on Fama-French 12 industry classifications are also included.  p-values based on standard errors 
clustered by industry are in parentheses and marginal effects computed at the mean values of the independent variables 
are provided in brackets.  Marginal effects are the change in the probability of provision adoption for a one standard 
deviation change in a continuous variable or a shift from zero to one for an indicator variable.  ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 3: Probability of Exclusive Forum Provision Adoption (continued) 
 
Panel A: Full Sample  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept  -8.566*** -7.903*** -2.136*** -1.296*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Takeover Probability  0.073**  0.087**  
     (0.028)  (0.026)  
  [0.001]  [0.022]  
Future Takeover   1.026***  1.266*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
   [0.008]  [0.316] 
Firm Size  0.220*** 0.170*** 0.033 -0.022 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.300) (0.211) 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.008] [-0.006] 
Prior Performance  -0.232* -0.232** -0.207 -0.230 
  (0.055) (0.022) (0.221) (0.163) 
  [-0.002] [-0.002] [-0.052] [-0.058] 
FCF  1.093*** 1.227*** 1.190*** 1.279*** 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) 
  [0.009] [0.010] [0.297] [0.320] 
Leverage  -0.339 -0.089 0.500 0.857*** 
  (0.257) (0.635) (0.112) (0.007) 
  [-0.003] [-0.001] [0.125] [0.214] 
R&D  1.615** 1.371** 2.390*** 2.111*** 
  (0.021) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) 
  [0.013] [0.011] [0.598] [0.528] 
Institutional Ownership  -0.023 0.468 -0.078 0.491 
  (0.965) (0.152) (0.904) (0.461) 
  [-0.000] [0.004] [-0.020] [0.123] 
Different Inc./HQ  1.090*** 1.080*** 1.118*** 1.128*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  [0.009] [0.008] [0.280] [0.282] 
      
Year & Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  25,544 25,544 1,020 1,020 
Pseudo r2  0.135 0.144 0.044 0.063 
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Table 3: Probability of Exclusive Forum Provision Adoption (continued) 
 
Panel B: Governance Sample  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept  -8.447*** -7.861*** -2.159*** -1.353*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Takeover Probability  0.067*  0.083**  
     (0.052)  (0.039)  
  [0.001]  [0.021]  
Future Takeover   1.048***  1.249*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
   [0.010]  [0.312] 
Captured  0.227* 0.238* 0.255* 0.210 
  (0.090) (0.087) (0.073) (0.130) 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.064] [0.052] 
Busy  0.204 0.211 0.179 0.182 
  (0.347) (0.319) (0.661) (0.639) 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.045] [0.045] 
CEO-Chair  -0.096 -0.094 -0.122 -0.095 
  (0.265) (0.268) (0.143) (0.244) 
  [-0.001] [-0.001] [-0.030] [-0.024] 
Firm Size  0.202*** 0.155*** 0.025 -0.028 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.560) (0.152) 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.006] [-0.007] 
Prior Performance  -0.259** -0.254** -0.224 -0.242 
  (0.042) (0.017) (0.167) (0.134) 
  [-0.003] [-0.002] [-0.056] [-0.060] 
FCF  1.156*** 1.284*** 1.152** 1.240*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.003) 
  [0.011] [0.012] [0.288] [0.310] 
Leverage  -0.246 -0.025 0.493 0.830*** 
  (0.397) (0.889) (0.117) (0.009) 
  [-0.002] [-0.000] [0.123] [0.207] 
R&D  1.404** 1.187** 2.293*** 2.040*** 
  (0.023) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) 
  [0.014] [0.011] [0.573] [0.510] 
Institutional Ownership  -0.067 0.388 -0.096 0.446 
  (0.898) (0.243) (0.883) (0.498) 
  [-0.001] [0.004] [-0.024] [0.112] 
Different Inc./HQ  1.106*** 1.100*** 1.151*** 1.154*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  [0.011] [0.011] [0.288] [0.289] 
      
Year & Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  22,569 22,569 1,020 1,020 
Pseudo r2  0.122 0.131 0.046 0.064 
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Table 4:  Exclusive Forum Provision Adoption Announcement Returns 
 
The table reports sample mean Fama-French-Carhart four-factor adjusted three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
for a sample of 482 non-IPO exclusive forum provision adoption announcements.  The announcement date is defined as 
the 8-K filing date announcing the bylaw/charter change with the SEC.  Any announcements with confounding events, 
such as merger or earnings announcements are excluded from the sample.  Announcement returns are winsorized at the 
1% and 99% levels.  Panel A reports mean CARs for the full sample.  Panel B sorts the sample into high and low samples 
based on full sample median takeover measures.  Takeover Probability is the fitted value from a panel regression 
estimating the probability that a firm will be subject to a takeover offer in the following fiscal years (Appendix B).  Future 
Takeover is an indicator equal to one if the firm is subject to a takeover offer in the following fiscal year.  Panel C sorts 
the sample into pre- and post-Boilermakers decision samples.  Panel D sorts the sample in whether the firm is incorporated 
in a state that is different from its state of headquarters and whether the firm is incorporated in the state of Delaware.  
Panel E sorts the sample into high/yes and low/no samples based on full sample median governance characteristics.  
Captured is the percentage of independent directors with tenure less than the tenure of the current CEO.  Busy is the 
percentage of independent directors with greater than or equal to three additional public directorships.  CEO Chair is an 
indicator equal to one if the CEO is also chair of the board.  Institutional ownership is the percent of shares held by the 
top five institutional investors.  CEO Ownership is the percentage of outstanding shares held by the CEO.  Classified 
Board is an indicator equal to one if the firm has a classified board.  Panel F sorts the sample into yes and no samples 
based on exclusive forum provision characteristics.  Bylaw Amendment is an indicator equal to one if the exclusive forum 
provision is added to the corporate bylaws.  Stand-Alone Amendment is an indicator equal to one if the exclusive forum 
provision amendment is the only change made to the corporate bylaws or charter.  All firm characteristics are measured 
as of the fiscal year end prior to provision adoption.  ***, **, and * denote statistically significant differences in means at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 4: Exclusive Forum Provision Adoption Announcement Returns (continued) 
 
Panel A: Full Sample       
 N Avg. CAR   % Positive  
  Full Sample 482 1.56%***   52.28%  
Panel B: Takeover Probability High   Low  
 N Avg. CAR  N Avg. CAR High-Low    
  Takeover Probability 236 2.46%***  246 0.69%*** 1.77%*** 
  Future Takeover 66 10.30%***  416 0.17%*** 10.13%*** 
Panel C: Boilermakers Decision Yes   No  
 N Avg. CAR  N Avg. CAR Yes-No    
  Post Decision 421 1.76%***  61 0.15%*** 1.61%*** 
Panel D: State of Incorporation Yes   No  
 N Avg. CAR  N Avg. CAR Yes-No 
  Different Inc./HQ 429 1.51%***  53 1.97%*** -0.38%*** 
  Delaware Incorporation 408 1.41%***  74 2.34%*** -0.93%*** 
Panel E: Governance Characteristics High/Yes   Low/No  
 N Avg. CAR  N Avg. CAR High-Low    
  Captured 244 2.09%***  238 1.01%*** 1.08%*** 
  Busy 289 1.69%***  193 1.35%*** 0.34%*** 
  CEO Chair 217 1.59%***  265 1.53%*** 0.06%*** 
  Institutional Ownership 303 2.20%***  179 0.47%*** 1.72%*** 
  CEO Ownership 288 1.28%***  194 1.97%*** -0.69%*** 
  Classified Board 228 1.55%***  254 1.57%*** -0.02%*** 
Panel F: Provision Characteristics Yes   No  
 N Avg. CAR  N Avg. CAR Yes-No 
  Bylaw Amendment 469 1.55%***  13 1.61%*** -0.06%*** 
  Stand-Alone Amendment 312 2.10%***  170 0.60%*** 1.54%*** 
 
  
100 
 
 
 
Table 5:  Exclusive Forum Provision Adoption Announcement Returns - Multivariate 
 
This table presents OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor adjusted three-
day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) surrounding exclusive forum provision adoption announcement.  Announcement 
returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  Takeover Probability is the fitted value from a panel regression 
estimating the probability that a firm will be subject to a takeover offer in the following fiscal year (Appendix B).  Future 
Takeover is an indicator equal to one if the firm is subject to a takeover offer in the following fiscal year.  Firm Size is 
the natural log of total market capitalization.  Prior Performance is the one-year buy and hold abnormal return over prior 
fiscal year.  FCF is operating cash flow minus dividends scaled by total book value of assets.  Leverage is total book 
value of debt scaled by total book value of assets.  R&D is research and development expenditures scaled by total book 
value of assets.  Institutional ownership is the percent of shares held by the top five institutional investors.  Delaware 
Incorporation is an indicator equal to one if the firm is incorporated in the state of Delaware.  Bylaw Amendment is an 
indicator equal to one if the exclusive forum provision is added to the corporate bylaws.  Stand-Alone Amendment is an 
indicator equal to one if the exclusive forum provision amendment is the only change made to the corporate bylaws or 
charter.  Post-Boilermakers is an indicator equal to one if the firm adopts the exclusive forum provision following the 
Boilermakers decision on June 25, 2013.  Captured is the percentage of independent directors with tenure less than the 
tenure of the current CEO.  Busy is the percentage of independent directors with greater than or equal to three additional 
public directorships.  CEO Chair is an indicator equal to one if the CEO is also chair of the board.  CEO Ownership is 
the percentage of outstanding shares held by the CEO.  Classified Board is an indicator equal to one if the firm has a 
classified board.  All firm characteristics are measured as of the fiscal year end prior to provision adoption.  Industry 
fixed effects based on Fama-French 12 industry classifications are also included.  p-values based on standard errors 
clustered by Fama-French 12 industries are in parentheses ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels respectively.  
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Table 5: Exclusive Forum Provision Adoption Announcement Returns - Multivariate 
(continued) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -0.035 0.006 -0.028 0.005 
 (0.354) (0.755) (0.475) (0.824) 
Takeover Probability 0.005*  0.005*  
 (0.074)  (0.094)  
Future Takeover  0.100***  0.100*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Firm Size 0.005* 0.002 0.004 0.002 
 (0.100) (0.325) (0.311) (0.548) 
Prior Performance -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.214) (0.299) (0.240) (0.284) 
FCF 0.015 0.012 0.018 0.014 
 (0.471) (0.778) (0.445) (0.752) 
Leverage -0.021 -0.001 -0.021 -0.001 
 (0.375) (0.957) (0.389) (0.918) 
R&D  0.032 0.009 0.031 0.011 
 (0.316) (0.835) (0.330) (0.789) 
Institutional Ownership -0.001 0.021 -0.003 0.019 
 (0.987) (0.563) (0.938) (0.650) 
Delaware Incorporation -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.011 
 (0.349) (0.144) (0.381) (0.176) 
Bylaw Amendment -0.011 -0.015 -0.011 -0.014 
 (0.288) (0.202) (0.339) (0.259) 
Stand-Alone Amendment 0.014** 0.003 0.014** 0.003 
 (0.036) (0.520) (0.031) (0.540) 
Post-Boilermakers 0.013 0.004 0.014* 0.006 
 (0.101) (0.376) (0.063) (0.303) 
Captured   -0.001 -0.004 
   (0.919) (0.664) 
Busy   0.015 0.010 
   (0.609) (0.637) 
CEO Chair   0.002 0.005 
   (0.865) (0.576) 
CEO Ownership   -0.018 -0.009 
   (0.595) (0.732) 
Classified Board   0.001 0.003 
   (0.902) (0.723) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 482 482 482 482 
F-statistic 1.42 2.87 1.41 2.72 
p-value of F-statistic 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 
Adjusted r2 0.05 0.24 0.05 0.26 
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Table 6:  Market Reaction to Boilermakers Decision 
 
The table reports portfolio returns for all Delaware-incorporated firms with non-missing information in Compustat and 
CRSP around the Boilermakers decision on June 25, 2013.  Portfolio returns are Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model 
returns over the 3-day window surrounding the Boilermakers decision estimated using equation (1).  Portfolios are sorted 
based on takeover probability measures and exclusive forum provision adoption characteristics.  Panel A reports results 
for portfolios sorted by Takeover Probability, which is the fitted value from a panel regression estimating the probability 
that a firm will be subject to a takeover offer (Appendix B).  Panel B reports results for portfolios sorted by Future 
Takeover, which is an indicator equal to one if the firm is subject to a takeover offer in the following fiscal year.  Panel 
C reports results for portfolios sorted by whether the firm has an exclusive forum provision in place at the time of the 
Boilermakers decision or adopts one following the decision.  All firm characteristics are measured as of the fiscal year 
end prior to the Boilermakers decision.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively.   
 
Panel A: Takeover Probability    
 # of Firms Takeover Prob. Portfolio CAR (%) t-stat 
1 Lowest 506 3.21% -0.011% -0.04** 
2 506 4.72% -0.240% -0.84** 
3 506 6.14% -0.632% -2.15*** 
4 Highest 506 8.89% -0.306% -0.93** 
  Diff (4-1) -0.295% -0.74** 
 
Panel B: Future Takeover     
 # of Firms  Portfolio CAR (%) t-stat 
No 1,929  -0.374% *-1.83*** 
   Non-Adopter 1,536  -0.473% -2.10 ** 
   Adopter 393  0.012% 0.05** 
Yes 95  1.268% 1.98** 
   Non-Adopter 76  1.234% 1.68** 
   Adopter 19  1.421% 1.26** 
  Diff (Yes-No) 1.642% 2.66
*** 
 
Panel C: Provision Adopters    
 # of Firms  Portfolio CAR (%) t-stat 
No 1,612  -0.392% -1.74*** 
Yes 412  0.077% 0.36** 
   Pre-Boilermakers 66  0.703% 1.58** 
   Post-Boilermakers 346  -0.043% -0.87** 
  Diff (Yes-No) 0.469% 1.88** 
  Diff (Pre-No) 1.095% 2.31** 
  Diff (Post-No) 0.349% 1.30** 
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Abstract 
 
 
We examine the stability and composition of acquirer boards around mergers and the 
director characteristics associated with selection for the post-merger board.  Our results 
indicate that the post-merger board changes substantially and variation is significantly 
different from both non-merger years and non-merging firms.  Adjustments reflect firms 
upgrading skills associated with executive and merger experience and bargaining between 
targets and acquirers, rather than agency motives.  Conversely, director selection at non-
merging firms is driven by general skills and diversity. Our analyses provide insight into 
the dynamic nature of board structure and characteristics valued in the director labor 
market.   
 
 
JEL Classification: G34 
Keywords:  Mergers and acquisitions; Boards of directors; Director labor market 
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1. Introduction 
The composition, characteristics, and role of the board of directors are central issues 
in corporate governance.  Ideal boards provide independent advising and monitoring of 
management appropriate to the needs of the firm.  These functions are especially important 
around strategic decisions, such as mergers, which have the potential to significantly 
impact firm value.  Moreover, mergers can alter a firm’s monitoring and advising needs 
and provide a convenient opportunity to improve or denigrate the existing board 
composition and structure.  Nevertheless, little empirical attention has been given to board 
changes, either around mergers or in general.   
We develop two competing hypotheses to examine the structure and composition 
of boards around mergers.  On the one hand, prior studies suggest reasons to expect that 
boards should remain fairly stable around mergers (stability hypothesis).  Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998) posit that board structure is the result of negotiations between a CEO and 
its board.  Entrenched or powerful CEOs may exert pressure on a board (Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen, 2014; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  In this case, CEOs may try to limit board 
changes to maintain their influence even when a firm’s nature, and monitoring needs, 
warrant such changes.  In addition, transaction costs can impede boards from an optimal 
structure and/or composition (e.g., Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008).  New directors added 
or incumbent directors leaving may alter board cohesion and impose personal costs on 
directors.  The limited empirical evidence supports this notion of relative board stability 
around mergers.  Harford (2003) finds that post-merger target director retention is rare. 
Alternatively, theoretical arguments suggest shifts in acquirer boards (change 
hypothesis).  First, mergers represent a substantial shock to a firm that likely shifts its 
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operational activities and increases firm complexity. Thus, a firm’s advising and 
monitoring needs change and imply appropriate adjustments to board structure and 
composition.  This firm need motive suggests that board changes and director selection 
around mergers reflect the demand for increased advising and monitoring of the larger, 
more complex firm.  Second, a bargaining motive suggests that the post-merger board is 
the outcome of negotiations between acquirers and targets based on relative bargaining 
power or to aid deal completion.  Third, changes around mergers may provide managers 
cover to add CEO-friendly directors and shift the power structure between the CEO and 
the board.  Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) suggest that more powerful CEOs use their 
increased bargaining power over the director selection process to weaken board 
monitoring.  Under a CEO opportunism motive board changes around mergers occur for 
managerial welfare reasons. 
These alternative hypotheses (stability vs. change) lead us to explore several 
important and unaddressed questions: How stable are post-merger boards?  Which director 
characteristics are associated with selection on the post-merger board and are attributes 
demanded around a merger different than those in the absence of one?  How does post-
merger director selection relate to the longevity of their tenure?  Finally, how important are 
firm need, bargaining, and CEO opportunism motives in decisions regarding the post-
merger board’s structure and composition?   
Addressing these questions around mergers offers three main advantages.  First, 
mergers provide a unique setting to observe a relatively well-defined director labor pool 
and compare the characteristics of directors selected to those that are not.  Most prior 
studies are unable to observe candidates considered but not appointed to a board, leaving 
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an incomplete picture of the director selection process.  Second, we can compare potential 
board changes around mergers to concurrent shifts in a firm’s nature, and test ideas 
consistent with advising and monitoring needs.  Third, mergers are a rich setting to explore 
potential conflicts of interest with management, acquirer and target boards and both firms’ 
shareholders, which may impact board structure and composition. 
To address the stability of boards around mergers, we require a benchmark of 
typical board changes.  However, evidence on such a standard is limited.  Most prior studies 
examining board structure focus on cross-sectional variation, though a few examine 
changes over time, but for the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) period.  Denis and Sarin (1999) 
report changes to board size and independence from 1983-1992, while Cicero, Wintoki, 
and Yang (2013) and Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) examine these changes for two-
year periods leading up to the implementation of SOX.  Thus, we first provide a benchmark 
of the time series variation of board structure in the modern era, which is important given 
the fundamental shift in boards around SOX and contemporaneous changes in exchange 
listing requirements (Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2009). 
Examining our first question on board stability, we document substantial shifts in 
board size and composition around mergers from 1996-2012.  For the average deal, 0.95 
target directors and 1.15 unaffiliated directors (directors neither on the target nor acquirer 
boards) are added to the post-merger board.  The selection of these unaffiliated directors 
suggests their importance given the pool of available target and acquirer directors likely 
considered but not appointed.  This addition of 2.1 directors around a merger is 
significantly greater than the 0.80 directors added in the absence of one.  We also document 
significant changes to existing personnel as roughly twice as many acquirer directors depart 
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as in non-merging firms (1.40 versus 0.81, respectively).  Since firm size and complexity 
typically increase with a merger, we might expect board size to increase.  Board size does 
increase 42% of the time, and yet in over half of these cases an acquirer director still 
departs.  Further, in nearly one-quarter of deals, acquirer boards shrink even though non-
acquirer directors are typically added.  These results are inconsistent with the stability 
hypothesis and suggest board structure and composition changes are significantly different 
around mergers.   
Given evidence consistent with the change hypothesis, we assess firm need, 
bargaining, and CEO opportunism motives.  We first focus on specific director attributes 
demanded for a post-merger board by comparing skills sought around a merger to those in 
a non-merger year.  Both unaffiliated and target director additions around mergers reflect 
an increased demand for specific skills, such as prior CEO, merger and board experience.  
Non-merger director selection, however, occurs for more routine reasons such as diversity, 
financial expertise and retirement; director selection drivers are distinct in mergers.  These 
results hold comparing merger years to a propensity score-matched sample of non-merging 
firms or to post-merger size/industry matched non-merging firms (control for supply and 
demand factors of director selection).  To further understand the director labor market, we 
compare all acquirer and target directors’ attributes, selected or not, and unaffiliated 
directors added.  Directors selected post-merger represent an upgrade in talent from pre-
merger (prior CEO, merger and industry experience).  Even if CEOs are likely entrenched, 
directors added do not have weaker monitoring abilities, inconsistent with CEO 
opportunism.  Collectively, our results indicate firm need drives director selection around 
mergers.   
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Next, we examine the motives for board structure and composition change around 
mergers at the firm-level.  As a target’s size and complexity increases, target directors with 
specific skills (e.g. CEO or merger experience) are more likely to be added post-merger.  
This result is consistent with firm need and suggests that these firms require increased 
monitoring and advising.  Target representation on the post-merger board is also associated 
with lower target announcement returns, suggesting that target directors bargain bid premia 
for board seats.  Our results, however, provide no evidence in favor of acquirer agency 
conflicts as a motive for board changes around mergers.   
To provide additional evidence for our hypotheses, we examine the tenure of 
directors added to the post-merger board.  We expect that directors retained for a short 
period are more likely to have been added for integration or bargaining purposes.  In 
comparison to target directors, unaffiliated directors are significantly more likely to be 
retained for periods longer than three years.  Directors that remain long-term have more 
CEO-merger experience, financial expertise, and are more likely to be placed on key 
committees, consistent with firms keeping directors to fulfill longer-term firm needs.  In 
addition, the shorter tenure of target directors is concentrated in deals with more complex 
targets, consistent with the notion that they are temporarily retained to facilitate the post-
merger integration process.  Collectively, our results provide evidence that firm need and 
bargaining motives play an important role in changes to acquirer boards around mergers. 
Our paper addresses the ongoing debate over the efficacy of board structure and its 
role as a governance mechanism. On the one hand, studies suggest that boards are optimally 
designed and provide appropriate oversight of the CEO and the firm.  Alternatively, 
director selection may be driven largely by CEOs seeking private benefits as well as other 
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agency conflicts.  We find that the selection of board members is driven by the specific 
nature of the firm, rather than CEO opportunism. While we do find some evidence for 
director retention that is consistent with bargaining, the directors selected appear of better 
quality.  Overall, the drivers of director selection are different around mergers and are 
consistent with a firm’s monitoring and advising needs. 
2. Hypotheses 
The impact of mergers on the structure and composition of acquirer boards is an 
empirical issue previously undocumented in the literature.  We develop two competing 
hypotheses related to the structure of the post-merger board:  relative stability versus 
change.  
2.1 Motivations for Board Stability around Mergers 
There are several reasons why post-merger boards may remain stable (stability 
hypothesis).  First, as targets are relatively smaller, the incumbent board may be adequate 
to monitor and advise the post-merger firm.  Second, theory suggests board structure is the 
result of negotiations between CEOs and a board (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).  Coles 
et al. (2014) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004) find that entrenched or powerful CEOs can 
wield significant influence.  Even if a firm’s nature and monitoring require alterations, 
powerful CEOs may curb board changes that would diminish their influence.38   
Transaction costs can also impede boards from their optimal structure and/or 
composition.  Coles et al. (2008) note that CEOs can face personal costs if incumbent 
directors with professional/ personal relations to a CEO leave or if new directors are added 
without such relations.  Research also indicates that few target directors are included post-
                                                           
38 Alternatively, an entrenched CEO may not only protect her position, but may seek to opportunistically 
alter the board in her favor.  We consider this alternate interpretation of agency motives in Section 2.2.3. 
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merger.  Harford (2003) documents that in over half of mergers, no target directors are 
retained and when a target director is retained, on average only one is selected.  These 
arguments imply stability of the post-merger board. 
To test board stability, we compare pre-merger acquirer and target boards to post-
merger boards.  Structural shifts are reflected in changes to board size while adjustments 
to board composition are captured by both additions and departures.  We also compare 
variations in boards around mergers to years in which the same firm does not merge and to 
a propensity score-matched sample of non-merging firms based on pre-merger firm and 
board characteristics.   
2.2 Motivations for Board Changes around Mergers 
Alternatively, there is theoretical and empirical evidence in other contexts 
suggesting board structure and composition could change post-merger (change 
hypothesis).  We propose three non-mutually exclusive motivations for such change: firm 
need, bargaining, and agency.   
2.2.1 Firm Need 
Mergers can represent a substantial shock to a firm, requiring board changes in 
response to shifts in underlying firm fundamentals.  As mergers expand a firm into new 
product lines, additional geographic areas, and increase its size and/or complexity, its 
monitoring and advising needs could change as well.  Acquisitions can also represent a 
convenient opportunity to upgrade the set of existing board skills since personnel changes 
can be easier to explain.   
The firm need motive suggests post-merger board changes are consistent with 
evolving monitoring and advising needs.  Fama and Jensen (1983) propose that a firm’s 
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organization depends on the operational complexity, with more complex firms requiring 
larger and more hierarchical organizations.  Harris and Raviv (2008) and Raheja (2005) 
hypothesize and Boone et al. (2007), Coles et al. (2008), and Linck et al. (2008) provide 
empirical evidence in the cross-section that more complex firms have larger, more 
independent boards; implying a positive association between complexity and board 
changes around mergers. We employ several measures of complexity, including relative 
deal size, industry diversification, number of target business segments, and R&D 
expenditures (Boone et al., 2007, Coles et al., 2008, and Linck et al., 2008).   
In addition to testing firm need at the firm-level, we examine characteristics of 
directors selected versus not selected post-merger.  Prior work identifies characteristics 
valued in the director labor market: CEO experience (Fich, 2005 and Fahlenbrach, Low, 
and Stulz, 2010), diversity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), financial expertise (Guner, 
Malmendier, and Tate, 2008), higher education (Cashman, Gillan, and Whitby, 2012), 
industry expertise (Denis, Denis and Walker, 2015), merger experience (Harford and 
Schonlau, 2013), outside directorships (Fama and Jensen, 1983), and performance 
(Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter, 2013).  As a firm’s monitoring and advising 
needs increase, these director skills become more valuable.  Under the firm need 
motivation, directors added around mergers should possess more of these attributes than 
directors added in the absence of a deal.  In addition, this motive predicts that directors 
selected for the post-merger board will have more of these qualities than directors not 
selected. 
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Firms assess skills needed in an ever-changing environment.39  Existing directors 
can also face retirement or mandatory age limitations.  Thus, firm need suggests that boards 
seek desirable attributes not currently present or that need to be replaced.  Many firms use 
a two-dimensional matrix showing needs versus existing attributes to determine if 
candidates possess skills absent.  For example, while financial expertise may be valuable, 
it may already exist.  In this case, a board would be less likely to seek more financial talent 
at the expense of other characteristics.  The proprietary information on specific board needs 
is unobservable, but will be reflected in the skills of directors added.  The characteristics 
of directors chosen exhibit a board’s revealed preference. 
2.2.2 Bargaining 
A second reason acquirers may alter boards around mergers is related to 
negotiations.  The price paid to target shareholders, location of the headquarters, name of 
the post-merger firm, and identity of the post-merger CEO and chair are all bargaining 
items.  The bargaining motive suggests that the structure and composition of the post-
merger board is an outcome of negotiations between acquirers and targets.40  In this case, 
the addition of target directors post-merger is related to the negotiated deal terms and/or 
the bargaining position of the parties involved in the transaction.  
Prior studies focus on the potential conflict of interest faced by target management 
in the negotiation process.  Wulf (2004) finds that target CEOs trade post-merger retention 
for premium at the expense of target shareholders.  Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) 
                                                           
39 Recent examples include boards seeking directors familiar with modern social media.  The 2011 Spencer 
Stuart Board Index indicates that demand for directors with digital backgrounds increased over 20% in the 
prior year.   
40 As one example, 21st Century Fox offered shareholders of Time Warner, Inc. board representation as part 
of Fox’s bid to acquire Time Warner (Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2014). 
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show that target CEOs are able to negotiate retention in exchange for lower merger bonuses 
related to the deal.  The bargaining power of the parties involved may also be related to the 
post-merger board structure.  Acquirers with a stronger bargaining position might not need 
to offer board seats as a concession in order to ensure deal completion.  On the other hand, 
targets with more bargaining power may be better able to negotiate for post-merger seats 
without trading off other deal terms.   
 To test this bargaining, we examine the relation between the addition of target 
directors, measures of relative bargaining power and deal premium.  We use four proxies 
for the relative bargaining power between the acquirer and target: relative deal size, target 
prior performance, target poison pill (Comment and Schwert, 1995) and target classified 
board (Bates, Becher, and Lemmon, 2008).  Larger targets and those with higher prior 
performance, a poison pill or classified board likely hold more bargaining power. Deal 
premium, proxied by a target’s announcement returns, can be traded for seats on the post-
merger board.  The bargaining motive predicts a positive relation between target director 
on the post-merger board and target bargaining power, but a negative one for target 
announcement returns.  This motivation, however, does not provide specific predictions 
about characteristics of target directors selected to the post-merger board; thus we are 
agnostic with regard to predictions for this rationale at the individual director level.  
2.2.3 CEO Opportunism 
 A final reason for post-merger board changes also relates to entrenchment issues.  
CEO opportunism suggests that board changes occur for acquirer managerial welfare 
reasons.  Mergers can provide a convenient opportunity for acquirer CEOs to shift to a 
more management friendly board.  Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model board structure 
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as a negotiation between a CEO and outside directors. More powerful CEOs may use their 
bargaining power to weaken board monitoring under the guise of structural shifts related 
to a deal.  Fracassi and Tate (2012) provide evidence consistent with this as firms with 
more influential CEOs are more likely to appoint directors connected to a CEO, which 
reduces firm value and leads to weaker board monitoring.  Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) 
find that CEOs involved in the director selection process are more likely to appoint busy 
directors, which could be consistent with the appointment of less valuable monitors.  The 
absence of constraints on a CEO’s power may also affect the post-merger board.  Boone et 
al. (2007) observe a positive relation between board independence and constraints on CEO 
influence, including monitoring by institutional owners.  This prior evidence implies an 
association between director selection, a CEO’s power and the existence of external 
monitoring.    
CEO opportunism predicts a positive association between acquirer CEO power and 
board changes, but a negative one between powerful CEOs and measures of individual 
director monitoring quality.  Both of these relations would be moderated by constraints on 
CEO power, such as the existence of external monitors.  Proxies for CEO power include 
the percentage of board capture, CEO-Chair duality, classified board, CEO ownership, and 
business connections between a CEO and directors (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2014; 
Fracassi and Tate, 2012).  External monitoring is proxied by the percentage of shares held 
by the top 5 institutional owners. 
3. Data 
3.1 Main Sample  
 To test our hypotheses, we construct three samples: primary acquirer sample, 
propensity score-matched sample of non-merging firms based on pre-merger firm 
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characteristics and a post-merger firm size, Fama-French 12 industry-matched sample of 
non-merging firms. Our primary acquirer sample consists of deals between 1996 and 2012 
from the Thompson/SDC U.S. Merger and Acquisitions database (SDC).  To observe 
acquirer and target directors, we require that both firms are U.S. publicly traded, the merger 
completed and 100 percent of a target is acquired.  From SDC, we collect announcement 
and completion dates, transaction value, method of payment, and merger premium.  This 
sample is merged with Compustat for accounting data, Center for Research of Stock Prices 
(CRSP) for stock returns, and institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters.  
Data on directors 1996 to 2003 (2004 to 2012) are obtained from RiskMetrics 
(BoardEx).41  We require information on acquirer and target pre-merger boards from the 
board report date closest to but prior to the announcement and on the post-merger board 
from the board report date closest to but after completion.  BoardEx provides details on 
director education, certifications, as well as past and current employment and directorships.  
For directors with missing information, we hand-collect data from proxy statements.  Our 
final sample consists of 716 acquirers in 1,153 mergers.   
To identify changes to acquirer boards, post-merger directors are matched with pre-
merger acquirer and target directors. We define three types of post-merger directors: (i) 
retained directors from the pre-merger acquirer board (10,688); (ii) retained directors from 
the pre-merger target board (1,089); and (iii) unaffiliated directors on neither the acquirer 
nor target board pre-deal (1,459).  We also define two other types of directors: not retained 
                                                           
41 The BoardEx universe begins in 2000, but since Management Diagnostics began data collection in 2003, 
firms that were publicly traded between 2000 and 2003, but delisted before 2004 are not part of the BoardEx 
universe.   
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acquirer (target) directors on the pre-merger acquirer (target) board, but not on the post-
merger board (1,895(9,199)).     
3.2 Non-Merger Year Samples 
To understand board structure and composition changes around a merger, it is 
necessary to have a benchmark of typical board changes in non-merger situations.  
Surprisingly, the availability of such a benchmark is limited.42  As a result, we create three 
distinct non-merger year samples: own-firm non-merger sample, propensity score-matched 
sample, and supply-side matched sample.   
3.2.1 Own-Firm Non-Merger Sample  
First, we create a sample of firm-years in which the acquirers in our sample did not 
engage in a merger.  Board changes in this non-merger years sample are identified the same 
as the merger sample detailed above.  Retained directors sat on the board in the prior year 
and continue to do so.  New directors did not sit on the board in the prior year.  Not retained 
directors sat on the board in the prior year, but no longer do so.  This own-firm non-merger 
sample includes 6,659 firm-years. 
3.2.2 Propensity Score-Matched Sample 
Comparing changes in board structure around a merger to those in non-merger 
years allows us to compare a firm to itself.  This methodology, however, may not account 
for the fact that the changes are driven by underlying factors rather than a merger, such as 
time trends or other industry factors.  As a result, we employ a difference-in-difference 
methodology where we construct a second benchmark of non-merger board changes by 
                                                           
42 Denis and Sarin (1999) examine changes to board size and independence (1983-1992).  Cicero, Wintoki, 
and Yang (2013) and Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) present changes in board size and independence over 
two-year periods pre-Sarbanes Oxley.  These studies focus on changes in the fraction of outside directors and 
the number of directors.   
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matching the pre-merger firm to firms that did not merge.  Firms are matched using a 
propensity score-matching methodology based on firm and board characteristics.  Each 
acquirer is matched to ten non-merger firms with replacement with the closest propensity 
scores based on the model in Appendix B.43  We calculate differences in board changes 
across time (e.g., pre- versus post-merger) and matched firms.  The difference of these 
differences (difference-in-difference) allows us to compare two sets of relatively similar 
firms in the same year, where the main difference is one undergoes a merger and the other 
does not.  This sample yields 6,346 matched non-merger firm-years to compare to our main 
sample.  
3.2.3 Supply-side Matched Sample  
The characteristics of directors selected for the post-merger board reveals a firm’s 
demand for particular skills and attributes.  It is possible, however, that director selection 
is not purely a demand effect.  For a given director to be added, they must also agree to 
serve.  The post-merger firm is larger and presumably more prestigious, making a seat on 
that board more attractive (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014).  To control for these supply-side 
effects, our third benchmark focuses on the post-merger firm.  We create another matched 
sample of firms that did not engage in a merger in the same year.  This sample is based on 
the post-merger firm size and industry and yields 44,833 matched non-merger firm-years 
to compare to our merger sample.  These matched firms are likely attracting potential 
candidates from the same pool of individuals as the acquirers.   
 
 
                                                           
43 All results are robust to a non-merger matched sample based on the five nearest neighbors or a caliper of 
0.001. 
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 details summary statistics for the primary sample of 1,153 acquisitions from 
1996-2012.  Panel A presents deal characteristics, which are consistent with studies using 
similar sample restrictions (e.g., Cai and Sevilir, 2012, and Ishii and Xuan, 2014).  Panel 
A focuses on measures of firm complexity to test for firm need.  Average (median) relative 
deal size is 0.46 (0.22), suggesting a wide range of deal complexity within our sample.  
Panel B details that, on average, acquirer size and number of business segments increase 
after a merger.  In addition, the average target spends a significantly higher percentage of 
assets on R&D than the average acquirer.    
Following prior studies, the number of outside directorships, education level, 
financial expertise, as well as CEO, merger, and industry experiences are proxies for 
director talent and quality (Panel C).  Compared to acquirer boards, target boards are 
smaller, and their directors hold fewer outside directorships, are less educated, and have 
less prior merger/CEO-merger experience.  Target boards, however, have more financial 
experts and outside CEO experience than acquirers. We conduct individual director-level 
analyses, with pair-wise comparisons (e.g., target directors retained to acquirer directors 
leaving) to test the firm need and CEO opportunism motives.  
To test for bargaining, we use four proxies for the target’s relative bargaining 
power: relative deal size, target prior performance, target poison pill and target classified 
board.  Panel B of Table 1 shows that average annual prior target stock performance is 
9.5% compared to 16.8% for acquirers.  Roughly 40% of targets have a poison pill and 
60% have a classified board.  In addition, a target’s abnormal merger announcement return 
is used as a proxy for a negotiating term that can be traded for seats on the post-merger 
119 
 
 
 
board under the bargaining motive.  Panel A of Table 1 reports that target shareholders 
experience an average announcement return of 25.1%. 
Measures of acquirer CEO power and external monitoring are used to test for CEO 
opportunism.  Proxies for CEO power include the degree of board capture, CEO-Chair 
duality, CEO ownership, and business connections between a CEO and directors.  Panel C 
details that 55% of the pre-merger acquirer board is captured, significantly higher than for 
targets (51%).  Two-thirds of acquirer CEOs are chair, higher than for the target (59%) and 
average acquirer CEO ownership is 2.4%.  Finally, the percentage of acquirer directors that 
currently or previously served on the same board or worked at the same firm as the acquirer 
CEO (connected to CEO) is 10%, but only 0.8% of target directors have these connections.  
External monitoring is proxied by the percentage of shares held by the top 5 institutional 
owners and this percentage of shares held by these owners is higher for targets than 
acquirers and increases for the combined firm (Panel B).  
4. Results 
4.1 Board Dynamics around Mergers 
Our first research question focuses on whether there are changes to acquirer boards 
around mergers and if these changes are different from changes in the absence of a merger.  
Table 2 provides a univariate difference-in-difference analysis, where we compare changes 
to acquiring boards to changes of our benchmark firms.44  For each of our board structure 
measures, we calculate the difference in both the pre- and post-period across merger and 
matched firms and then calculate the difference in these differences.  Panel A examines 
                                                           
44 We find similar results comparing board changes around a merger to our own-firm non-merger sample 
(unreported).   
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difference-in-differences for various measures of board changes across all firms, while 
Panel B segments results by relative deal size.   
Panel A reports that in the pre-merger period differences in board structure and 
composition changes between acquiring firms and the propensity score-matched non-
acquiring firms is insignificant.  After a merger, however, there are substantial and 
significant differences in board changes for merging firms.  Nearly 10% of the post-merger 
board consists of newly added unaffiliated directors versus 7.9% for non-merger matched 
firms.  Similarly, at least one unaffiliated director is added in 58% of merger years versus 
51% for non-merger firms (both are significantly higher around mergers).  This 
corresponds to an addition of 1.15 unaffiliated directors in merger years compared to only 
0.80 directors in non-merger years.  In unreported results, we also find that retained target 
directors represent 7.1% of the post-merger board or 0.95 additional directors added to the 
post-merger board (implying 10% of the target board is retained).45   
Significant board changes, however, are not limited to adding directors.  A greater 
fraction of a prior year’s directors departs in merger years (12.8%) than at non-merging 
firms (7.9%).  This corresponds to at least one director departing in 65% (51%) of the years 
with (without) a merger.  The difference-in-differences of director additions and departures 
from pre- to post-merger periods are all statistically significant at the 1% level.  This 
suggest that changes to acquiring firm boards are significantly greater relative to non-
acquiring matched firms in the year following a merger.   
New directors added and incumbent directors departing does not fully reflect board 
changes in mergers.  Board size increases nearly twice as frequently around mergers, yet 
                                                           
45 Harford (2003) finds a similar percentage of target director retention post-merger.  
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over 50% (33%) of the time an acquirer director also departs at merging (non-merging) 
firms; difference-in-differences are significant at the 1% level.  Acquirer board size is 
significantly less likely to remain stable following a merger compared to the matched 
sample of non-acquiring firms (36% in merger versus 50% in non-merger years).  While 
firm size and complexity increase in mergers, board size decreases 22% of the time, despite 
the addition of new directors in nearly half of these cases.  Overall, the composition and/or 
size of the board changes nearly 84% (68%) of the time around mergers compared to the 
absence of one, highlighting the dynamics of board variation in mergers.  
While we document considerable board variation around mergers, these changes 
could be primarily driven by the nature and complexity of a deal.  To test this, we split our 
mergers into terciles by relative deal size (Panel B).  Regardless of size, acquirer boards 
are less stable in merger than non-merger years.  In particular, additions and departures to 
acquirer boards vary by deal size, yet the difference-in-differences are substantial even in 
the smallest deals.   
The univariate difference-in-difference tests in Table 2 yield evidence consistent 
with substantial changes to acquirer boards around mergers.  We verify whether these 
results hold in a multivariate framework in Table 3.  To capture the impact of mergers on 
boards, we create two indicators; one for acquirers (Merger) and one the post-merger 
period (Post).  We regress measures of board structure and composition changes on these 
indicators and their interaction (Merger x Post).  If acquiring boards experience more 
change than the non-merging matched sample, the coefficient on the interaction term 
should be positive and significant.  We also control for firm and board characteristics as 
well as industry and year fixed effects. The board structure and composition changes of 
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interest include change in board size (Models 1 and 4), the addition of unaffiliated directors 
(Models 2 and 5) and the departure of incumbent directors (Models 3 and 6).   
Model 1 of Table 3 reports that the coefficient on Merger x Post is 0.562 and is 
significant at the 1% level.  This result suggests that, following a merger, the board size of 
acquiring firms increases significantly compared to the non-merger matched sample.  We 
find similar results in regard to the addition of unaffiliated directors (Model 2) and the 
departure of incumbent directors (Model 3). These results imply an increase in the relative 
addition/departure of unaffiliated/ incumbent directors following a merger.  The economic 
magnitude of the relative board changes following a merger is similar to those reported in 
the univariate analysis.  Our results are qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged in 
Models 4-6 where we include all control variables providing additional evidence that 
acquiring firm boards are not stable around mergers.   
Despite our difference-in-difference analysis, other explanations may exist for 
board changes around mergers.  First, these changes may be driven by anticipation of a 
deal or as a firm re-evaluates its needs post-merger.  We examine shifts in boards in the 
years prior to and after a merger (Figure 1) and find little evidence of significant board 
changes.  For example, the average percentage of new directors in the year prior to (after) 
a merger is 9.8% (7.7%) compared to 18.7% in a merger year.46  Next, given board 
classification as a potential entrenchment device, firms with classified boards may 
experience fewer changes. In unreported tests we find no evidence firms with classified 
boards experience any less board changes around mergers. 
                                                           
46 We obtain qualitatively similar results if we extend the window to three years before/after the merger is 
completed. 
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It is also possible that the emergence of activist investors plays a role in a firm 
undertaking a merger and the concurrent changes in board structure and composition.   
Prior studies document that these investors do seek board representation (Brav, Jiang, 
Partnoy and Thomas, 2008 and Klein and Zur, 2009).  In unreported results, we search for 
all cases where an acquirer is the subject of a 13-D filing or amendments in the two years 
pre-merger announcement.  Reviewing each filing, we find that 5.5% of our mergers 
experience the emergence of an activist investor in this two-year window.47  For these few 
cases where an activist emerges, we examine all related 13D filings and Factiva news 
stories to determine if the activist attempted to influence the board or the merger.   In only 
0.6% of our deals did an outside investor publicly encourage the merger or attempt to obtain 
representation on the acquirer board.  We also exclude all deals in which an activist appears 
in this two-year window and find qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. 
Collectively, these results suggest that the influence of activists is not a first-order concern 
in our study.  
Finally, some unobservable endogenous factor not captured by the propensity 
score-matching methodology may drive the motivation to undertake a merger as well as 
the subsequent board changes.  One setting that the motivation to merge may be more 
exogenous is an industry merger wave, which may be spurred by technological or 
regulatory shocks (Harford, 2005).  During such a wave, acquirers may be forced to merge 
in response to these shocks.  Examining deals that take place inside a merger wave, we 
continue to find significant changes to board composition and structure around mergers 
                                                           
47 An activist investor may have already filed a 13D prior to our two-year window before the merger (existing 
activist).  Less than 1% of acquirers had an existing activist file an amendment during this window. Further, 
on average, these existing activists hold a position in the acquirer for more than five years before the merger. 
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(untabulated).  As a result, we do not find any support that these alternative motivations 
explain board changes around mergers. 
Overall, results in Tables 2 and 3 as well as Figure 1 are striking: acquiring boards 
are not stable around mergers.  These findings suggest substantial shifts in board structure 
and composition surrounding mergers and these changes are significantly greater than 
those that otherwise occur.  We next turn our attention to understand why these changes 
occur. 
4.2 What Does the Director Labor Market Value? 
By focusing on adjustments to the post-merger board at the individual director 
level, our goal is to better understand the specific skills of board members valued in the 
director labor market.  The setting of mergers affords the opportunity to compare directors 
selected to a post-merger board to those not selected.  The revealed preference of firms’ 
post-merger selections provides evidence on why board structure and composition change 
around mergers.   We begin by exploring whether the attributes demanded in a merger year 
are different from those sought in a non-merger year.     
4.2.1 Merger vs. Non-merger Years 
For each acquirer in our main merger sample, Panel A of Table 4 compares 
attributes of directors added to the board in merger years to the set of firms in the propensity 
score-matched sample that did not engage in a merger.48  Comparison (1) focuses on all 
new directors on a board (unaffiliated and retained targets in merger years versus new in 
non-merger years).  Comparisons (2) and (3) examine only unaffiliated and only retained 
                                                           
48 In unreported analysis, we also compare the attributes of directors added around a merger to directors 
added at the same acquiring firms in non-merger years and find quantitatively and qualitatively similar 
results.   
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target directors, respectively, added in merger years versus new directors in non-merger 
years. 
In general, comparison (1) suggests that firms select directors in merger years for 
different reasons than in non-merger years as all attributes of directors added in merger 
years are statistically different from those selected in non-merger years.  In particular, 
directors in merger years are added for their deal and executive experience (external CEO, 
merger, CEO-merger, and industry experience); a skill set likely related to the monitoring 
and advising needs of merger integration.  Conversely, director selection in non-merger 
years focuses on retirement (age), general skills (higher education and financial expertise) 
and diversity (gender).49  These results are consistent with firm need; as the monitoring and 
advising needs of a firm change with a merger, certain director skills (e.g. deal and industry 
experience) become more valuable. 
Comparisons (2) and (3) of Panel A separate new directors in merger years into 
unaffiliated and target directors, respectively.  Again, we find that unaffiliated and retained 
target directors possess more executive and deal experience than new directors added in 
non-merger years.  Both unaffiliated and target directors added have significantly more 
CEO and CEO-merger experience than new directors selected at non-merger matched 
firms.  In addition, retained target directors possess more outside directorships and merger 
experience than non-merger year additions.  
Panel B of Table 4 addresses potential supply-side effects related to the 
composition of the post-merger board.  As firm size increases, seats on the post-merger 
                                                           
49 Results are robust to restricting merger experience to recent experience in the past three years (rather than 
at any point in the past) as well as restricting financial expertise to only CFA/CPA certification in this and 
all further analysis.  
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board may be more prestigious in the director labor market and thus, attract more qualified 
directors than the pre-merger board.  We address this concern by matching each acquirer 
to a set of non-acquirers in the same year, Fama-French 12 industry and firm size decile 
based on the size of the post-merger firm.  This matched sample of new directors added in 
non-merger years allows us to compare unaffiliated directors added to acquirer boards to a 
comparable pool of new directors that may have been considered but not selected by an 
acquirer.  In general, results are consistent with Panel A.   Overall, directors added in 
merger years are selected for their executive and deal experience.  These results provide 
further support for firm need; changes in acquiring boards around mergers reflect attributes 
related to a firm’s changing monitoring and advising needs. 
4.2.2 Director Selection - Acquirer and Target Director Pools 
Next, we examine determinants of post-merger board selection for acquirer and 
target pools of directors using logistic regressions in Table 5.  These models include deal 
fixed effects which allow within deal variation in director characteristics for each pool to 
explain selection.  The deal fixed effects control for any unobservable firm or deal-specific 
attributes that may simultaneously link engaging in a merger and changes to a board.  
Column 1 examines selection from the combined acquirer and target director pool.50  
Consistent with firm need, acquirer and target directors on a post-merger board have more 
outside directorships.  Notwithstanding the literature on busy boards, experience on 
additional boards broadens the experience brought to the current board.  In addition, 
selected directors possess more prior merger experience than those not selected, also 
consistent with firm need.  Finally, directors with outside target industry experience are 
                                                           
50 This model includes all acquirer and target directors, even if no target director is on the post-merger 
board.   
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less likely to be added.  While this appears inconsistent with firm need, it is concentrated 
in related deals and suggests a duplicative effect as acquirer and target directors have 
similar industry knowledge.  Consistent with firm need, if we limit the sample to 
diversifying deals, the coefficient on target industry experience becomes positive and 
significant for target directors (untabulated).  
To further address supply side issues in the director labor market, we construct 
measures of the relative importance of a directorship (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014).  A 
director’s board seat with the highest (lowest) market capitalization is ranked as the most 
(least) important directorship.  Directors with only one seat are ranked as the most 
important.  Directors are more likely to appear on the post-merger board if that directorship 
(acquirer or target) is their most important.   
Having examined characteristics of all directors retained post-merger, we next 
condition on deals in which at least one target director is added and focus on the target 
director pool (Column 2).  Target directors with more outside directorships and more 
outside CEO experience are more likely to be added to the post-merger board (all consistent 
with firm need), although female target directors are less likely added.  While our results 
indicate diversity in gender is valued, there may be a limit to which adding any specific 
attribute is valuable, especially if other desirable qualities (e.g., CEO experience) are 
demanded.  Focusing on supply-side effects, target directors are less likely added if the 
target directorship is the director’s least important seat.  These results provide support for 
the firm need motive; when target directors are added to the post-merger board, they 
possess more outside executive and board experience than target directors not retained. 
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Finally, we separate the acquirer pool and condition on deals when at least one 
acquirer director departs (Column 3).  Consistent with firm need, acquirer directors on the 
post-merger board hold more outside directorships and merger experience than those that 
depart.  In addition, acquirer directors retained have less outside target industry experience, 
again concentrated in related deals.  Acquirer directors with outside CEO experience are 
less likely retained, which appears inconsistent with firm need.  However, in subsequent 
tests, the net amount of outside CEO experience on the post-merger board increases with 
the addition of unaffiliated directors.  Inconsistent with the agency motives, CEO 
connections do not explain post-merger retention.     
As an additional test of CEO opportunism, we estimate regressions similar to Table 
5 for subsamples based on potential agency conflicts and find the characteristics of retained 
acquirer and target directors are not different for CEO-Chair duality, acquirers with 
captured boards (highest tercile of percentage captured), high CEO ownership (highest 
tercile of CEO ownership), low institutional ownership (lowest tercile of institutional 
ownership), or connections between directors and the acquirer CEO (highest tercile of 
percent connected).  These results are not consistent with CEO opportunism.  Overall, 
results suggest that boards change around mergers to increase experience; director 
backgrounds with executive and deal experience are most valued. 
4.2.3 Director Selection – Unaffiliated and Retained Target Directors  
To further understand the post-merger board at the director-level, Table 6 compares 
unaffiliated directors added to other (not) retained directors. We estimate logistics 
including deal fixed effects as in Table 5.  Consistent with firm need, unaffiliated directors 
are added for their CEO, outside directorship, and target industry experience.  In fact, these 
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directors have more of this experience than retained and not retained acquirer directors.  
Unaffiliated directors are also more likely to be connected to an acquirer CEO than target 
directors (retained or not), but, not surprisingly, less so than acquirer directors retained.  
This finding could be indicative of either agency conflicts or a desire to populate a board 
with directors of known quality, given that there are both costs and benefits associated with 
the appointment of connected directors (Schmidt, 2015).  We address these interpretations 
in subsequent tests.  Unaffiliated directors added do have significantly less merger 
experience than retained or departing acquirer or target directors.  In general, however, our 
results provide support for firm need; the addition of unaffiliated directors upgrades the 
director skill set of the post-merger board that could be useful in merger integration.   
Table 6 also examines retained target directors and builds on our evidence that 
boards upgrade talent around mergers.  Consistent with unaffiliated directors, retained 
target directors hold more directorships and have more outside CEO experience than (not) 
retained acquirer directors.  In addition, these directors have more target industry 
experience than acquirer directors, providing additional support for firm need as a motive 
for director selection.   
We also examine if managerial welfare motives explain the addition of unaffiliated 
or retained target directors.  We estimate regressions similar to Table 6 for subsamples 
based on our measures of acquirer CEO power (untabulated).  The characteristics of 
unaffiliated and retained target directors compared to all other sets of directors do not vary 
by these measures.  Regardless of potential CEO opportunism, directors added around a 
merger possess more outside CEO experience and outside directorships than retained and 
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not retained acquirer (target) directors.  These results provide additional evidence in favor 
of firm need rather than agency motives.   
Overall, results from Tables 4-6 examining the determinants of director selection 
provide broad evidence that past experience matters for director selection onto the post-
merger board.  In particular, directors with outside CEO, merger, and additional industry 
experience as well as those with more outside directorships are more likely included on the 
post-merger board.  Our findings suggest that firm need drives director selection and 
improves overall board quality around mergers. 
4.3 What Determines Board Changes around Mergers? 
 Next, we focus on firm-level tests to examine motivation for board changes.  Table 
7 examines the percentage of: target directors added (Model 1), unaffiliated directors added 
(Model 2), and acquiring board not retained (Model 3).  In Model 1, the percentage of 
target directors on the post-merger board increases with relatively larger deals and more 
complex (high R&D) targets.  Consistent with firm need, as target complexity or size 
increases, so do the monitoring and advising skills needed.  Merging with a target outside 
an acquirer’s industry may imply a greater need for advising skills, suggesting higher target 
director retention in these deals.  Results show that these directors are retained more often 
in related deals and could be consistent with CEO opportunism.  However, target directors 
retained in either related or diversified deals are both characterized as high quality directors 
(CEO, directorship, and merger experience).   
Given that the post-merger board contains more unaffiliated directors than target 
directors retained, we next examine the addition of unaffiliated directors (Model 2).    None 
of our variables designed to measure firm need or the general controls appear to explain 
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the addition of unaffiliated directors at the firm-level.  All previously documented results, 
however, suggest that unaffiliated directors are added for their prior executive and director 
experience.  Importantly, retirement does not play a role in the percentage of unaffiliated 
directors added as the percentage of pre-merger acquirer directors over 72 provides no 
explanatory power.51  Finally, we examine the percentage of pre-merger acquirer directors 
not retained (Model 3).  Similar to target director retention and consistent with firm need, 
the percentage of acquirer directors not retained increases with relative deal size and deal 
complexity (target R&D).  Overall, results from Table 7 suggest that changes to board 
structure and composition around mergers are driven by firm need and complexity.   
 Table 8 focuses on bargaining related to the percentage of the combined board 
comprised of: retained target directors (Model 1), retained target outside directors (Model 
2), retained target inside directors (Model 3), and whether the target CEO is retained 
(Model 4).  The percentage of target directors added is significantly negatively related to 
target announcement returns; consistent with a tradeoff of power for premium where target 
directors negotiate for seats on the post-merger board in exchange for a lower premium 
(Wulf, 2004).  We find that even where it is likely targets trade power-for-premium, target 
directors retained are still of higher quality (CEO, directorship, and merger experience) 
(unreported).  From an acquirer’s view, retention of these target directors appears driven 
by firm need rather than CEO opportunism.  Target takeover defenses (e.g., poison pill or 
classified board) may strengthen its bargaining position and allow a board to better 
negotiate representation on the post-merger board.  The presence of a target poison 
                                                           
51 The mandatory retirement age for directors is 72 years (Cline and Yore, 2014).  Results are robust to using 
the percentage of directors 65, 68, or 70 or older or average director age instead of the percentage of directors 
72 or older. 
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pill/classified board has a significantly positive effect on the percentage of target directors 
post-merger and supports the notion that the post-merger board is an outcome of bargaining 
between acquirers and targets.52   
Models 2 – 4 of Table 8 decompose retained target directors into outsiders, insiders, 
and target CEO.  The results suggest that the power for premium trade-off documented in 
Model 1 is concentrated in outside target director retention.  Consistent with Bargeron et 
al. (2013), we do not find that target CEO retention is related to this trade-off.   
Finally, Table 9 explores agency explanations for board changes around mergers 
using the same methodology as Table 7.  As noted, the CEO opportunism motive predicts 
that firms with more powerful CEOs should experience more change to the post-merger 
board.  Across our four measures of CEO power (board capture, CEO-Chair duality, 
connections between the acquirer CEO and directors, and CEO ownership) and our three 
measures of board changes, we find very little evidence that board changes around mergers 
are associated with agency conflicts.  In particular, only director connections to the CEO 
has a significantly positive impact on target director retention.  In all other instances, there 
is no relation between measures of CEO power and board changes, except acquirers with 
higher board capture, CEO-Chair duality and higher CEO ownership are less likely to 
retain target directors and not retain incumbent acquirer directors.   
Overall, results from Tables 7 and 8 suggest that both firm need and bargaining 
play an important role in changes to board structure and composition around mergers, while 
Table 9 provides little evidence that acquirer CEO opportunism are driving these changes. 
                                                           
52 Targets may also adopt these structures to protect their exploitable assets, so the relation between target 
director retention and governance may be related to the integration rather than bargaining. In our sample, 
however, there is no correlation between measures of target complexity (R&D expenditures) and classified 
board/poison pill.    
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4.4 Unaffiliated and Retained Target Director Tenure 
Examining board tenure provides additional insight into the motives for board 
changes around mergers.  Our three motives for post-merger board changes: firm need, 
agency, and bargaining (target) have different implications for the length of director 
retention.  Unaffiliated and target directors chosen to fulfill long-term specific firm needs 
are likely retained longer.  However, target directors primarily added to facilitate 
bargaining (i.e., complete the deal at a lower premia) fulfill their purpose at deal closing.  
Also, target directors may be retained for shorter-term needs, such as aiding the post-
merger integration process.  For both the bargaining and integration motives, we would 
expect target director tenure to be short-lived.  In contrast, target directors chosen on the 
basis of long-term firm need would be expected to have a longer tenure. 
 Table 10 summarizes the director tenure results and finds that 70% of all new 
directors remain longer than three years, suggesting that board changes around mergers are 
fairly permanent.53  Panel A segments new directors into unaffiliated and target. We find 
that 75% of unaffiliated directors remain for at least three years post-merger, which is 
significantly greater than the 70% retention of new directors for three plus years in the 
propensity score-matched non-merger sample.  This result provides additional evidence 
that these changes are relatively more permanent.  For target directors, however, only 63% 
remain on the post-merger board for more than three years.   
Panel B segments directors by whether they stay or go over this three-year horizon.  
In general, directors that stay long-term have more CEO-merger experience, financial 
expertise, and are on key committees (audit, compensation, and nominating).  This result 
                                                           
53 Results are qualitatively similar if examine alternate tenure horizons such as one-year or two-years. 
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is consistent with firm need; the more permanent shifts in acquiring firm boards reflect 
directors with outside executive and deal experience and utilization of these talents in more 
prominent board roles.   In addition, directors with longer tenure are not more connected 
to the acquirer CEO than those with shorter tenure; which is also consistent with upgrading 
a board’s skill set and inconsistent with agency motives.  These results hold whether we 
examine unaffiliated or target directors (untabulated). 
While target directors added also represent an upgrade in board skill, it is not clear 
why fewer stay long-term.  We explore two explanations: bargaining and integration.  If 
the observed shorter tenure is a function of bargaining, we would expect this to be more 
prevalent in deals where targets receive a relatively lower premium.  However, in Panel C 
of Table 10 comparing deals with high and low premia, we find that target directors in low 
premia mergers have a longer tenure.  This result is inconsistent with bargaining driving 
shorter tenure for retained target directors.   
If integration is a reason for this shorter tenure, we would expect that the subset of 
target directors with shorter tenure to be concentrated in cases where target integration is 
more of a concern: large, diversifying, and complex deals.  Retained target directors have 
significantly shorter tenure in more complex deals (Panel C).  Furthermore, Panel D 
examines characteristics of target directors that are retained for less than three years.  
Results show that retained target directors in more complex deals have significantly more 
financial, industry, CEO, and CEO-merger experience.  All results in Table 10 hold if the 
sample is limited to directors less than the age of 72, 69, or 65.  These findings are 
consistent with the notion that target directors with skills related to merger integration are 
retained in deals that likely require more such support.   
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In unreported tests, we repeat these analyses in a multivariate framework 
controlling for director characteristics (age, experience, committee membership, etc.) and 
board classification.  Consistent with Table 10, unaffiliated directors are significantly more 
likely to remain on the combined board for more than three years as compared to retained 
target directors.54  In addition, the shorter tenure of target directors continues to manifest 
in more complex deals, consistent with integration as the motive for shorter target director 
retention.  Overall, our results suggest that the substantial changes to acquirer boards are 
relatively permanent and directors added in mergers reflect a demand for skills related to 
the monitoring and advising needs of the post-merger firm. 
5.  Robustness 
We conduct robustness on subsamples based on time and regulation. SOX impacted 
board structures and makeup (Linck et al., 2009).  In addition, regulated firms may demand 
different expertise or regulators may limit board composition (Houston and James, 1995; 
Kole and Lehn, 1999).  In unreported results, we analyze sub-samples of pre- and post-
SOX as well as excluding financials and utilities and find the significant board changes 
around mergers are consistent across time periods and industries.  We conduct all analyses 
in Tables 2 - 9 on these sub-samples and while there are idiosyncratic differences, our 
general results remain. Boards change substantially around mergers and directors are added 
to the post-merger board in an attempt to improve the executive and deal experience of the 
board or due to bargaining between the merger participants. 
                                                           
54 Unaffiliated directors are 15% more likely to remain for more than three years than retained target 
directors.   
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In sensitivity tests examining the determinants of target director retention, the 
addition of unaffiliated directors and the departure of acquirer directors (Tables 7-9), we 
control for additional factors that may impact the degree of change around mergers: serial 
acquirer (whether the firm engages in other acquisitions in the prior two years), free cash 
flow, leverage, geographic segments, operational segments, acquirer announcement return, 
geographic distance between the acquirer and target, and target firm governance measures 
as well as target industry homogeneity, average analyst forecast error or analyst coverage.  
Inclusion of these variables does not further explain post-merger board composition or alter 
our other results.   
 
6.  Summary and Conclusions 
Prior literature has given little attention to changes in boards of acquiring firms.  
This is surprising given the importance of the board of directors and the potential for 
changes in the firm’s monitoring and advising needs around a merger.  It is possible that 
certain factors, like transaction costs, restrict adjustments to optimal board structure and 
composition, implying the relative stability of the post-merger board.  Alternatively, theory 
suggests adjustments to the post-merger board as the monitoring and advising needs of the 
firm change due to the merger.   
Our results indicate dynamic shifts in acquirer boards around mergers that are 
significantly different from both non-merging firm and non-merger years.  Directors are 
added to the post-merger board at a significantly higher rate than for non-acquiring firms.  
In over 40% of deals, board size increases even though an acquirer director frequently 
departs.  Board size also decreases in nearly 25% of deals although firm size and 
complexity increase.  Overall, acquirer board size and/or composition change 84% of the 
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time and these changes are driven primarily by firm need and bargaining.  The addition of 
unaffiliated and/or target directors reflects demand for monitoring and advising the post-
merger firm and improved director quality.  In addition, target firms negotiate 
representation on the post-merger board when they have relatively more bargaining power 
compared to the acquirer firm or in exchange for accepting lower merger premiums.    
Examining director level characteristics, unaffiliated and target directors added 
after mergers have significantly different attributes from directors added to boards of non-
merging firms.  Skills related to executive and deal experience are more valued around 
mergers, while general skills such as education and financial expertise are sought in non-
merger years.  Moreover, directors added to the post-merger board have more outside board 
and executive experience than both retained and not retained acquirer directors, suggesting 
boards upgrade overall talent around a merger.  Finally, significant adjustments to 
acquiring firm boards around mergers are relatively permanent as a vast majority of these 
new directors remain on the post-merger board long-term. 
Our results provide evidence on the dynamics of acquirer boards and, more 
generally, on director selection.  Mergers provide a unique setting to contrast the 
characteristics of candidates added, retained and not selected, offering insights into 
attributes valued in the director labor market.  Our evidence suggests that acquirers 
improve overall board quality and place an increased importance on executive and deal 
experience in director selection around mergers.  Overall, we complement prior studies on 
the determinants of board structure by providing insight into the dynamic nature and board 
structure and the characteristics valued in the director labor market.  
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Appendix A:  Variable Definitions  
 
 Variable Definition 
Panel A: Deal Characteristics  
Deal Value ($ mil) Transaction value ($ millions) 
Relative Deal Size Deal transaction value scaled by acquirer market value of equity 
Acquirer CAR Acquirer 3-day cumulative abnormal return (-1, +1) around the merger 
announcement date 
Target CAR Target 3-day cumulative abnormal return (-1, +1) around the merger 
announcement date 
Premium Final bid price scaled by target share price 42 days prior to merger 
announcement minus one 
Diversifying Deal Indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer and target are in different 
Fama-French 12 industries, zero otherwise 
All Equity  Indicator variable equal to one if merger is 100% financed with equity, 
zero otherwise 
All Cash Indicator variable equal to one if merger is 100% financed with cash, 
zero otherwise 
Tender Offer Indicator variable equal to one for those deals announced via a tender 
offer, zero otherwise 
Hostile Indicator variable equal to one for those deals where the acquiring firm 
makes a hostile takeover attempt, zero otherwise 
Multiple Bidders Indicator variable equal to one if a target firm receives more than one 
takeover offer, zero otherwise 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size ($ million) Total book value of assets 
Business Segments  Number of unique business segments 
ROA Net income scaled by total book value of assets 
R&D Research and development expenditures scaled by total book value         
of assets 
Leverage Total book value of debt scaled by total book value of assets 
Top 5 Institutional Ownership 
(%) 
Percentage of total outstanding shares held by the largest five 
institutional owners 
Stock Performance One-year buy and hold abnormal returns 
Stock Volatility Standard deviation of annual monthly returns  
Board Size Total number of directors on the board 
Independence Percentage of independent directors on the board 
Captured Percentage of outside directors with tenure less than the current CEO 
CEO-Chair Indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is also chair of the board,     
zero otherwise 
CEO Age CEO age in years 
Directors >= Age 72 Percentage of the board that is 72 years or older 
 
  
139 
 
 
 
Appendix A (continued):  Variable Definitions  
 
 
 Variable Definition  
Panel C: Director 
Characteristics 
 
Outsider Indicator variable equal to one if director is an outsider, zero otherwise 
Director Tenure  Director tenure in years 
Director Age Director age in years 
Female Indicator variable equal to one if director is female, zero otherwise 
Outside Directorships Total number of additional public board seats held 
Hold Outside Directorships Indicator variable equal to one if director holds additional public board 
seats, zero otherwise 
Higher Education  Indicator variable equal to one if director holds post-secondary degree, 
zero otherwise 
Financial Expert  Indicator variable equal to one if director holds CFA or CPA or has 
prior/current CFO experience, zero otherwise  
Outside CEO Experience Indicator variable equal to one if director is currently or previously CEO 
of an outside public firm, zero otherwise 
Merger Experience Indicator variable equal to one if director has previously served on a 
board that engaged in an acquisition, zero otherwise 
CEO-Merger Experience Indicator variable equal to one if director has previously served as CEO 
of a firm that engaged in an acquisition, zero otherwise 
Target Industry Experience  Indicator variable equal to one if director has additional employment or 
director experience in target Fama-French 12 industry, zero otherwise 
Connected to CEO Indicator variable equal to one if director currently/previously served on 
the same board or worked at the same firm as the acquirer CEO, zero 
otherwise 
Audit Committee Member Indicator variable equal to one if director sits on the audit committee, 
zero otherwise 
Compensation Committee 
Member 
Indicator variable equal to one if director sits on the compensation 
committee, zero otherwise 
Nominating Committee 
Member 
Indicator variable equal to one if director sits on the nominating 
committee, zero otherwise 
Highest Ranked Seat Indicator variable equal to one if acquirer (target) firm seat is director’s 
largest directorship in terms of market capitalization, zero otherwise 
Lowest Ranked Seat Indicator variable equal to one if acquirer (target) firm seat is director’s 
smallest directorship in terms of market capitalization, zero otherwise 
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Appendix B: Propensity Score-Matching Model Results 
 
The table reports the results of the propensity score-matching model estimating the likelihood of engaging in a merger.  
All independent variables are calculated as of the prior fiscal year end.  Year and industry fixed effects are also included.  
All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.  p-values based on standard errors clustered by firm are in 
parentheses and a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 
 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Merger (0/1) 
Constant -3.481a 
 (0.000) 
Firm Size 0.238a 
 (0.000) 
Leverage -0.162c 
 (0.074) 
Stock Performance 0.039c 
 (0.090) 
Tobin’s Q 0.012 
 (0.150) 
Independence 0.102 
 (0.392) 
CEO-Chair Duality 0.041 
 (0.235) 
CEO Age -0.004c 
 (0.081) 
Board Size 0.012c 
 (0.071) 
Unaffiliated Added -0.065c 
 (0.059) 
Incumbent Departs 0.011 
 (0.757) 
  
Observations 28,861 
Pseudo r2 0.168 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
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Figure 1: Changes to Acquirer Board Surrounding Mergers 
 
The figure reports changes to the board of directors for firms that engage in an at least one acquisition during the sample 
period 1996-2012.  Changes to the board in year t-1 and year t+1 are compared to board changes in the year surrounding 
the merger, year t.  Changes include the percentage of the board that is new, percentage of the board that is retained, 
percentage of the board that is not retained, the likelihood of adding a new director, and the likelihood of not retaining 
an incumbent director.  The unshaded bar represents year t-1, the black bar represents the merger year, and the shaded 
bar represents year t+1.   
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Table 1:  Deal and Firm Characteristics 
 
The table reports summary statistics for 1,153 deals from 1996-2012.  Panel A contains deal characteristics.  Panel B 
includes differences in means of firm characteristics for acquirer pre-deal, target pre-deal and post-merger firms.  Panel 
C reports summary statistics on board characteristics.  All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.  All variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  a, b, and c denote statistically significant differences in means at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
Panel A:  Deal Characteristics    
 Mean Median Std Dev  Q1 Q3 
Deal Value ($ mil)  $3,725  $990  $9,616    $323   $3,071  
Relative Deal Size 0.461 0.219 0.820  0.060 0.610 
Acquirer CAR -1.5% -1.0% 6.5%  -4.3% 1.4% 
Target CAR 25.1% 20.1% 24.9%  8.8% 34.6% 
Premium  40.5% 34.3% 36.7%  18.7% 54.4% 
Diversifying Deal  33.2%      
All Equity  24.9%      
All Cash  35.6%      
Tender Offer 16.9%      
Hostile 1.0%      
Multiple Bidders 4.9%      
Panel B:  Firm Characteristics    
 
Acquirer   
(1) 
Target  
(2) 
Post-Merger  
(3) 
 (1) – (2) (3) – (1) 
Firm Size ($ mil)  $59,142   $7,407   $76,049    $51,734a  $16,907 a  
Business Segments 2.971 1.732 3.087  1.239 a 0.116 b 
R&D 0.031 0.058 0.031  -0.026 a 0.000 
ROA 0.117 0.066 0.096  0.051 a -0.021 a 
Stock Performance 16.8% 9.5%         –   7.3% b      – 
Top 5 Institutional 
Ownership 
24.2% 26.5% 24.5%  -2.3% a 0.3% b 
CEO Ownership 2.39% 1.89% 1.95%  0.50% -0.44% b 
Poison Pill – 37.9%         –       –      – 
Classified Board 51.1% 59.8% 49.4%  -8.5% a -1.7% a 
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Table 1:  Deal and Firm Characteristics (Continued) 
 
Panel C:  Board Characteristics    
 
Acquirer   
(1) 
Target  
(2) 
Post-Merger  
(3) 
 (1) – (2) (3) – (1) 
Board Size 10.87 8.90 11.48  1.96 a 0.61 a 
Independence 73.7% 70.3% 74.7%  3.4% a 1.0% 
Directors >= Age 72 6.3% 6.6% 6.4%  -0.3% 0.1% 
Female 11.3% 7.7% 11.7%  3.6% a 0.4% 
Director Tenure 7.73 7.39 7.46  0.34 b -0.28 c 
Outside Directorships 1.12 0.76 1.08  0.35 a -0.04 
Hold Additional Seats 54.3% 40.2% 54.0%  14.1% a -0.3% 
Higher Education 57.6% 49.7% 58.5%  7.9% a 0.8% 
Financial Expert 12.5 % 12.6% 13.1%  -0.1%  0.6% 
Outside CEO Experience 22.3% 25.2% 22.9%  -2.9% a 0.5% 
Merger Experience 80.4% 52.1% 73.9%  28.3% a -6.5% a 
CEO-Merger Experience 9.9% 7.2% 16.4%  2.7% a 6.5% a 
Target Industry Experience 24.6% 34.8% 25.9%  -10.2% a 1.3% 
Connected to CEO 10.0% 0.8% 7.3%  9.2% a -2.7% a 
Captured 54.9% 51.1% 55.9%  3.7% a 1.1% a 
CEO-Chair  66.0% 59% 62%  7.0% a -3.0% c 
CEO Age 55.50 54.59 55.87  0.91 a 0.37  
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Table 2: Board Structure – Acquiring Firms versus Non-Acquiring Firms 
 
The table compares board dynamics of firm-years involving a merger with a public target to a propensity score-matched sample of firm-years with no merger activity.  Results of 
the propensity score model are reported in Appendix B.  There are 1,008 merger firm-years in each of the pre- and post-merger periods and 6,346 non-merger firm-years in each of 
the pre- and post-merger periods.  Panel A considers all merger and non-merger firm-years.  Panel B splits firm-year matches into relative deal size terciles and reports the difference-
in-difference effect only.  a, b, and c denote statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel A 
Pre-  Post-   
Merger Non-Merger Diff.  Merger Non-Merger Diff.  Diff-in-diff 
% of Board – Unaffiliated Director 9.61% 9.27% 0.34%  9.90% 7.92% 1.98%a  1.65%a 
≥ 1 Unaffiliated director added 54.66% 51.95% 2.71%  58.33% 50.79% 7.55%a  4.84%a 
% of Board – Not Retained 9.25% 9.18% 0.07%  12.80% 7.88% 4.92%a  4.84%a 
≥ 1 Director departs 55.46% 52.99% 2.46%  65.48% 50.61% 14.86%a  12.40%a 
∆ Board size 0.04 0.00 0.04  0.60 -0.02 0.62a  0.58a 
Board size increases 27.28% 24.93% 2.35%  41.96% 24.98% 16.99%a  14.64%a 
     & director departs 12.10% 10.05% 2.05%c  23.91% 8.29% 15.62%a  13.57%a 
Board size does not change 45.73% 49.80% -4.06%  35.71% 49.51% -13.80%a  -9.74%a 
     & director departs 16.96% 18.01% -1.05%b  19.25% 17.11% 2.13%c  3.18% 
Board size decreases 26.98% 25.28% 1.71%  22.32% 25.51% -3.19%b  -4.90%a 
     & director added 10.71% 9.23% 1.48%  10.71% 8.95% 1.76%c  0.28% 
1
4
4
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Table 2: Board Structure – Acquiring Firms versus Non-Acquiring Firms (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel B 
Merger-  
Low Size     
(1) 
Merger-  
Medium Size  
(2) 
Merger-   
High Size      
(3) 
% of Board – Unaffiliated Director 1.59%
c 3.13%a 0.30% 
≥ 1 Unaffiliated director added 3.32% 6.43%c 5.31%c 
% of Board – Not Retained 2.85%a 4.15%a 6.56%a 
≥ 1 Director departs 11.16%a 9.27%a 14.81%a 
∆ Board size -0.10 0.44a 1.58a 
Board size increases -5.12% 15.55%a 37.25%a 
     & director departs -0.24% 10.91%a 32.09%a 
Board size does not change 2.56% -12.35%a -21.10%a 
     & director departs 8.06%a 1.09% -1.49% 
Board size decreases 2.56% -3.20% -16.15%a 
     & director added 1.42% 1.42% -3.73%c 
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Table 3: Board Dynamics around Mergers – Difference-in-difference  
 
The table presents OLS regressions where the dependent variables are the change in board size (Models 1 and 4), an 
indicator equal to one if an unaffiliated director is added to the board (Models 2 and 5), and an indicator variable equal 
to one if a director departs the board (Models 3 and 6).   Merger is an indicator equal to one for 2,016 firm-years in the 
year prior to and following a firm engaging in a merger and equal to zero for 12,692 non-merger propensity score-
matched firm-years.  Post is an indicator equal to one for merging firms and non-merger matched firms in the year 
following the merger and zero otherwise.  All other independent variables are calculated as of the prior fiscal year end.  
Year and industry fixed effects are also included.  All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.  p-values based 
on standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses and a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels respectively.  
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Table 3: Board Dynamics around Mergers – Difference-in-difference (Continued)  
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 
∆ 
Board 
size 
≥ 1 
Unaffiliated 
director 
added 
≥ 1 
Director 
departs 
 
∆ 
Board 
size 
≥ 1 
Unaffiliated 
director 
added 
≥ 1 
Director 
departs 
 
Model 
1 Model 2 
Model 3  Model 
4 Model 5 
Model 6 
Constant -0.023 0.039 0.067b  1.678a -0.358a -0.748a 
 (0.693) (0.195) (0.036)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Merger 0.052 0.030c 0.022  0.089c 0.011 0.001 
 (0.263) (0.073) (0.193)  (0.052) (0.481) (0.967) 
Post -0.005 0.012c -0.013c  -0.005 0.009 -0.015b 
 (0.789) (0.091) (0.066)  (0.787) (0.205) (0.029) 
Merger x Post 0.562a 0.043b 0.122a  0.560a 0.040c 0.120a 
 (0.000) (0.038) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) 
Board Size     -0.177a -0.004c 0.045a 
     (0.000) (0.090) (0.000) 
Firm Size     0.098a 0.047a 0.008b 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.048) 
Leverage     -0.126 -0.024 0.013 
     (0.128) (0.436) (0.685) 
R&D     0.037 0.046 -0.090 
     (0.825) (0.575) (0.287) 
ROA     -0.026 -0.053 -0.146a 
     (0.820) (0.280) (0.002) 
Stock Performance     0.064a 0.005 -0.026a 
     (0.003) (0.535) (0.003) 
Stock Volatility     -0.387 0.265a 0.480a 
     (0.143) (0.002) (0.000) 
Average Director 
Age 
    0.009b 0.002 -0.002 
    (0.016) (0.285) (0.219) 
Top 5 Institutional 
Ownership 
    -0.258b -0.023 0.014 
    (0.039) (0.635) (0.764) 
Independence     0.225c 0.056 0.080b 
     (0.066) (0.164) (0.044) 
CEO-Chair Duality     0.037 -0.014 -0.019c 
     (0.185) (0.207) (0.090) 
        
Observations 14,708 14,708 14,708  14,708 14,708 14,708 
r2 0.02 0.02 0.03  0.12 0.05 0.10 
Year & Industry    
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4:  Director Characteristics – Merger Years versus Non-Merger Years  
 
The table compares director characteristics of firm-years involving a merger with a public target to firm-years with no 
merger activity.  Panel A compares years in which a firm engages in a merger to a propensity score-matched sample of 
firms based on pre-merger firm characteristics that do not engage in a merger.  This sample includes 1,189 (933) 
unaffiliated (retained target) director-firm-years in merger years and 6,051 new director-firm-years in non-merger years.  
Panel B compares years in which a firm engages in a merger to a matched sample of firms in the same year, Fama-French 
12 industry and firm size decile based on post-merger size that do not engage in a merger.  This sample includes 1,459 
(1,089) unaffiliated (retained target) director-firm-years in merger years and 12,872 new director-firm-years in non-
merger years.  Column (1) compares the mean characteristics of all new directors in merger years (unaffiliated and 
retained target) to new directors in non-merger years. Column (2) compares mean characteristics of unaffiliated directors 
in merger years to new directors in non-merger years. Column (3) compares mean characteristics of retained target 
directors in merger years to new directors in non-merger years.  a, b, and c denote statistically significant differences in 
means between merger and non-merger years at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
      
Panel A:  Propensity 
Score-Matched Firm 
Comparison 
{Unaffiliated & 
Retained Target} 
vs. Non-Merger          
(1)  
Unaffiliated     
vs. Non-Merger 
(2)  
 
Retained Target 
vs. Non-Merger 
(3) 
 Merger 
Non-
Merger  Merger 
Non-
Merger  Merger 
Non-
Merger 
Outsider 87% 85%a  86% 84%  89% 85%a 
Age 58.0 56.1a  56.5 56.2  60.0 56.1a 
Female 12% 14%c  15% 14%  9% 14%a 
Higher Education 56% 65%a  58% 66%a  53% 66%a 
Financial Expert 7% 10%a  8% 10%c  6% 10%a 
Hold Outside 
Directorships 
54% 50%a  53% 51%  55% 50%b 
Outside CEO 
Experience 
25% 18%a  25% 20%a  26% 18%a 
Merger Experience 44% 28%a  30% 29%  61% 29%a 
CEO-Merger Experience 19% 8%a  18% 10%a  19% 9%a 
Panel B: Post-merger 
Size Matched Firm 
Comparison 
{Unaffiliated & 
Retained Target} 
vs. Non-Merger          
(1)  
Unaffiliated     
vs. Non-Merger 
(2)  
 
Retained Target 
vs. Non-Merger 
(3) 
 Merger 
Non-
Merger  Merger 
Non-
Merger  Merger 
Non-
Merger 
Outsider 87% 85%  85% 85%  88% 85%c 
Age 58.0 55.4a  56.6 55.4a  59.8 55.2a 
Female 12% 16%a  14% 16%  9% 16%a 
Higher Education 55% 66%a  56% 66%a  52% 66%a 
Financial Expert 7% 9%a  7% 9%a  6% 10%a 
Hold Outside 
Directorships 
53% 51%  51% 52%  56% 48%b 
Outside CEO 
Experience 
25% 19%a  25% 20%a  26% 17%a 
Merger Experience 41% 29%a  28% 30%  59% 27%a 
CEO-Merger Experience 18% 7%a  17% 8%a  19% 6%a 
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Table 5:  Determinants of Aggregate Director Selection – Acquirer and Target Pools 
 
The table details logistic models estimating director selection onto the post-merger board from pools of potential 
candidates.  All regressions contain deal fixed-effects.  Column (1) analyzes director selection from the candidate pool 
containing acquirer and target directors, the pool in column (2) contains only target directors, and column (3) contains 
only acquirer directors.  Column (1) includes all mergers, column (2) includes only mergers in which at least one target 
director was retained, and column (3) includes only mergers in which at least one acquirer director was not retained.  The 
dependent variable for all logit models is an indicator variable equal to one if the director is selected for the post-merger 
board and zero if not selected.  All other variable definitions are included in Appendix A.  p-values are included in 
parentheses.  a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Acquirer & 
Target  
Selection 
(1) 
Target Selection 
≥ 1 Target 
Retained 
(2) 
Acquirer Selection   
≥ 1 Acquirer         
Not Retained  
(3) 
Outsider 0.545a 0.659b 0.795a 
 (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 
Age -0.033a -0.022a -0.057a 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
Female 0.234a -0.324c 0.265b 
 (0.006) (0.069) (0.024) 
Higher Education  0.074 0.004 0.062 
 (0.165) (0.968) (0.384) 
Financial Expert  -0.002 -0.181 0.150 
 (0.979) (0.251) (0.176) 
Hold Outside Directorships  0.513a 0.861a 0.292a 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Outside CEO Experience -0.060 0.259c -0.214b 
 (0.357) (0.058) (0.011) 
Target Industry Experience -0.187a -0.183 -0.207b 
 (0.009) (0.168) (0.035) 
Merger Experience 0.567a -0.169 0.778a 
 (0.000) (0.275) (0.000) 
Connected to CEO -0.052 0.703 0.122 
 (0.660) (0.190) (0.379) 
Highest Ranked Seat 0.298a 0.054 0.165 
 (0.001) (0.776) (0.142) 
Lowest Ranked Seat -0.052 -0.383b 0.124 
 (0.579) (0.048) (0.329) 
Acquirer Director 4.284a   
 (0.000)   
Target CEO 1.214a 1.456a  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Acquirer CEO  1.234a  1.404a 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Tenure -0.018a 0.014 -0.031a 
 (0.000) (0.182) (0.000) 
    Observations 17,849 2,427 7,108 
Pseudo r2 0.570 0.056 0.073 
Deal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6:  Determinants of Specific Director Selection – Unaffiliated, Retained and Not 
Retained 
 
The table details logistic models comparing unaffiliated and target directors to selected and not selected acquirer and 
target directors.  All regressions contain deal fixed-effects.  Columns 1-4 examines unaffiliated directors, while Columns 
5 - 6 examine retained target directors.  In particular, Column (1) compares unaffiliated directors to not retained acquirer 
directors, column (2) compares unaffiliated directors to not retained target directors, column (3) compares unaffiliated 
directors to retained acquirer directors and column (4) compares unaffiliated directors to retained target directors, Column 
(5) compares retained target directors to not retained acquirer directors, and column (6) compares retained target directors 
to retained acquirer directors.  The dependent variable for all logit models is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
director is an unaffiliated or retained target director and zero for the comparison director.  Each regression in the table 
only includes deals with both types of directors involved in the comparison.  All other variable definitions are included 
in Appendix A.  p-values are included in parentheses.  a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 Unaffiliated vs.  Target Retained vs. 
 Not Retained  Retained 
 Not 
Retained 
 
Retained 
 
Acquirer 
(1) 
Target 
(2) 
 
Acquirer 
(3) 
Target 
(4) 
 Acquirer 
(5) 
 
Acquirer 
(6) 
Outsider 0.558a 0.182  0.666a 0.809a  -0.404b 
 
0.138 
 (0.007) (0.105)  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.035) 
 
(0.210) 
Age -0.049a -0.024a  -0.024a -0.005  -0.063a 
 
-0.006 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.672)  (0.000) 
 
(0.303) 
Female 0.505b 0.645a  0.188 0.260  0.027 
 
-0.231 
 (0.015) (0.000)  (0.127) (0.355)  (0.907) 
 
(0.101) 
Higher 
Education 
-0.135 0.109  0.046 0.152  -0.129 
 
-0.099 
(0.313) (0.174)  (0.606) (0.374)  (0.322) 
 
(0.239) 
Financial Expert 0.347c -0.040  0.182 0.750a  -0.338 
 
-0.369a 
 (0.073) (0.712)  (0.137) (0.004)  (0.109) 
 
(0.006) 
Hold Outside  0.578a 0.891a  0.399a -0.020  0.626a 
 
0.288a 
   Directorships (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.920)  (0.000) 
 
(0.003) 
Outside CEO  0.539a 0.488a  0.689a 0.498b  0.348b 
 
0.432a 
   Experience (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.022)  (0.030) 
 
(0.000) 
Target Industry  0.719a -0.411a  0.406a 0.174  0.360b 
 
0.536a 
   Experience (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.462)  (0.029) 
 
(0.000) 
Merger 
Experience 
-3.230a -1.677a  -3.766a -2.802a  -0.821a 
 
-1.438a 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Connected to 
CEO 
-0.088 2.474a  -0.469a 1.333a  -2.319a 
 
-2.745a 
(0.694) (0.000)  (0.009) (0.003)  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
          
Observations 2,091 5,387  6,922 1,116  1,472 
 
4,343 
Pseudo r2 0.428 0.174  0.399 0.299  0.157 
 
0.126 
Deal Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Table 7:  Determinants of Board Dynamics – Firm Need 
 
The table presents Tobit regressions where the dependent variables are the percentage of the post-merger board that is 
retained target directors (Model 1), the percentage of the post-merger board that is unaffiliated directors (Model 2), and 
the percentage of the pre-merger acquirer board that is not retained (Model 3).  Year and Fama-French 12 industry fixed 
effects are also included.  All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.  p-values based on standard errors clustered 
by Fama-French 12 industry are in parentheses and a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 
% Combined Board: 
Retained Target 
% Combined Board: 
Unaffiliated 
% Acquirer Board: 
Not Retained 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.249a 0.039 -0.047 
 (0.004) (0.608) (0.638) 
Relative Deal Size 0.160a 0.015 0.058b 
 (0.000) (0.420) (0.028) 
Diversifying Deal -0.085a 0.010 -0.026 
 (0.000) (0.583) (0.166) 
Target R&D 0.069a -0.017 0.032a 
 (0.000) (0.111) (0.000) 
Target Business 
Segments 
0.012 -0.001 0.007 
(0.110) (0.888) (0.361) 
All Equity 0.123a -0.007 0.067a 
 (0.000) (0.585) (0.000) 
All Cash -0.183a 0.013 0.006 
 (0.000) (0.446) (0.780) 
Tender Offer -0.104b -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.011) (0.771) (0.597) 
Hostile -0.139b -0.024 -0.142b 
 (0.047) (0.753) (0.042) 
Multiple Bidders -0.113b 0.030 0.003 
 (0.031) (0.335) (0.895) 
Acquirer Board 
Independence 
0.003 -0.041 0.029 
(0.943) (0.316) (0.506) 
Acquirer CEO Age -0.001 0.002a 0.003a 
 (0.585) (0.007) (0.007) 
Acquirer Directors Age 
>= 72 
-0.023 -0.056 -0.178c 
(0.743) (0.277) (0.072) 
Acquirer Stock 
Performance 
-0.070a 0.010 -0.025a 
(0.006) (0.426) (0.001) 
    
Observations 1,125 1,125 1,125 
Pseudo r2 0.65 0.15 0.34 
Year & Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8:  Determinants of Board Dynamics: Bargaining 
 
The table presents regressions modeling the power for premium tradeoff.  Models 1-3 are Tobit regressions and Model 4 
is a linear probability model.  The dependent variables are the percentage of the post-merger board that is retained target 
directors (Model 1), the percentage of the post-merger board that is retained target outside directors (Model 2), the 
percentage of the post-merger board that is retained target inside directors (Model 3), and an indicator equal to one if the 
target CEO is retained on the post-merger board (Model 4).  Year and Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects are also 
included.  All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.  p-values based on standard errors clustered by Fama-
French 12 industry are in parentheses and a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively.  
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Table 8:  Determinants of Board Dynamics: Bargaining (Continued) 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 
% Combined 
Board: Retained 
Target 
% Combined 
Board: Retained 
Target Outsider 
% Combined 
Board: Retained 
Target Insider 
Target CEO 
Retained 
(0/1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant -0.172c -0.194c -0.125b 0.220c 
 (0.082) (0.052) (0.017) (0.080) 
Target CAR -0.175a -0.170a -0.069 -0.083 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.245) (0.234) 
Target Stock 
Performance 
-0.037 -0.032 -0.024c -0.017 
(0.223) (0.274) (0.076) (0.488) 
Target Poison Pill 0.024 0.018 0.031a 0.037c 
 (0.110) (0.250) (0.001) (0.050) 
Target Classified 
Board 
0.029c 0.034b -0.009 0.025 
(0.067) (0.020) (0.383) (0.383) 
Relative Deal Size 0.148a 0.150a 0.028c 0.086c 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.057) 
Diversifying Deal -0.062a -0.074a 0.008 -0.007 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.554) (0.737) 
All Equity 0.117a 0.108a 0.057a 0.120a 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
All Cash -0.171a -0.167a -0.077b -0.089a 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.007) 
Tender Offer -0.086a -0.071c -0.056c -0.031 
 (0.004) (0.060) (0.079) (0.165) 
Hostile -0.148b -0.117b -0.696a -0.176a 
 (0.012) (0.039) (0.000) (0.003) 
Multiple Bidders -0.112b -0.094c -0.094b -0.144b 
 (0.021) (0.052) (0.027) (0.015) 
Acquirer Board 
Independence 
0.001 0.028 -0.061c -0.058 
(0.987) (0.592) (0.083) (0.413) 
Acquirer CEO Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.474) (0.366) (0.990) (0.565) 
Acquirer Directors 
Age >= 72 
-0.009 -0.034 0.019 0.092 
(0.910) (0.745) (0.820) (0.328) 
Acquirer Stock 
Performance 
-0.051 -0.055c 0.001 -0.019 
(0.105) (0.065) (0.937) (0.532) 
Observations 1,125 1,125 1,125 1,125 
r2 0.66 0.69 0.50 0.18 
Year & Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 9:  Determinants of Board Dynamics – Agency 
 
The table presents Tobit regressions where the dependent variables are the percentage of the post-merger board that is 
retained target directors (Model 1), the percentage of the post-merger board that is unaffiliated directors (Model 2), and 
the percentage of the pre-merger acquirer board that is not retained (Model 3).  Year and Fama-French 12 industry fixed 
effects are also included.  All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.  p-values based on standard errors clustered 
by Fama-French 12 industry are in parentheses and a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 9:  Determinants of Board Dynamics – Agency (Continued) 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 
% Combined Board: 
Retained Target 
% Combined Board: 
Unaffiliated 
% Acquirer Board: 
Not Retained 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.022 0.073 0.076 
 (0.867) (0.360) (0.395) 
Acquirer Board Captured -0.052b -0.030 -0.048 
 (0.035) (0.143) (0.104) 
Acquirer CEO-Chair  -0.035b 0.018 -0.001 
 (0.022) (0.444) (0.977) 
Acquirer % Connected to 
Acquirer CEO  
0.136a -0.056 0.047 
(0.005) (0.134) (0.344) 
Acquirer CEO Ownership -0.074 -0.068 -0.225a 
 (0.214) (0.307) (0.001) 
Acquirer Top 5 Instit. 
Ownership 
0.108 -0.078 -0.120 
(0.252) (0.258) (0.135) 
Diversifying Deal -0.075a 0.009 -0.024 
 (0.000) (0.651) (0.203) 
All Equity 0.109a -0.005 0.064a 
 (0.000) (0.700) (0.000) 
All Cash -0.272a 0.004 -0.017 
 (0.000) (0.795) (0.380) 
Tender Offer -0.154a -0.008 -0.019 
 (0.003) (0.660) (0.316) 
Hostile -0.137b -0.022 -0.128 
 (0.029) (0.787) (0.125) 
Multiple Bidders -0.031 0.038 0.030 
 (0.522) (0.274) (0.294) 
Acquirer Board 
Independence 
-0.047 -0.059 -0.008 
(0.433) (0.108) (0.870) 
Acquirer CEO Age -0.001 0.002a 0.003b 
 (0.766) (0.003) (0.028) 
Acquirer Directors Age 
>= 72 
0.023 -0.032 -0.137 
(0.604) (0.583) (0.202) 
Acquirer Stock 
Performance 
-0.067b 0.011 -0.024a 
(0.017) (0.373) (0.003) 
Observations 1,125 1,125 1,125 
r2 0.51 0.17 0.32 
Year & Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10:  Unaffiliated/Target Director Tenure 
 
The table presents analysis of director tenure for retained target directors and unaffiliated directors on the post-merger 
board.  There are a total of 841 deals with at least one retained target or unaffiliated director (2,548 retained target and 
unaffiliated directors) on the post-merger board.  Panel A reports the percentage of directors that remain 3 years following 
the merger.  Panel B compares characteristics of those directors that remain for at least 3 years to those directors that 
leave within 3 years following the merger.  1,344 (588) retained target or unaffiliated directors stay (leave) for (in) more 
(less) than 3 years, 804 (264) unaffiliated directors stay (leave) for (in) more (less) than 3 years, and 540 (324) retained 
target directors stay (leave) for (in) more (less) than 3 years.  Panel C reports the percentage of retained target directors 
that remain 3 years following the merger for the subsamples of deals based on above and below median premium and 
deal complexity (target R&D expenditures) mergers.  Panel D compares characteristics of retained target directors that 
leave within 3 years following the deal in above and below median deal complexity (target R&D expenditures) mergers.  
All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.  a, b, and c denote statistically significant difference in means at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10:  Unaffiliated/Target Director Tenure (Continued) 
 
 
Panel A:  Tenure     
 All Unaffiliated Target Difference 
Tenure >= 3 years 69.6% 75.3% 62.5% 12.8%a 
 
Panel B:  Stay vs. Leave 
 Stay >= 3 years Leave < 3 years  
Outsider 90% 80%a  
Age 57.24 58.30a  
Female 14% 7%a  
Higher Education 59% 46%a  
Financial Expert 7% 5%c  
Hold Outside Directorships 56% 52%  
Outside CEO Experience 24% 26%  
Target Industry Experience 28% 29%  
Merger Experience 42% 43%  
CEO-Merger Experience 18% 15%c  
Connected to CEO 6% 4%  
Audit Committee 31% 25%a  
Compensation Committee 26% 19%a  
Nominating Committee 21% 18%c  
Panel C:  Target Director Tenure 
 High Premium Low Premium Difference
 
Tenure >= 3 years 52.0% 64.9% -12.9%b 
 Low Complexity High Complexity Difference 
Tenure > = 3 years 65.0% 55.2% 9.8%a 
Panel D:  Short Tenure Target Director Characteristics 
 Low Complexity High Complexity Difference 
Financial Expert 5% 14% 9%a 
Hold Outside Directorships 56% 64% 8% 
Outside CEO Experience 24% 33% 10%c 
Target Industry Experience 28% 37% 9%c 
Merger Experience 64% 65% 1% 
CEO-Merger Experience 15% 24% 10%b 
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